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ABSTRACT 
This thesis sought to explore two different methodological approaches to episodic 
memory, namely episodic memory as demonstrated in humans and episodic-like 
memory as demonstrated in animals.  
The results of Chapter 2 were successful in demonstrating episodic-like memory in 
the rat using recollection alone, despite the fact that performance in this study was 
significantly poorer compared to the original (Eacott, Easton, & Zinkivskay, 2005). 
Subsequent experiments within this chapter highlighted potential methodological 
issues (e.g. interference of odour cues, stability of performance over lengthy testing 
periods) that impact on such spontaneous tasks.  
Chapter 3 investigated the effect of bilateral lesions to the hippocampus on episodic-
like memory. The results of Chapter 3 were not in agreement with previous findings 
as none of the three groups (Sham Group/Partial Hippocampal Group/Hippocampal 
Group) showed evidence of episodic-like memory. In depth analyses of the three 
groups lead the author to the conclusion that this was not due to an ineffective task 
but due to extraneous factors impacting upon the performance of the animals. 
Analyses of D2 scores and raw exploration times in both phases of the experiment 
also highlighted the importance of D2 scores in determining object familiarity.  
Chapter 4 further investigated the effect of bilateral lesions to the hippocampus on 
episodic-like memory in animals using an Open Field arena. The addition of 
landmarks to the testing room resulted in the Sham group successfully 
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demonstrating episodic-like memory whilst the Hippocampal lesion group remained 
at chance levels. As there was no significant difference between the two groups it 
was not possible to conclude that this was as a result of the lesions to the 
hippocampus. The control task showed neither group demonstrating memory for the 
more simple „what-where‟ task, therefore it was concluded that a problem with the 
methodology still remained. Subsequent experiments within this chapter investigated 
cleaning methodology, the stability of performance over time, and the effect of task 
change on performance. The clear variability in the data over lengthy testing periods 
emphasised the sensitivity of such tasks. 
Chapter 5 aimed to investigate whether applying comparable „What-Where-When‟ 
and „What-Where-Which‟ tasks to human investigations of episodic memory would 
result in similar patterns of data with regard to recollection and familiarity. Analysis of 
the results revealed the use of other strategies to solve the episodic „What-Where-
When‟ questions. Subsequent experiments within this chapter aimed to confirm the 
use of strength of memory trace as a strategy for solving these episodic questions. 
Results from the final experiment suggested that other strategies were also being 
employed in addition to strength of memory trace. Conclusions were drawn 
regarding the individual components of episodic memory and their susceptibility to 
interference from other strategies.  
Overall conclusions focused on the definition of episodic memory and the potential 
implications of alternative strategies impacting on such tasks. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  General Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore two different methodological approaches to 
episodic memory, namely episodic memory as demonstrated in humans, and 
episodic-like memory as demonstrated in animals.  
In order to investigate both approaches it is necessary to understand firstly, what 
constitutes episodic memory in humans and secondly, to attend to the ongoing 
debate as to whether animals can show behavioural manifestations of the different 
features of episodic memory. Whilst doing so, what will become clear is what Squire 
(2004) touched upon, that it is not only the task to be learned that is important, but 
also the strategy that is implemented during that task. The path of most animal 
research is a logical one, with rationale taken from human studies and adapted for 
the purpose of further manipulations, to animal studies.  This path was no different 
regarding the study of episodic memory.  
What this thesis intends to do is bring this path full circle. As there is a question over 
whether or not episodic-like memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998) in animals is a true 
reflection of episodic memory in humans, this thesis will investigate episodic-like 
memory in animals and then develop a comparable task in humans to determine if 
this reflects episodic memory in humans.  
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1.2  The Concept of Human Episodic Memory 
The concept of episodic memory grew out of semantic memory with which it shares 
many features. However, episodic memory also possesses features that are unique 
and that go beyond the semantic system. Episodic memory was initially defined with 
regard to its distinction from semantic memory (Tulving, 1972) (i.e. remembering 
personally experienced events versus general facts). However, problems with this 
early definition of episodic memory stemmed from a lack of relevant evidence. In 
addition, Tulving (1983) admitted that the traditional, Ebbinghaus-inspired, study/test 
laboratory experiments of verbal learning and memory could not fully encompass 
episodic memory due to two important features of episodic memory being omitted. 
One such feature involved the content of what the participants in the experiments 
had to learn. The traditional experiments had concentrated on the simple question of 
„what‟. In other words, “what do you remember of...?” Yet episodic memory concerns 
more than just „what‟. It concerns the happenings at particular places at particular 
times, put more clearly, it is about the „what‟, the „where‟ and the „when‟ of an 
episode (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998). The importance of this will become apparent 
later on when discussing episodic-like memory in animals. 
The other missing feature was what Tulving (1983) originally referred to as 
„recollective experience‟, or a conscious awareness of something that has happened 
in the past. In traditional experiments (to be discussed in detail further on) the 
reasoning was that if a participant recognises an item in a recognition test they are 
therefore remembering it from that list i.e. they have a conscious recollection of the 
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item occurring in that list. However, subsequent research showed that this was not 
necessarily the case (Jacoby, 1991; Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Toth, 2000). 
Recognition of an item from a study list could occur both with and without 
awareness. Furthermore, when participants were aware of an item‟s previous 
occurrence in the experiments study list, the awareness could take two forms, either 
„autonoetic‟ or „noetic‟. Autonoetic consciousness has been defined by Wheeler, 
Stuss, and Tulving (1997, p. 335) as “the capacity that allows adult humans to 
mentally represent and to become aware of their protracted existence across time”. 
Such awareness involves a focus of attention on personal experiences. This type of 
awareness can be contrasted with a noetic form, involving awareness of something 
objectively known. Wheeler and colleagues emphasised that the distinction is one of 
experience because one may be noetically aware of one‟s body position, for 
example, or even personally experiences events if they are unaccompanied by an 
experience of re-experiencing or reliving the past. 
Thus, in the context of the traditional recognition experiments, a participant could 
either remember the episode of an item appearing on the study list (autonoetic), or 
know that it occurred without remembering (noetic). Tulving (1989) subsequently 
concluded that a correlation between behaviour and conscious experience need not 
necessarily exist, and so the traditional research was not focused purely on episodic 
memory (Tulving, 2002b). 
Therefore, by today‟s distinction (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998), “the essence of 
episodic memory lies in the conjunction of three concepts – self, autonoetic 
awareness, and subjectively sensed time” (Tulving, 2002b, p. 5). These three 
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concepts proposed as prerequisites for episodic memory are thought to be 
interrelated and indivisible from one another.  
1.3 “Why Do We Remember the Past and Not the Future?” 
As defined previously, autonoetic awareness refers to the awareness that humans 
have of remembering a personally experienced event. This phenomenological 
experience is different not only from the awareness of the immediate present, but 
also different from a feeling of mere familiarity. Consequently, a requirement of 
episodic memory is „conscious recollection‟, discriminating between past events that 
are not based on familiarity e.g. differences between strengths of memory traces.  
Tulving and Markowitsch (1998) also suggested that episodic memory requires the 
ability to subjectively sense time. This differs from semantic memory by being 
oriented to the past, but more specifically, the personal past. Semantic memory does 
not require mental time travel, for example, it is not necessary to relive one‟s actual 
birth to know when one‟s birthday is. Yet Crowder (1986) emphasised that the 
subjective experience of reliving a past episode should be considered the “controlling 
definition of episodic memory” (p. 566). In order to mentally travel back in one‟s own 
mind to relive a past event Tulving (2002) posits that this requires a certain form of 
self-consciousness known as chronosthesia. This enables individuals to think about 
the subjective time in which they live or have lived in the personal past. Although 
autonoesis and chronosthesia both imply an awareness of self in time, there exists 
different points of emphasis within the two concepts. In autonoesis emphasis is 
placed on the awareness of self existing in subjective time. However, chronosthesia 
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places emphasis on the awareness of subjective time in relation to the self. 
Therefore, chronosthesia could be considered the temporal aspect of autonoesis.  
It has been suggested that an evolutionary advantage of the episodic memory 
system may be that episodic recollections support the integrity of the self by allowing 
one to reflect on personal experiences (Wheeler, 2000) by utilising the subjective 
self-conscious experiences of autonoesis and chronosthesia mentioned previously. 
Alternatively however, the evolutionary advantage may lie not with necessarily 
remembering past events, but with supporting the planning of future ones (Dudai & 
Carruthers, 2005a; Schacter & Addis, 2007) and predicting future possibilities 
(Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). This explains why episodic memories are often 
more inaccurate than semantic counterparts (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008) and 
more susceptible to errors and biases (Schacter & Addis, 2007).  
It has also been argued that the ability to plan for the future based on past 
experience was the primary selection pressure for the evolution of the brain 
structures that are implicated in human mental time travel into both the past and the 
future. According to this theory animals do not possess episodic memory nor do they 
have the ability to plan for the future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007b). 
Developmental psychologists suggest that in an episodic context mental time travel 
does not develop in children until the age of four at which time such abilities come on 
stream (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999; Perner, 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 
2007b; Tulving, 2005; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). Despite the evidence 
suggesting that animals and children are capable of interval timing (lasting seconds 
or minutes) (Friedman, 1993; Gallistel, 1990), they are thought to be incapable of 
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„temporal perspective taking‟ (i.e. chronosthesia) which extends time both into the 
distant past and the far future. So although young children may be able to learn the 
sequence of ordered events, the lack of a unified temporal framework means they 
are unable to represent events that have occurred at unique temporal locations in 
their past (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999).  
There are also links between how young children acquire episodic memory and 
episodic future thinking (Atance & O‟Neill, 2005; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005) and a 
parallel decline in mental time travel detail for both the past and the future with 
advanced age (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008). Yet the existence of these links 
does not mean that there are no differences (for a review see Suddendorf, 2010). 
Such a topic has led to some interesting suggestions regarding how to examine 
episodic memory behaviourally in nonhuman animals, for example Suddendorf and 
Busby (2005) suggest applying a methodology that focuses on future-oriented 
actions. However, before examining the issue in nonhuman animals it is necessary 
first to briefly discuss the components of episodic memory and establish how 
episodic memory in humans can be demonstrated considering the definitions 
imposed upon it.  
1.4 Components of Episodic Memory: Distinguishing between recollection and 
familiarity 
Most people have come across a situation in which we have met someone and have 
the feeling that they are familiar but are unable to remember information such as 
their name or where we have seen them before. Experiences such as these suggest 
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that recognition memory can be either based on some sense of familiarity or on the 
recollection of detailed information about a past episode. In fact the notion that 
episodic recognition memory consists of distinct components is an ancient one. For 
example, Aristotle (trans.1931) distinguished between what he referred to as 
reminiscence, the ability to recall the temporal order of events in unique experiences 
from a more simple, matching of current sensations to impressions of previous 
experiences, akin to today‟s notion of familiarity.  
From the 1970s onwards cognitive psychologists formalised this view by developing 
dual-process models (e.g. Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Jacoby, 1983a, 1983b; Jacoby & 
Dallas 1981; Mandler, 1980; O'Reilly & Norman, 2002; Tulving, 1985). Such models 
of recognition memory suggest that recognition occurs through two separate memory 
processes which are clearly distinct: familiarity and recall (variously termed 
elaboration and integration (Mandler, 1980) or perceptual and conceptual (Jacoby, 
1983a)). Familiarity is considered relatively automatic and more quantitative, 
reflecting signal strength. Recollection however, is a slower process as it requires 
the recovery of memories that relate to the spatial, temporal and inter-item context of 
an episode and so is more qualitative in nature (Mandler, 1980). Furthermore, it has 
also been hypothesised that these two forms of retrieval are different with respect to 
their underlying retrieval dynamics and neural substrates (for reviews, see Aggleton 
& Brown, 2006; Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Yonelinas et al., 2002). The 
central aims of these models however, differ in important ways. Some models focus 
on the functional nature of recollection (e.g. Atkinson & Juola, 1974), some models 
make claims regarding the neural substrates and mechanisms of the two processes 
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(e.g. O'Reilly & Norman, 2002), while others take the view that familiarity and implicit 
forms of memory such as priming are two expressions of the same process (e.g. 
Mandler, 1980).  
Other early theorists argued that recognition memory reflected only a single 
familiarity process. The role of recollection in recognition memory, if indeed there 
was one, was not thought to be of significance. With regard to recognition it was 
thought that the signal-detection theory (Egan, 1958) suitably represented single 
process models. The theory holds that studied items are on average more familiar 
than new items, however, as the old and new item familiarity distributions overlap a 
response criterion is required in order to accept only the items above that level of 
familiarity as having been studied. One advantage of this is that there is only a single 
memory component to be considered therefore the accuracy of recognition memory 
can be represented via a single parameter (i.e. d‟ – the distance between the 
distribution of the old and new items/the ability of the participant to discriminate 
between old and new items). 
In recent times, advocates of the signal-detection theory have often argued against 
the dual-process model of recognition memory by proposing that recognition 
judgements are best construed as being based on a singular memory-strength or 
confidence variable rather than two separate qualitatively different memory 
processes (e.g. Donaldson, 1996; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Dunn, 2004, 2008; 
Hirshman & Henzler, 1998; Shimamura & Wickens, 2009; Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; 
Xu & Bellezza, 2001). Yet, even the interpretation of memory strength as a familiarity 
variable is now also being debated with some theorists preferring to characterise 
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memory strength as evidence of the amount of mnemonic information retrieved, in 
other words, strength of memory and content are essentially the same concept as 
strength is interpreted as the amount of content retrieved (e.g. Anderson & Bower, 
1972; Dunn, 2008).   
However the memory strength variable is characterised, signal-detection theorists 
maintain that recognition memory judgements are based on one process not two. 
Wixted (2007) suggested that this need not necessarily mean that the signal-
detection theory cannot be compatible with dual-process models as long as one 
considers recollection and familiarity as continuous processes that are then 
aggregated to determine the memory strength of a test item. A continuous process 
would have degrees of variance in response to a test item (i.e. yielding varying 
degrees of confidence and accuracy) whereas in contrast, a categorical process 
would either occur or not occur (i.e. yield high confidence and high accuracy when 
seen to occur). Although there is a general consensus that familiarity is a continuous 
process it is not agreed as to whether this is true for recollection. Some accounts 
purport recollection to be a categorical process with respect to confidence and 
accuracy. For example, according to the Dual Process Signal Detection Model 
(DPSD) (Yonelinas, 1994) recollection succeeds for some items (therefore the 
recognition judgement is based purely on recollection) and fails for some items 
(therefore the recognition decision is based purely on familiarity). A recognition 
judgement that leads to a successful recollection is characterised by high confidence 
and high accuracy, whereas when recollection fails, the confidence and accuracy of 
the recognition judgement is dependent on the strength of the familiarity signal (with 
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higher familiarity being associated with higher confidence and accuracy). Parks and 
Yonelinas (2007, 2009) however, put forward the suggestion that the DPSD model 
makes no assumptions as to whether recollection is indeed a categorical process, 
rather it allows for the possibility that recollection is a continuous process. According 
to the model, there exists a threshold level of memory strength below which 
recollection is unsuccessful. Above the threshold, recollection is thought to be 
continuous in nature i.e. recollection can be content rich or content poor.  
Such disagreements between the two theories continue to be debated, and, as 
touched upon above, are particularly apparent when attempting to measure 
recollection and familiarity. 
1.5 How to Measure Human Episodic Memory 
It has been established that there exists two different types of awareness, autonoetic 
and noetic awareness (for definition see section 1.2). According to Tulving‟s (1983) 
definition, autonoetic awareness is a reflection of episodic memory and noetic 
awareness is a reflection of semantic memory. In addition, both of these distinct but 
overlapping memory systems contribute to recognition memory (Tulving, 1983, 
1985).  
1.5.1 Traditional Recognition Tests and Episodic Memory 
In a traditional recognition test, participants study word or picture lists, and following 
a delay are presented with a list of studied items that are intermingled with novel 
items. The aim of such a test is for the participant to decide if a given item was part 
of the original study list. In early versions of such tests it was presumed that the 
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measured behaviour was true reflection of cognition. If a participant recognises an 
item in a recognition test, this therefore means that they remember the item from the 
list, thus they have a conscious recollection of the presence of the item in the study 
list. However, this is not necessarily the case. Research investigating implicit 
memory (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Schacter, 1987), or what is referred to as 
nonconscious memory (Jacoby, 1991; Toth, 2000), has shown that it could also 
reflect a lack of such awareness. If autonoetic awareness reflects a remembering or 
recollection of an item on a study list, then „noetic‟ awareness reflects the possibility 
that participants know that an item appeared on a study list without actually 
remembering that it did (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000; 
Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Rajaram, 1993; Tulving, 1985). Therefore, a behaviour 
could reflect two differing forms of awareness and as such, behaviour and conscious 
experience is not as clearly correlated as first thought and thus, the traditional 
research was not actually concerned with episodic memory (Tulving, 2002b). These 
studies also serve to highlight the point made by Squire (2004), that it is not only the 
task to be learnt that is important, but also the strategy used to solve the task. 
There have been various methods that have been developed to examine the relative 
contribution of recollection and familiarity to recognition memory, e.g. the 
„remember/know‟ procedure briefly introduced above (Tulving, 1985), the „process 
dissociation‟ procedure (Jacoby, 1991) and the „receiver operating characteristic‟ 
procedure (Yonelinas, 1994). Each procedure shall be discussed in turn, however 
particular concentration will be placed upon the remember/know procedure due to 
the fact that a substantial amount of research has adopted this procedure particularly 
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when attempting to determine the functional differences within the medial temporal 
lobe (e.g. Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire, 
2003). In addition, Wixted & Mickes (2010) point out that the remember/know 
procedure is being ever more widely used, with a record number of studies published 
in 2009. 
1.5.2 Using Remember/Know to measure Recollection and Familiarity  
With regard to the traditional verbal learning and memory experiments as reviewed 
by Tulving (2002b), a major problem in tests that measure recognition memory in 
humans is distinguishing between autonoetic awareness and noetic awareness. 
However, Tulving (1985) showed that participants could understand the distinction 
between the two types of awareness and crucially report it through the use of 
remember and know responses. He proposed that participants were able to indicate 
which state of awareness pertained to a particular memory by stating „remember‟ if it 
was retrieved from the episodic memory system or ‘know if it was retrieved from the 
semantic memory system. 
To elaborate, he asked participants to study a list of words. These words were 
presented again in a recognition test but this time they were interspersed with 
unstudied words. For each tested word participants were required to make a „Yes‟ or 
„No‟ decision as to whether the word had appeared in the list of previously studied 
words. If the answer was „Yes‟ then they were also required to respond either 
„Remember‟ or „Know‟. In this context a „remember‟ response indicated that they 
could consciously recollect something they experienced at the time that they studied 
that word. A „know‟ response indicated that they could not recollect such information, 
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but they recognised the word using other criteria. A substantial amount of research 
has adopted this simple, yet effective procedure. Because participants are instructed 
to respond „remember‟ whenever they recollect a test item, the probability of a 
„remember‟ response can be used as an index of recollection. The probability that an 
item is „familiar‟ however, is equal to the conditional probability that it received a 
„know‟ response given it was not recollected (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).  
The concepts of remember and know and the states of awareness that they are 
purported to capture lend support (relevant but limited due to differences in the 
central aims) to dual-process theories of recognition memory (see section 1.4). With 
regard to the remember/know paradigm, the dual-process model suggests that the 
process of recollection results in a remember experience/response, whereas the 
familiarity process results in a know experience/response (Kelley & Jacoby, 1998; 
Yonelinas, 2001b). The idea that these remember and know judgements are a 
reflection of recollection and familiarity respectively has been strongly opposed by 
modern single-process signal detection theorists who maintain that remember and 
know judgments are in fact a reflection of different degrees of memory strength or 
confidence rather than qualitatively different memory processes (e.g. Donaldson, 
1996; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Dunn, 2004, 2008; Hirshman & Henzler, 1998; 
Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Shimamura & Wickens, 2009; Xu & Bellezza, 2001). 
Therefore, it is not the case that know responses reflect strong, familiarity-based 
memories that are devoid of recollection. Rather, compared to remember 
judgements, know responses are actually a reflection of weaker memories that are 
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associated with lesser degrees of confidence and lesser degrees of recollection 
(Wais, Mickes, & Wixted, 2008). 
1.5.3 The Process Dissociation Procedure 
Jacoby (1991; 1994) developed a series of techniques with the aim of separating the 
recollection and familiarity components of recognition memory. In this paradigm, 
participants study a list of items in two differing contexts, following which are two 
recognition tests. In what is referred to as the inclusion test, participants are required 
to identify an item as old if they have previously encountered  the item, irrespective 
of the context in which it was presented. In the exclusion test, participants are asked 
to identify an item as old only if it was presented in one of the two study contexts. 
Therefore, although correct responses in the inclusion test may be based on both 
recollection and familiarity processes, those correct responses in the exclusion test 
must be based on recollective processes alone. Assuming that these two 
components of recognition memory are independent, it is then possible to calculate 
quantitative estimates of both recollection and familiarity (Hay & Jacoby, 1996; 
Jacoby, Debner, & Hay, 2001; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993; Joordens & 
Merolke, 1993; Curran & Hintzman, 1995).  
1.5.4 Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) 
Another compelling method for distinguishing between recollection and familiarity is 
the analysis of receiver operating characteristics (Yonelinas, 2001a; for a review see 
Yonelinas, & Parks, 2007).  During a typical item recognition experiment participants 
are asked to study a list of words, faces, or other stimuli. They are then tested with a 
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list that includes both the old items (the items on the study list) and an equal number 
of new items. The task for the participant is to distinguish each item as either „old‟ or 
„new‟. The resulting ROC analysis plots hits (correct identification of old items) 
against false alarms (incorrect identifications of new items as if they were old) across 
a variations in response criterion (i.e. the propensity to make a positive recognition 
response). Data points are then curve fitted to by a model with two parameters (Y 
intercept and d‟) using a least-squares method (see Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, 
Lazzara, & Knight, 1998, for details).  
ROC analysis originates from the application of signal detection theory to recognition 
memory. Therefore, assuming that recognition judgements are based on an 
assessment of a continuous variable such as familiarity, and assuming that the 
variances of the familiarity distributions are of new and old items are equal, ROC 
curves will be symmetrical. However, in normal human participants, the ROC 
function is typically characterised by two features: the curve is asymmetrical, 
involving an above-zero Y-intercept, and the shape of the function is curvilinear, 
upwardly deflected from the line of chance. According to the DPSD model this 
deflection exists because the ROC curve is a culmination of two different curves, i.e. 
a continuous curvilinear function reflecting the contribution of familiarity to 
recognition memory, and a linear function reflecting of the contribution of recollection 
to recognition memory (Yonelinas, 1994, 2001a). The „all-or-none‟ nature of 
recollection results in a ROC curve that is linear, therefore incorporating a threshold 
level as opposed to being continuous. It is the marrying of this linear component with 
the otherwise symmetric familiarity ROC curve that results in the asymmetric ROC 
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curves that are synonymous with human recognition memory judgements. Support 
for this interpretation is evident in the estimates of the linear (recollective) and 
symmetric (familiarity) components of ROC curves as they are seen to vary 
alongside different experimental manipulations in a manner similar to estimates 
resulting from the remember/know procedure (Yonelinas, 2002). 
1.6 Functional Dissociations Between Recollection and Familiarity  
Previous cognitive and neuropsychological research suggests that recollection and 
familiarity are functionally distinct processes and through the application of different 
experimental manipulations different effects on recollection and familiarity can be 
observed (for reviews see Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Park, 2006; Gardiner, Ramponi, & 
Richardson-Klavehn, 2002; Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004; Yonelinas, 2002). 
For example during study, manipulations to levels of processing (Gregg & Gardiner, 
1994; Rajaram, 1993) and divisions of attention (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Yonelinas, 
2001a) have a greater effect on recollection compared to familiarity. This is also true 
in certain subject populations, for example older adults (Healy, Light, & Chung, 2005; 
Norman & Schacter, 1997; Parkin & Walter, 1992)  
Interest in identifying the neural correlates of these two memory processes has 
steadily increased with implications for current models of recognition memory. 
1.7 The Neuroanatomy of Human Episodic Memory 
Much research has concentrated on whether recollection which is episodic in nature 
and familiarity which is semantic in nature, are mediated by the same or different 
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brain structures. The medial temporal lobe (MTL) has long been implicated in these 
declarative memory processes since patients with large MTL lesions have 
impairments in both semantic and episodic memory (Scoville & Milner, 1957; Squire, 
Stark, & Clark, 2004). However, controversy surrounds the division of labour 
between distinct MTL subregions. For example, there is a continuing debate as to 
whether the hippocampus and the perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices play 
different roles in recollection and familiarity (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Squire, Stark, 
& Clark, 2004; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998). One theory is that the hippocampus is 
a critical component of an extended neural network that supports episodic memory in 
humans (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Eichenbaum, 2000; Eichenbaum, Dudchenko, 
Wood, Shapiro, & Tanila, 1999; Mishkin, Suzuki, Gadian, & Vargha-Khadem, 1997; 
Moriss & Frey, 1997; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998). 
Aggleton and Brown (1999) proposed a model of the neural circuitry involved in 
episodic memory in which they claim that the neural basis of recall and familiarity 
differ. According to this model recall relies on a circuit that includes the hippocampus 
(hippocampal fields CA1-4, the denate gyrus and the subicular complex), fornix, 
mamillary bodies, anterior thalamus and possibly the cingulum bundle (see figure 
1.1).  
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Figure 1.1: Schematic diagram of the principle pathways that allow the encoding of episodic 
information and underlie recollective aspects of recognition. The relative thickness of the lines indicates 
the putative importance of the various connections (taken from Aggleton & Brown (1999)). 
Particularly, there is the notion that the link from the mamillary bodies and anterior 
thalamic nuclei, via the fornix, is critical for normal episodic memory (Gaffan, 1992). 
Furthermore, and as originally proposed by Delay and Brion (1969), the core deficits 
observed in anterograde amnesia (i.e. a failure to acquire or retain episodic 
information that occurred after the onset of the brain injury (Tulving, 1983)) result 
from damage to this axis. Aggleton and Brown (1999) emphasise the importance of 
the efferents from the hippocampus via the fornix to the diencephalon. In this case 
the hippocampus refers to the hippocampal fields CA1-4, the denate gyrus, and the 
subicular complex. The mamillary bodies and the medial thalamus are both medial 
components of the diencephalon, of which the thalamus, hypothalamus, 
epithalamus, and subthalamus are components. Such efferents are considered 
necessary for efficient encoding and therefore effective recall of new episodic 
memory. Moreover, the presence of projections back from the diencephalon to the 
temporal cortex and hippocampus also support episodic memory. This extended 
hippocampal-diencephalic system is crucial for efficient encoding and the 
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subsequent recall of information that is episodic in nature. Damage to the component 
structures can result in anterograde amnesia and damage to different parts can also 
result in similar memory impairments.  
Aggleton and Brown (1999) also claim that this hippocampal-diencephalic system 
may not be vital for efficient recognition as recognition is composed of two 
independent processes (Mandler, 1980) and only one of these processes is 
dependent on the hippocampus. Item recognition occurring via recollection of the 
stimulus is hippocampally dependent, whereas recognition occurring via familiarity of 
a stimulus is not hippocampally dependent. Familiarity according to this model, 
reflects an independent process that is reliant on a distinct system that involves the 
perirhinal cortex of the temporal lobe and the medial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus 
(Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Fortin, Wright, & Eichenbaum, 2004; Mayes, Holdstock, 
Isaac, Hunkin, & Roberts, 2002, Yonelinas et al, 2002) (see Figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1.2: Schematic diagram of the principle pathways underlying the detection of item familiarity. 
The relative thickness of the lines indicates the putative importance of the various connections (taken 
from Aggleton & Brown (1999)). 
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As mentioned previously, functional dissociations between recollection and familiarity 
can be observed in amnesic patients. In most cases of amnesia, there is bilateral 
involvement of the extended hipopcampal-diencephalic system (i.e. the 
hippocampus, fornix, mamillary bodies, anterior thalamus, and possibly the cingulum 
bundle) which leads to severe deficits in both recall and recognition. Studies of 
human amnesics have implicated the medial temporal lobes and the medial 
diencephalon in anterograde amnesia (e.g. Stefanacci, Buffalo, Schmolke, & Squire, 
2000). Problems arise however, when attempting to identify the critical structures. It 
is a widely held view that temporal lobe amnesia is a result of damage to the 
hippocampus, yet whether such damage is sufficient to induce amnesia is debatable. 
If bilateral damage is necessary, then evidence from amnesic studies where there is 
discrete unilateral hippocampal damage in one hemisphere alongside more 
extensive temporal lobe damage in the other hemisphere, would implicate the 
hippocampus (Penfield & Mathieson, 1974; Woods, Schoene, & Kneisley, 1982). 
Other evidence comes from amnesics who have confirmed bilateral pathology 
confined to the hippocampus and adjacent parahippocampal gyrus or uncus 
(DeJong, Itabashi, & Olson, 1969; Glees & Griffiths, 1952). The high proportion of 
cases where there is bilateral pathology and spared recognition in addition to 
implicating the hippocampus (Aggleton et al., 2005; Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, & 
Mishkin, 2001; Barbeau et al., 2005; Bastin et al., 2004; Holdstock, Mayes, Gong, 
Roberts, & Kapur, 2005; Holdstock et al., 2002), also implicates the fornix (Aggleton 
et al., 2000) and mamillary bodies (Dusoir, Kapur, Byrnes, Mckinstry, & Hoare, 
1990). This suggests that damage within this extended hippocampal system impairs 
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recall but partially spares recognition, thus, damage exterior to this system 
selectively contributes to the recognition deficit. 
Such investigations provide further support for the dual-process models of 
recognition memory if the spared recognition reflects a selective preservation of 
familiarity based recognition. Using a variety of techniques such as the 
remember/know procedure and the ROC procedure it has been shown that 
amnesics with recognition sparing in fact show a selective sparing of familiarity 
(Aggleton et al., 2005; Barbeau et al., 2005; Bastin et al., 2004; Eldridge, Knowlton, 
Furmanski, Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000; Eldridge, Engel, Zeineh, Bookheimer, & 
Knowlton, 2005; Holdstock et al., 2002; Holdstock et al., 2005; Yonelinas et al., 
2002).  
However, cases where amnesia is a result of hypoxia (lack of oxygen to the brain) do 
not always support this view. Selective hippocampal shrinkage due to hypoxia has 
often revealed clear and equivalent deficits in both recall and recognition (Manns, 
Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, & Squire, 2003; Wixted & Squire, 2004), yet the degree of 
the shrinkage is no greater than in cases where there is spared recognition. The 
leads some researchers to suggest that the hippocampus is important for both 
recollection and familiarity and the extent, therefore, to which they are dissociable 
has also been questioned (Jenson, Kirwan, Hopkins, Wixted, & Squire, 2010; 
Manns, et al., 2003; Squire et al., 2004; Squire et al, 2007; Wais, Wixted, Hopkins, & 
Squire, 2006; Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Squire, 2004). This lack of consistency 
continues the debate, particularly because other hypoxic cohorts do show a degree 
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of spared recognition (Quamme, Yonelinas, Widaman, Kroll, & Sauvé, 2004; 
Yonelinas et al., 2002). 
One issue that stems from such studies is that not only does there exist much 
individual variability within this aetiology, but also there is the probability that diffuse 
damage is contributing to the deficits in memory (Allen, Tranel, Bruss, & Damasio, 
2006). This has led researchers to attempt to model anterograde amnesia in animals 
and investigate the effects of precise lesions in animals. A prerequisite of this 
however, is the development of tasks that probe the same forms of memory that are 
found to be impaired in amnesics, namely episodic memory. Although animal studies 
would clearly allow for a much broader range of investigative techniques that have 
higher anatomical, pharmacological, physiological, genetic and molecular precision, 
the question arises as to whether it is possible to study episodic memory in animals.  
1.8 The Concept of Episodic-like Memory in Animals  
The concept of episodic memory has changed somewhat since it was introduced 
nearly 40 years ago, from a general idea of consciousness that both the episodic 
and semantic memory systems both shared (Tulving, 1972)  to one that is more 
system specific.  
With such a human-centric view of episodic memory it would initially appear that 
developing animal models of it would be impossible, particularly considering there 
are no agreed behavioural markers of consciousness in non-verbal animals. Some 
even argue that this reflects a stark discontinuity in the evolution of cognitive abilities 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2008; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998). However, 
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Clayton and Dickinson (1998) attempted to resolve this issue by concentrating on 
Tulving‟s (1972) original definition which focuses on the content of episodic memory 
i.e. what happened, when it happened, and where it happened. They propose that 
“the merit of this definition is that the simultaneous retrieval and integration of 
information about these three features of a single, unique experience may be 
demonstrated behaviourally in animals” (Griffiths, Dickinson, & Clayton, 1999, p. 76). 
They termed this ability episodic-like memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998) in order to 
distinguish between the behavioural and phenomenological criteria for episodic 
memory, given that the latter (e.g. autonoetic and chronosthetic consciousness), 
which usually accompanies conscious recollection in humans, cannot be assessed in 
non-human animals. Although more recently this definition of episodic-like memory 
has been refined (Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003) before discussing how and 
why, it is necessary to focus on the classic experiment of Clayton and Dickinson 
(1998) which has led to over a decade‟s worth of research into episodic-like memory 
in non-human animals.  
Clayton and Dickinson (1998) exploited the natural behaviour of Western scrub-jays 
(Aphelocoma californica). In the wild these birds scatter-hoard perishable insects 
that degrade over time in addition to seeds that remain palatable for almost indefinite 
periods. Therefore it would be advantageous for the scrub-jay to remember not only 
where it cached, but also whether the cached food is perishable and, if it is 
perishable, how long ago the cache was made. Such a what-where-when memory 
for the caching episode would allow the scrub-jay to recover the perishable food 
before it becomes unpalatable. In the wild, this what-where-when memory would 
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derive additional benefits, for example, the continuous risk of caches being pilfered 
means that the older the cache the higher the probability that the cache is already 
empty. This then impacts on optimal retrieval times and discounting of cache 
locations that have been found empty at recovery after only a short time interval has 
passed since caching. Having the capability to integrate information concerning 
when the cache had occurred and what had been cached is also important for those 
species that cache different types of food that decay at different rates, ensuring that 
items are recovered before they decay (for further discussion see Grodinski & 
Clayton, 2010).  
In controlled laboratory experiments, hand-reared scrub-jays were given a series of 
trials in which they were allowed to cache the preferred wax moth larvae („wax 
worms‟) as well as the less preferred peanuts in sand-filled ice cube trays. By 
attaching Lego blocks to these ice cube trays they were not only spatially distinct but 
also trial-unique. This allowed the scrub-jay at recovery to use the structure as a cue 
to retrieve a memory of the caching episode. Caching in this experiment always 
occurred in the morning.  To investigate the „when‟ aspect of episodic-like memory 
there were short (4 hour delay) and long trials (124 hour delay). In the short trials the 
trays were returned to the bird‟s cage in the afternoon of the same day in order for 
fresh caches to be recovered. In the long trials the trays were not returned to the 
bird‟s cage until the afternoon of the fifth day, during which time the wax worms had 
perished. During the initial trials the scrub-jays searched for the wax worms rather 
than the peanuts, reflecting their food preference. However, within four trials of both 
long and short delays, they searched at recovery for the wax worms in the short trials 
 42 
 
but changed to searching for the peanuts in the long trials. Clayton and Dickinson 
reason that the test trials demonstrate that such a change in the pattern of searching 
is dependent upon memory for the caching episode at recovery rather than on any 
cues stemming from the caches themselves. In addition, prior to the test trials, all the 
caches were removed from the trays, however the scrub-jays were still continuing to 
preferentially search the wax worm sites after the short delay but the peanut site 
after the long delay. This was taken as evidence that the scrub-jays were relying on 
memory and not on unintended cues present at test.  
Since this initial demonstration, numerous other studies have also shown that scrub-
jays have a detailed representation of what, where, and when food was cached. For 
example, it has been shown that scrub-jays can remember the specific contents of 
their caches rather than just relative preferences (Clayton & Dickinson, 1999a), they 
can use the detailed what-where-when information to search for a preferred food 
type (their food preferences were altered through specific satiety) (Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1999b) and remember the relative time of caching as well as what type of 
food was cached in each cache site (Clayton and Dickinson, 1999c). Subsequent 
experiments also show that scrub-jays can remember which perishable foods they 
have hidden where and how long ago, irrespective of whether the food had decayed 
or ripened (Clayton, Yu, & Dickinson, 2001; de Kort, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2005). 
As mentioned previously, there has been a recent refinement of the definition of 
episodic-like memory. It has been argued that although memory for the what-where-
when of a single episode is necessary for episodic-like memory, it is not sufficient 
(Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003). Suddendorf and Busby (2003) suggest that 
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such what-where-when memory may be episodic or may equally involve cognitive 
processes that have no consideration of the past. Clayton, Bussey, and Dickinson 
(2003) point out that what-where-when memory represents the content of the 
behavioural criteria, yet structure and flexibility are equally important. The integration 
of the individual components will allow for discrimination between similar episodes 
that occurred at different times and that can be used flexibly depending on the 
available semantic information. 
1.8.1 Structure 
The integrated structure means that the components of an event are bound together 
in memory. Consequently, probing of an episodic memory for any one feature of the 
episode will result in automatic retrieval of the other features. Without this binding, or 
integrated structure, an animal would be unable to discriminate between different 
episodes that share common features. Clayton and colleagues (2001) highlighted 
this issue by showing that scrub-jays are able to discriminate between episodes in 
which the same food was cached but in different locations and at different times. In 
the wild the relevance and importance of such an integrated structure becomes 
apparent. The continuous risk of caches being pilfered implies that the older the 
cache the more likely it is to have been pilfered. This may then affect optimal 
retrieval times and also increase the discounting of cache locations that have been 
found empty at recovery, depending upon the time that has elapsed since caching 
(Grodinski & Clayton, 2010).   
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1.8.2 Flexibility 
It is also important for those species that cache different types of food that decay at 
different rates to be able to integrate new information about the decay rate of 
different food types that is received after caching. In order to do so it is necessary to 
have a flexible declarative memory system. Clayton, Bussey, and Dickinson (2003) 
argue that declarative memories are reliant on the flexible utilisation of memorised 
information, and can be updated when new information is acquired. Clayton, Yu, & 
Dickinson (2003) clearly demonstrate such flexibility. In their study scrub-jays were 
allowed to cache perishable and non-perishable food types, however, during the 
interval between caching and recovery they were given the opportunity to learn that 
the perishable food type degraded faster than previously experienced. If the birds 
are using a flexible declarative memory system, knowledge regarding the rate of 
perishability of the particular food type will be updated. Consequently search 
behaviour at recovery will be altered appropriately, despite the fact that episodic 
information concerning the initial caching event was encoded before the acquisition 
of the new knowledge regarding decay rates. The results of this study show that the 
scrub-jays did in fact do this. As the scrub-jays continued to search for the perishable 
food if it had been cached recently, the possibility that they had just developed an 
aversion to searching for food that may perish was ruled out.  
The types of rules that are learnt also reflect this flexibility. In addition to learning that 
a food is perishable, the scrub-jays are also able to learn that following a short 
interval food is inedible, however later on it will ‟ripen‟ (de Kort et al., 2005).  
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1.8.3 Other Avian Models of Episodic-Like Memory 
Like the Western scrub-jay, magpies (Pica pica) are opportunistic food-hoarders 
whose food preferences often include those food types that degrade over time 
(Birkhead, 1991). Zinkivskay, Nazir, and Smulders (2009) showed that magpies 
demonstrate memory for what type of food they have hidden, and where and when 
they have hidden it. Their experimental design differed however from Clayton and 
Dickinson (1998), as none of the trials relied on one food type being preferred over 
another. In this case the type of food was made interesting only by its colour. 
Zinkivskay and colleagues also stated that the original study of Clayton and 
Dickinson (1998) limited the number of possible locations in which the scrub-jays 
could search for food upon return. The magpies however, were allowed to hoard as 
many food items (out of those available) as possible therefore creating a continuous 
spatial environment in which items could be found. Furthermore, unlike in the studies 
carried out by Clayton and colleagues (see Salwiczek, Watanabe, & Clayton, 2010), 
Zinkivskay et al. incorporated control trials in which the food items were removed 
prior to test to eliminate any possible visual and olfactory cues.  
Feeney, Roberts, and Sherry (2009) propose that episodic-like memory as observed 
in the scrub-jays and magpies may be a more general ability that extends itself to 
other species that cache food, particularly if selection pressures require the ability to 
remember what was cached, where, and when. In their study, although black-capped 
chickadees (Poecile atricapillus) demonstrated memory for what food type was 
cached and where, they were unable to alter their search behaviour according to the 
retention interval. Feeney and colleagues suggest that in contrast to the scrub-jays, 
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the chickadees did not hide the food themselves but instead found the food items 
that the researchers had hidden. It is possible then, that an integrated representation 
of what-where-when memory can only occur if the food is cached by the birds 
themselves as opposed to being hidden, if the two rely on different cognitive 
processes. Furthermore, the authors question the ecological validity of the paradigm 
considering that the wooden board used to hide the food items was placed on the 
ground, akin to the ice-cube trays for the scrub-jays, however the natural behaviour 
of chickadees is to store their food in shrubs and trees. Consequently, the authors 
adapted the experimental design to be more species-appropriate. By replacing the 
wooden board with four artificial trees with branches that contained holes with unique 
landmarks, the chickadees were now able to demonstrate memory for what-where-
when. However, Salwiczek and colleagues (2010) suggest that further investigation 
into the „when‟ component is needed in addition to examining the structure and 
flexibility of the chickadees memory for what, where, and when. 
It has been argued that the avian models of episodic-like memory as described 
above are limited for several reasons. Firstly, Clayton and colleagues (Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1998; 1999a; 1999b, 1999c; Clayton, Yu, & Dickinson, 2001; 2003) make 
use of hand-reared scrub-jays and the experimental paradigm they employ relies on 
their natural food-storing abilities, hence it may not be transferrable to other species 
(Eacott, Easton, & Zinkivskay, 2006). Salwiczek et al. (2010) however, argue that the 
performance of the chickadees in the food-finding paradigm suggests that the 
demonstrations of what-where-when memory found in the scrub-jays and magpies 
cannot be inextricably linked, or restricted to, food storing birds. Rather it is likely to 
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be a cognitive capacity with more general applications. Furthermore, Zentall et al. 
(2001) have suggested that demonstrations of episodic-like memory must be done 
so through the use of an unexpected question. The test should be unexpected as 
episodic information should be encoded automatically, thus, a trail-unique learning 
paradigm should be applied. As the above studies have an element of training, 
memory for a unique episode is not being measured, rather the tasks are being 
solved through the acquisition of semantic knowledge about when to recover the 
particular food types as opposed to recalling episodically which foods have been 
cached and where. The scrub-jays for example, had to learn that worms went bad 
after a certain interval (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998), and the magpies had to learn 
which colour food was edible after a certain retention interval (Zinkivskay et al., 
2009). Clayton and Russell (2009) suggest that such criticisms stem from a 
misunderstanding of the theoretical interpretations of the role of semantic and 
episodic-like memory in the control of caching. Clayton and colleagues (2003) 
propose that during such training when the birds learn about the properties of the 
food, they must flexibly integrate, for example, a semantic-like rule concerning how 
long each food type remains fresh with a specific episodic-like memory of which 
caches they had hidden and where in a given tray on a specific day, as each caching 
event is in fact unique.  
Using the trial-unique learning paradigm, Zentall and colleagues (2001) tested 
pigeons (Columba livia) ability to report the location they had recently pecked, 
without prior experience of having to do so. Although the results of the experiment 
suggest that they were able to do just that, Singer and Zentall (2007) suggest that 
 48 
 
discrimination of proprioceptive cues present when the unexpected question occurs 
could serve as an alternative explanation to the use of episodic-like memory to 
answer the unexpected question. In their follow-up study they attempted to correct 
for this by using a different type of differential sample response i.e. location, in 
addition to reducing the likelihood that beak position was being used as a cue at the 
time of test (however, see Zentall, Singer, & Stagner, 2008) and found that they were 
able to accurately answer the unexpected question of where they had pecked. 
Zentall and colleagues (2008) conclude that although their study and previous 
studies (Singer & Zental, 2007; Zental et al., 2001) may not be considered as 
rigorous demonstrations of episodic-like memory, nevertheless they demonstrate 
memories that are unlikely to be accounted for by semantic or rule-based processes. 
Crystal (2010) does point out however, that as episodic memory is generally 
regarded as a long-term memory it is interesting that the above studies by Zentall 
and colleagues have only made use of short delays between encoding and test (0-2 
sec).  
Skov-Rackette, Miller, & Shettleworth (2006) also tested pigeons on the unexpected 
question paradigm. Importantly, this is the only study that explicitly tests the 
structural criterion of episodic memory in another animal species aside from scrub-
jays. Pigeons were found to perform well when trained to respond to either a what, 
where, or when question, even though the test component was unknown at the time 
of encoding. This would suggest simultaneous encoding of the three elements. 
Performance however was not correlated when two successive tests of one stimulus 
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were presented. This suggests that what, where, and when memories in pigeons are 
not integrated but rather encoded independently. 
1.8.4 Other Animal Models of Episodic-Like Memory  
In addition to the previously discussed avian models of episodic memory, there has 
been a significant amount of research attempting to establish models of episodic-like 
memory in other non-human animals. Inspired by Clayton and Dickinson‟s (1998) 
study, Hampton, Hampstead, and Murray (2005) adapted the food-caching paradigm 
of the scrub-jays to investigate whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) could 
demonstrate memory for the what, where, and when of a foraging event. However, 
although the monkeys quickly learned to first search for their preferred food, and to 
avoid empty foraging locations, they were unable to learn that the preferred food was 
available after the short, but not the long delay. The monkeys were therefore able to 
remember the what and where components of a trial unique event, but failed to 
remember the when component. Hampton and colleagues (2005) argue that their 
study is not the only study that fails to demonstrate the when component of episodic-
like memory (e.g. Bird, Roberts, Abroms, Kit, & Krupi, 2003) and therefore perhaps 
the episodic-like memory demonstrated in scrub jays is a result of specific selection 
pressures faced by food-storing birds. However, Salwiczek et al. (2008) consider the 
foraging paradigm to be unsuitable for testing episodic-like memory in rhesus 
monkeys as their natural behaviour does not require them to cache perishable and 
non-perishable foods, nor does their survival depend on them burying food for 
consumption at a later date. Furthermore, as they are primarily herbivorous, it is not 
necessary to keep track of decay rates (Hampton et al., 2005). 
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As Hampton et al (2005) mention, there are other studies that fail to demonstrate the 
when component of episodic-like memory. Bird et al. (2003) tested laboratory rats 
(Rattus norvegicus) for their ability to remember which foods had been cached, 
where, and how long ago. Although the rats were shown to have reliable memory for 
the type and location of food, they were unable to demonstrate memory for when 
they had cached the food. Again, Salwiczek et al (2010) argue that most species of 
rat do not cache food in the wild to the same extent that jays and other food-caching 
corvids do, nor is their survival, or the survival of primates, reliant on their caches. 
Hampton and colleagues suggest that evidence for episodic-like memory in other 
species may emerge once appropriate paradigms have been developed.  
However, Babb and Crystal (2005) utilised the food scavenging behaviour of rats in 
order to demonstrate that rats also have a detailed representation what, where, and 
when specific events occur. Using an 8-arm radial maze rats were trained to 
remember where they had previously encountered food that they could then recover 
after either a short or a long delay (30 minutes or 4 hours respectively). Initially the 
rats learned that out of the four accessible arms of the maze, only one contained the 
preferred food type (chocolate pellets). They then learned that when all eight arms of 
the maze were accessible that the four previously inaccessible arms contained the 
less-preferred food type (regular pellets). In addition, if the rats were returned to the 
maze following the long delay the chocolate pellets were replenished, however, this 
was not the case following the short delay. The results showed that the rats did learn 
to avoid the previously baited arms and to re-visit the chocolate arm after only the 
long delay, so demonstrating that rats could use the length of the delay as a cue by 
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which to determine to their choice of arm to search.  Furthermore, when the 
preference for the chocolate pellets was eliminated (using Lithium Chloride (LiCl)) 
there was found to be a notable reduction in the number of visits to the chocolate 
arm when compared to the previous testing phase using the long delay. Babb and 
Crystal argue that the rats could not have reduced their number of visits to the 
chocolate arms without discriminating between memory for what, where, and when.  
Hampton et al. (2005) argue that because the chocolate pellets were available in the 
afternoon testing sessions but not the morning testing sessions, time of day could 
serve as a cue in solving the task i.e. in determining whether or not to search or 
avoid the chocolate baited arm. Follow up studies (Babb & Crystal, 2006a, 2006b; 
Naaqshbandi, Feeney, McKenzie, & Roberts, 2006) address this issue by controlling 
for time of day and determine that this cannot be used to discriminate what, where, 
and when. However, as study phases and testing phases occurred on successive 
days, the rats could have discriminated between alternate days (i.e. did the study 
occur yesterday or today) (Crystal, 2009). This issue will be discussed in more detail 
in the following section. 
1.9 What is When? 
It becomes clear from such studies on non-human animals, that the „when‟ 
component presents a challenge to researchers as „when‟ has a variety of guises. 
„When‟ could refer to a regular time slot (e.g. morning or afternoon), a time relative to 
another point (e.g. yesterday or the first/second time) or a precise point in time (e.g. 
when I broke my arm). As episodic memory concerns those memories for specific 
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past events, not all the above guises fall under the heading of episodic. Considering 
„when‟ as a regular time slot certainly would not be considered episodic. Considering 
„when‟ relative to another time point also poses a problem. For instance, if an animal 
can only show memory for whether a specific event was more or less recent (e.g. 
first or second exposure), but cannot show memory for the precise occasion when 
that event occurred, there is a possibility that strength of memory is being utilised to 
retrieve the information. Therefore, a true and complete episodic what-where-when 
memory is not being demonstrated (Eacott & Easton, 2009). Certainly, Friedman 
(1993) suggests that humans use such processes in order to judge the time of an 
episode. This again raises the important issue that strategy as well as task needs to 
be considered (Squire, 2004).  
Such an argument has been raised with the study of Kart-Teke, De Souza Silva, 
Huston, and Dere (2006). They adopted a paradigm for their study based on the 
spontaneous recognition paradigm (Ennaceur & Delacour, 1988) which utilises a 
rat‟s innate preference for exploring novel aspects of their given environment. Rats 
were first allowed to explore an open field environment in which there were four 
copies of an object in certain locations. In the second exposure phase (after an hour 
delay) there were now four copies of a second object in different locations. In the 
final test phase, two copies of each of the objects were presented. One of each of 
these objects was in a location that had been previously seen, yet the other copy of 
each object had moved to a different location within the open field. The rats 
preferentially explored the item that had been seen least recently and that had 
changed location, in that respect it was the most novel aspect of their environment. 
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Kart-Teke, et al. (2006) conclude that this demonstrates memory for „what‟ (i.e. the 
object seen), „where‟ (i.e. if the object had moved location), and „when‟ (i.e. if it was 
encountered in the first or second exposure phase) that is considered episodic-like 
memory in animals. However, as just discussed, the preferential exploration of the 
least recently seen object may simply reflect a reduced strength memory trace for 
that object (Easton & Eacott, 2008). 
Easton and Eacott (2008) suggest that strength of memory trace could also be a 
potential explanation for the memory seen in scrub-jays (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998). 
However, Clayton, Griffiths, Emery, and Dickinson (2001) refute this hypothesis 
stating that such an account assumes that the discriminability of memory traces does 
not vary with their strength. In a study using a specific satiety devaluation procedure 
Clayton and Dickinson (1999a) reported that the discriminability of the „what-where‟ 
memories for devalued and non-devalued food was comparably good after one week 
as after only a few hours. Clayton and colleagues argue that if strength of memory 
trace was impacting upon searching behaviour then there would be an observed 
reduction in the overall level of searching with respect to the retention interval, 
however this was not found to be the case. 
Strength of memory trace is not the only discriminating factor that poses problems 
for researchers attempting to demonstrate memory for the what, where, and when of 
an episode. As highlighted by Hampton and colleagues (2005) (see section 1.8.4) 
the issue of what is „when‟ in some episodic-like tasks is debatable. They argue that 
in the study by Babb and Crystal (2005), time of day (morning or afternoon) could be 
inadvertently offering a reliable discriminative stimulus for solving the task. Although 
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subsequent studies have shown that time of day cannot be used to discriminate 
between memory for what, where, and when, it has been shown that rats, for 
example, can discriminate between alternate days (Crystal, 2009). Roberts and 
colleagues (2008) suggest that such tasks are not purely episodic in nature as 
„when‟ in these cases may only be referring to a relative memory of „how long ago‟. 
Animals may be remembering how long ago an event occurred by keeping track of 
how much time has elapsed since caching or encountering a particular food item in a 
particular location and are using elapsed time as an indicator for revisiting or 
avoiding a location (Roberts, 2002). In fact, in their recent study, Roberts et al. 
(2008) showed that rats could remember the when of an episodic-like memory trace 
in terms of the relative time elapsed (i.e. how long ago) but not with regard to an 
absolute time of day at which the event occurred, consequently the authors conclude 
that episodic-like memory in rats is distinctly different to human episodic memory. 
Conflicting data is presented by Zhou and Crystal (2009) who suggest that memory 
for what, where, and when in their study could not be solved by judging the relative 
familiarity of the study items or timing an interval between study and test. According 
to de Kort, Dickinson, and Clayton (2005)  such a criticism cannot be levelled at 
Clayton and Dickinson‟s (1998) work with scrub-jays as they point out that the 
recoveries after both the short and long delay always occurred at the same time of 
day (4 hours after caching on the same day as caching or 5 days after caching), 
therefore, neither circadian rhythms, nor the state of hunger at the time of recovery 
could act as a discriminative stimulus that would influence the scrub-jays searching 
behaviour.  
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Crystal (2010) proposes that the ability to use what, where, and when based on time 
of day may actually be quite widespread. For example, a study by Ferkin, Combs, 
delBarco-Trillo, Pierce, & Franklin (2008) showed that male meadow voles (Microtus 
pennsylvanicus) can remember where and when they encountered a female and in 
what stage of postpartum estrus she was in. However, the use of a 24 hour delay 
leads some to question whether or not circadian interval timing as opposed to 
episodic recall is being measured (Cheke & Clayton, 2010).   
Although the above study by Ferkin et al. (2008) and the study by Kart-Teke et al. 
(2006) detailed earlier have no learnt element to them, they are reliant on the 
recognition of the stimulus and its location. Yet, as already established, human 
episodic memory is associated with recall mechanisms, not familiarity based ones. 
Therefore it cannot be claimed that these tasks are relying on episodic recall 
mechanisms. Studies by Babb and Crystal (2005, 2006a, 2006b) have also been 
criticised as although their studies claim to rely on recall processes only, their 
experimental paradigm involves an extensive number of training trials that could 
result in rule based learning (Cheke & Clayton 2010; Clayton and Russell, 2008). 
Although the same could be said for Clayton and Dickinson‟s (1998) study with scrub 
jays, the number of training trials differ considerably. In addition, the studies of Babb 
and Crystal have recently been criticised for failing to control for familiarity (Cheke & 
Clayton, 2010), yet similar claims against Clayton and colleagues have not been 
upheld (see Clayton & Dickinson, 1999a). From the studies discussed here, it seems 
that Clayton and colleagues (1998; 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 2001; 2003) have indeed 
shown that non-human animals can demonstrate episodic-like memory that is not 
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based on familiarity, and that does not utilise cues such as time of day, circadian 
rhythms, or state of hunger. 
1.10 What is Which? 
Considering the issues that surround what constitutes the „when‟ component of 
episodic-like memory, it is perhaps more appropriate to view it as memory for what 
happened on a specific occasion, as opposed to what happened at a particular time 
as identified by for example, temporal order (first or second) or elapsed time (a long 
or short delay). This concept of „occasion‟ not only specifies a particular point in time 
but also allows for that point in time to be additionally identified by non-temporal 
contextual identifiers (e.g. when I gave a talk in London).  
Such contextual identifiers have proven very useful in discriminating episodes. 
Gaffan (1994) demonstrated in monkeys that when simple object discrimination 
learning occurred when objects were in a fixed location against a discrimination-
unique visuo-spatial background or scene, learning of these discriminations 
increased at a marked rate to the point where it approached one-trial learning. 
Gaffan suggests that discrimination via such a „scene‟ is analogous to episodic 
memory in that the event being remembered has a particular location with respect to 
particular background. It is that unique background that serves to identify the 
memory of that event as unique, thus defining the occasion. Such learning it has 
been claimed, should not be regarded as an alternative form of scene learning, but 
as a form of episodic-like memory (Eacott & Easton, 2009; Eacott & Norman, 2004).  
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Therefore, Eacott and Norman (2004) made use of this broader what-where-which 
definition of episodic-like memory, where „which‟ serves as the occasion setter that 
defines an event as unique. Their task placed reliance upon rats innate preference 
for novel items (Ennaceur & Delacour, 1988). An open field apparatus was used in 
which the floor and wall coverings (context), objects, and the locations of the objects 
were manipulated by the experimenter. In the first of two exposure phases the rats 
were presented with two objects in a particular context in the open field. In the 
second exposure phase the same two objects were presented but in opposite 
locations and using a different context. The test phase presented the rat with one of 
the previous experienced contexts but now with two copies of one of the previously 
experienced objects. Consequently, one of these objects was in a location not 
previously associated with that context for that object. Due to the rat‟s innate 
preference for novelty, exploration of this novel object-location-context (what-where-
which) combination was significantly higher than for the familiar combination. As 
discussed above, previous demonstrations of episodic-like memory in the rats have 
been criticised for not only being dependent on „how long ago‟ but also for the 
amount of training required. Eacott and Norman‟s task only required habituation to 
the apparatus and could theoretically be adapted for use with other species. Eacott 
and Norman (2004) also demonstrated that this task is sensitive to lesions of the 
fornix. Considering all these factors, this task proves a useful tool in investigating 
episodic-like memory in not only rats but other common laboratory animals (e.g. 
Kouwenberg, Walsh, Morgan, & Martin, 2009). 
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Despite the usefulness of this task, it received the same criticisms that other 
recognition tasks received (e.g. Ferkin et al 2008; Kart-Teke et al., 2006) with regard 
to the fact that both familiarity and recall mechanisms can be employed. Arguments 
from Eacott and Gaffan (2005) as to why the demonstrated what-where-which 
memory was reliant on recall mechanisms shall be discussed later in reference to 
underlying neural substrates.   
In an attempt to fend off such criticism Eacott, Easton, and Zinkivskay (2005) 
modified the Eacott and Norman (2004) task to show that rats could remember an 
event as defined by the absolute definition of what-where-which using only 
recollection. In this novelty-based task an E-maze apparatus was used which 
allowed for an „objects visible‟ pre-training stage, and an „objects hidden‟ test stage. 
During the objects visible stage the rats were exposed to a first context in the E-
maze in which there were two different objects to explore. These were in certain 
spatial locations and were visible to the rat from the start arm of the E-maze. When 
returned to the E-maze for the second exposure phase in a different context, the 
objects were placed in a different configuration. Between exposure to the second 
context and the test phase the rats were held in a holding cage in which was a copy 
of one of the objects presented in the E-maze that the rats were free to explore.  
They were then returned to the E-maze for the test phase which used one of the 
previously encountered contexts. As expected, rats typically explored the object that 
was not present in the holding cage with them, giving more credence to the theory 
that they possess an innate preference for novelty (Ennaceur & Delacour, 1988). 
The experimental phase of this task was referred to as the „objects hidden‟ stage. 
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The process was akin to the „objects visible‟ stage, however, in this case the objects 
were „hidden‟ out of sight of the animal in the arms of the E-maze. Eacott, Easton 
and Zinkivskay reason clearly that in the objects visible stage, because the objects 
are in fact visible when the rat emerges from the start arm, the choice of the non-
habituated object could be solely based on familiarity. Yet, in this objects „hidden‟ 
stage, because the objects were not visible to the rat when emerging from the start 
arm, the rat needed to „recollect‟ the prior experience in the particular context in 
order to successfully find the non-habituated novel object. This aspect of the task 
cannot be solved using familiarity mechanisms alone.  
The task successfully demonstrated the what-where-which memory as rats selected 
the non-habituated object during the experimental stage of the task. As Eacott and 
Norman (2004) previously suggest, this what-where-which triad can be considered to 
be episodic-like in animals. Importantly, this task shows the flexibility of episodic 
memory as it is known to be in humans and as deemed crucial by Clayton, Bussey 
and Dickinson (2003). Preference for the non-habituated object occurs after 
exposure to the original event, and depending on which object is used during 
habituation, either object could be the preferred choice.  Unlike other tasks 
investigating episodic-like memory in animals (e.g. Ferkin et al., 2008; Kart-Teke et 
al., 2006), this task can only be solved using recollection of past experiences. The 
objects hidden stage of the task does not allow for the interference of familiarity 
cues. Furthermore, the task fits the criterion of an integrated structure as it can only 
be solved by combining the knowledge of knowing what object needs to be searched 
for, which context is present, and where the object is located. This task is unique in 
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the fact that it does not rely on reward, it does not require substantial pre-training, 
and it can also be adapted to different species of common laboratory animals. But 
more importantly, it was the first, and only task to date, that demonstrates recall of 
what-where-which memory in rats in an unlearned task. 
1.11 How Can Animals Studies Contribute to Understanding the Neural Basis of 
Episodic Memory? 
Although some aspects of the paradigms used in the animal studies investigating 
memory for what-where-when/which are still questioned, their contribution to the 
understanding of the neural substrates of episodic memory are without doubt 
invaluable. Despite the debate as to whether episodic memory depends on a 
dissociable neural system (Aggleton & Brown, 1999), there is much support for the 
hippocampus playing a critical role (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Eichenbaum, 2000; 
Eichenbaum et al., 1999; Mishkin et al., 1997; Moriss & Frey, 1997; O'Keefe & 
Nadel, 1978; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998).  
Although the study by Eacott and Norman (2004) was criticised due to the possible 
interference of familiarity processes, Eacott and Gaffan (2005) argued that the 
pattern of performance of the same animals in variations of the task support the 
claim that what-where-which measures the recall component of recognition memory. 
In their study, those rats with lesions specifically in the hippocampal system were 
impaired on the what-where-which task, yet dual component tasks such as what-
where and what-which were not impaired. This apparent dissociation was not due to 
the level of difficulty as rats with lesions exterior to the hippocampal system 
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(postrhinal cortex) were found to be relatively unimpaired in the what-where-which 
tasks but impaired in the dual component what-which task. This double dissociation 
of impaired recollection within the hippocampal system and impaired familiarity 
exterior to this system reflects the two components of recognition memory and to an 
extent lends support to the dual-process models of recognition memory (Atkinson & 
Juola, 1974; Jacoby, 1983a, 1983b; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980; O'Reilly 
& Norman, 2002; Tulving, 1985). Gaffan‟s (1994) investigations into scene memory 
in monkeys showed that those monkeys with fornix lesions were severely impaired 
when each discrimination was associated with a particular spatial location on a 
unique background scene. When a discrimination was only associated with a 
location or a scene then the effects of the fornix lesions were less apparent. In 
addition to this, there is further evidence that such what-where-which memory as 
demonstrated in the open field (Eacott & Norman, 2004) and in the E-maze (Easton, 
Zinkivskay, & Eacott, 2009) is dependent on the fornix.  
The application of ROC analyses (see General Introduction, Section 1.6.4.) to 
investigations of memory in non-human animals has several implications. Firstly, 
experiments that employ the use of a recognition paradigm (e.g. Kart-Teke et al., 
2006; Dere, Huston, & De Souza Silva) cannot provide conclusive evidence for 
recollection (as opposed to familiarity). Secondly, if non-human animals also exhibit 
these two distinct response types, mediated by equivalent brain areas to those in 
humans, then this implies that they are experiencing something akin to recollection.  
Studies employing ROC curves have attempted to dissociate recollection and 
familiarity (Fortin et al., 2004; Sauvage et al., 2008) but have not escaped without 
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criticism (Wixted & Squire, 2008). Easton, Zinkivskay, and Eacott (2009) reason that 
although statistical analyses of ROC curves provides evidence for both mechanisms, 
there is a need for direct behavioural evidence for the dissociation in the rat. In their 
study they demonstrated that although lesions to the fornix impair the recall for what-
where-which memory, recognition was unimpaired. Using the what-where-which task 
in the E-maze (Eacott et al., 2005) Easton et al., (2009) found that rats with lesions 
to the fornix did not turn to the relatively novel, hidden object, yet those rats with 
sham lesions did make the appropriate turn. This result indicates that those rats with 
lesions to the fornix are unable to recollect episodic-like memory. However, 
recognition of objects by the same animals on the same trials was unimpaired (with 
respect to the sham-lesioned animals) by the same lesions. In addition, as recall and 
familiarity are components of recognition (Yonelinas, 2001a) and recall is impaired in 
this task (based on first turn behaviour), the observed normal recognition 
performance must be due to intact familiarity. This study therefore gives credence to 
the two separate neural circuitry systems put forward by Aggleton & Brown (1999) 
which also suggests that the fornix has a role in recollection processes but not 
familiarity processes. This is the first task to demonstrate behaviourally a 
dissociation between the neural systems involved in the recall and familiarity circuits 
in animals.  
A previous study by Eacott & Norman (2004) would appear to contradict this data. In 
their study they tested fornix lesioned rats in the open field using the what-where-
which task (a task which allows for an objects visible stage only) and reported that 
the fornix lesioned rats demonstrated impaired performance of this task. However, 
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Easton et al., (2009) explain that it is the difference in the nature of the two tasks that 
result in this possible confusion. In the Eacott & Norman (2004) task the test phase 
involves two copies of the same object. Object preference was determined if the rat 
remembered information regarding what object they saw, where they saw it and in 
what context it was in. In this respect the rats would require episodic-like memory as 
defined previously (Eacott et al., 2005). In Easton et al‟s. (2009) task, as the E-maze 
is used the method differs. During the objects visible stage two different objects are 
presented to the rat, although both have been seen before, only one of these objects 
has been habituated to. In this case, during the objects visible task only an object 
preference is needed. The objects visible stage of the Easton et al., (2009) task does 
not require episodic-like memory and as such lesions to the fornix bear no effect, yet 
in the Eacott & Norman (2009) task performance is impaired as episodic-like 
memory is a necessity.  
However, Easton et al. (2009) do not disregard the possibility that the impairment 
observed may actually be an impairment of only a single component of episodic 
memory such as memory for the object, spatial location or even context. Although 
object memory was seen to be intact in this task, spatial nor contextual memory was 
specifically taken into account, both of which to some degree rely on the 
hippocampal system (Broadbent, Squire, & Clark, 2004; Smith & Mizumori, 2006).  
Previous studies using the open field observed that rats with lesions to the fornix 
(Eacott & Norman, 2004; Norman & Eacott, 2005) or with lesions to the 
hippocampus (Langston & Wood, 2006) show significant memory in tasks 
manipulating combinations of components such as object and place or object and 
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context, yet are impaired at what-where-which memories. This implies that the fornix 
impairment seen in Eacott & Norman (2004) was an impairment in the triad of what-
where-which memory. It also suggests that Easton et al., (2009) did not observe an 
impairment in spatial or contextual memory alone. It still however, does not allow for 
any conclusions to be drawn as to whether there is a failure in the recall of any of the 
individual components of episodic-like memory. This matter is not easily resolved 
considering recall in itself is dependent on the hippocampal system (Aggleton & 
Brown, 1999; Fortin, Wright, & Eichenbaum, 2004; Yonelinas, 2001a) therefore if in a 
spatial memory task there is a failure of recall, how would this be differentiated? Not 
only this, but as recall is a core factor in episodic memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 
1998; Tulving, 1983), any task requiring recall would also be subservient to the 
systems and neural circuitry that episodic memory is reliant upon.  
The value of such tasks in animals is clear. Research has continued to focus on 
other neuroanatomical structures in an attempt to further understand the complex 
neural networks associated with episodic memory. The greater understanding that 
researchers have regarding such forms of memory is directly relevant to furthering 
our understanding of memory impairments in ageing and related diseases.  
1.12 Conclusions 
Just as the definition of episodic memory in humans has undergone revisions 
(Tulving, 1972; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998) so has the definition of episodic-like 
memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003). Using 
these definitions there is now good evidence that animals have the capacity for 
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episodic-like memory. It has been suggested that the requirements for episodic 
memory in animals are harder to achieve than those requirements concerning 
human episodic memory (Eacott & Easton, 2009) which may in part explain why the 
methodology of such studies has often been called into question (Babb & Crystal, 
2005; 2006a; Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Eacott & Norman, 2004; Ferkin et al., 
2008; Hampton et al., 2005; Kart-Teke et al., 2006). Considering the 
aforementioned, the broad aim of this thesis was to further investigate episodic 
memory, both in humans and animals with respect to issues of methodology.  
The starting point for such an investigation lay with a task that has been shown to 
demonstrate episodic-like memory based on recall (Eacott et al., 2005), that can also 
be used to dissociate the recall and familiarity processes (Easton et al., 2009). 
Chapter 2 aimed to replicate the study (Eacott et al., 2005) in order to be able to 
investigate the effects of precise lesions of the hippocampus in Chapter 3.  The 
reviewed studies have contributed significantly to understanding the underlying 
neural substrates of episodic memory. Much of the research has lent support to the 
notion that there are dissociable neural networks for episodic memory (Aggleton & 
Brown, 1999) of which the hippocampus plays a crucial role (Aggleton & Brown, 
1999, 2005; Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Baddeley et al., 2001; Barbeau et al., 2005; 
Bastin et al., 2004; Eacott & Gaffan, 2005; Eacott & Norman, 2004; Easton et al., 
2009; Eichenbaum, 2000; Eichenbaum et al., 1999; Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 2004; 
Fortin et al., 2004; Holdstock et al., 2005; Holdstock et al., 2002; Jacoby, 1983a, 
1983b; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Langston & Wood, 2006; Mandler, 1980; Mishkin et 
al., 1997; Moriss & Frey, 1997; Norman & Eacott, 2005; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978; 
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O'Reilly & Norman, 2002; Tulving, 1985; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998). Yet to date, 
the effects of precise lesions to the hippocampus have not been investigated using 
such a task can demonstrate this dissociation.  
The direction of Chapter 4 was influenced in part by the results of the previous 
chapters. The issue that the requirements of episodic memory in animals dictate that 
it is harder to demonstrate was indeed reflected by the previous chapters. And so in 
keeping with the broad aim of investigating methodologies associated with episodic 
memory, Chapter 4 attempted to carry out the same task using another previously 
successful methodology (Langston & Wood, 2006). Whilst doing so, other 
methodological issues came to light and were also investigated further.  
Finally, Chapter 5 attempted to address demands that episodic-like memory in 
animals is not comparable with episodic memory in humans due to the fact that 
episodic memory in humans is associated with a feeling of travelling back in time 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and autonoetic awareness (Tulving, 2002b). Yet it 
has been pointed out that memories that appear to be episodic in nature are not 
always associated with a strong feeling of travelling back in times even in humans 
(Crawley & Eacott, 2006). Also, there are human tasks that are accepted as 
demonstrating episodic memory despite such „mental time travel‟ not always being 
assessed. This lends support to those who suggest that the criteria required for 
episodic-like memory in animals to be accepted as such is much more stringent than 
with human episodic memory. The specific aim of Chapter 5 therefore, was to 
address the issue of whether what is regarded as episodic-like memory in animals 
can be transferred and demonstrated as episodic memory in humans as “perhaps 
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tasks modelled on the episodic-like memory tasks given to animals but performed by 
human participants might reveal if such tasks are really subjectively experienced as 
like episodic” (Eacott & Easton, 2009).  
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2 EPISODIC MEMORY AND THE E-MAZE 
2.1 Introduction 
Since Clayton and Dickinson‟s (1998) initial demonstration of episodic-like memory  
in Scrub jays, numerous other studies have also shown that scrub-jays have a 
detailed representation of what, where, and when food was cached (Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c). As Clayton & Dickinson‟s scrub-jays were at that 
point the only non-human animals in which these “What”, “Where”, and “When” 
aspects of episodic-like memory had been demonstrated, Eacott & Norman (2004) 
designed a behavioural task that was transferrable to other species of common 
laboratory animals such as the rat. In their task, Eacott & Norman define episodic-
like memory as “What”, “Where” and “Which” with “Which” replacing “When” as the 
occasion setter that discriminates between one experience and another similar 
experience. It was possible however, that the episodic-like memory demonstrated 
was not a result of recollection processes alone as the task could potentially be 
solved through the familiarity of the objects experienced. As episodic memory is said 
to rely on recollection of past experience, Eacott, Easton, & Zinkivskay (2005) 
created a task  demonstrating just that (for further details of the task see General 
Introduction, Section 1.10), whilst also satisfying the criteria of structure and flexibility 
deemed essential for episodic-like memory (Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003). 
Due to the success of Eacott et al.‟s (2005) task, a replication was considered a 
justified starting point for the studies before attempting any modifications such as 
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lesion studies. The aim of such a replication would be to increase the level of 
performance and eliminate any variability in the data. Such variability in the data, as 
observed in Eacott et al.‟s study may require further manipulations to the 
methodology. It may also be necessary to carry out further days of this task. Eacott, 
Easton and Zinkivskay successfully demonstrated the what-where-which memory 
after a relatively short period of sixteen days. For lesion studies to be carried out it is 
necessary to have a task that that shows performance stable over numerous testing 
trials. This however leads on to further problems. It is possible that such long periods 
of testing may be detrimental to the overall performance of the task as the task itself 
may gradually become less novel. If this were to occur, manipulations regarding the 
overall novelty of the task would have to be addressed. 
2.2 Experiment 2a 
The first experiment aimed to replicate the results of Eacott et al. (2005) and so 
introduced no differences in methodology from the original study. The purpose of this 
study was to not only demonstrate the what-where-which memory as done so 
previously, but also to determine a baseline for which any further manipulations can 
be compared against. 
2.2.1 Methods and materials 
2.2.1.1 Subjects 
Sixteen experimentally naïve Dark Agouti male rats (Harlan Laboratories, UK) 
underwent surgery. They were housed in cages of four and were subject to diurnal 
conditions (12 hour light/12 hour dark cycles). Testing always took place during the 
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light cycle and never started before 7am or finished after 7pm.  Access to food and 
water was ad libitum, levels of which were monitored daily as governed by the 
Animal (Scientific Procedures Act) (1986) and approved by the Home Office Project 
licence. 
2.2.1.2 Apparatus 
2.2.1.2.1 E-Maze 
The E-Maze used in this task measured 9.5 x 35.5 x 17 inches. Made from mdf the 
walls and the floor were coloured grey and covered in perspex. This formed context 
X. Slots between the walls and floor and the perspex allowed for inserts to be used 
to change the context. Inserts of black and white patterned wallpaper were used as 
context Y. The E-maze also had a Perspex roof made up of sections. The lines 
separating these sections would be used as marker points for distinguishing a choice 
of left or right. A Perspex trap door separated the start-arm from the rest of the E-
maze. The rats were placed in this start arm at the beginning of every trial. It should 
be noted that the E-maze used in the current study was different to the maze used in 
the original study of Eacott et al. (2005). 
2.2.1.2.2 Objects 
Objects consisted of three items (e.g. lego or toys) put together to form a more 
complex object. To begin with two different objects were used each day and four 
copies of each object were made. Copies of objects were needed as scheduling 
made it possible to run two rats simultaneously. A copy of each object was needed 
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for the two habituation cages, a copy of each for the sample phases and a copy of 
each for the test phase.  
2.2.1.2.3 Objects and E-Maze 
In the objects visible stage, these objects were placed at either end of the length of 
the E-maze (see Figure 2.1). When the rat exited the start arm the objects were in 
view. A choice was recorded when the nose of the rat explored the object. In the 
objects hidden stage these objects were placed at the end of the outer arms (see 
Figure 2.2). In this stage when the rats appeared from the start arm it was not 
possible to see these objects. A choice was recorded when the nose of the rat went 
over the line indicated by a new section of the perspex lid. Exploration of an object 
was timed in seconds using a stopwatch. Exploration was when the rat‟s nose was 
exploring the object. If the body of the rat was touching the object but the nose was 
not this did not constitute exploration. Before the rat was placed in the start arm of 
the maze non-transparent lids were used to cover the maze so the rats would not be 
able to see the objects inside. These were then removed once the rat was in the 
start arm.  
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Figure 2.1:  Position of Objects in the E-maze during Objects Visible 
 
   
         
Figure 2.2: Position of objects in the E-maze during Objects Hidden 
 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 above show the locations of the objects in the E-maze for both 
the Objects Visible and Objects Hidden stage respectively. The green „S‟ indicates 
the start arm where the rat is initially placed. The red dashed lines indicate the 
specific location where the rats‟ noses crossed and thereby signifying a choice.  
S 
   S 
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Figure 2.3: Photograph of a rat in an E-maze exploring objects 
Figure 2.3 shows an example of a rat in an E-maze exploring the objects in the 
Objects Visible position. 
2.2.1.2.4 Test Room and Experimenter 
The task was always run in the same conditions. Lighting consisted of two 25w bulbs 
shone off the walls of the room in order to ensure that the E-maze was equally lit in 
all arms and there were no shadowed areas. During the task the experimenter sat 
out of sight in complete silence. Rats were monitored via a TV on which the rats‟ 
behaviour were being recorded to be analysed later that day. 
2.2.1.3 Design 
All animals were subject to the same E-maze, object habituation and task 
habituation. A schedule of object placement, context and test object were 
counterbalanced across each day and over the test period. The independent 
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variables that were manipulated were therefore object location and context. The 
dependent variable measure was direction of first turn and also the amount of time 
spent exploring the object. 
2.2.1.4 Data Collection 
2.2.1.4.1 First Turns 
In Objects Visible a correct choice would be made when the rat‟s nose touched an 
object.  
In Objects Hidden a correct choice would be made on the direction of the rat‟s first 
turn. This was determined on when the rat‟s nose crossed a line on the transparent 
perspex roof. These were scored as they happened. If a decision was unclear it 
would be reviewed on the video recording when the experiment had finished that 
day.  
2.2.1.4.2 Exploration Time and D2 Scores 
For both Objects Visible and Objects Hidden exploration time was scored after the 
experimental day was finished, from video using a stopwatch. The criteria for this 
exploration were that the rat‟s nose had to be touching and exploring the object. If 
the body of the rat was touching the object but not the nose this was not considered 
exploration. These times were then converted into D2 scores. A D2 score is a 
discrimination ratio which divides the difference in exploration time (D1) by the total 
time spent exploring the two objects: 
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D2 = (exploration of novel object - exploration of habituated object)/ (exploration of 
novel object + exploration of habituated object). 
D2 scores were calculated for each day which could then be averaged over the 
number of testing days. 
Analysis of first turns and exploration time were done each day following the 
experiment in order to keep track on performance and any possible stress factors. 
2.2.1.5 Procedure 
2.2.1.5.1 Habituation 
In order to not cause unwanted stress to the animals they were habituated to the 
procedure in stages. For two days the rats were placed in the E-maze (context X) in 
pairs for 20 minutes. For another two days they were then placed in the E-maze 
alone (context X) for 20 minutes with objects in the objects visible position. The next 
two days they were placed in the E-maze for 20 minutes with objects again in the 
objects visible position but this time using context Y. For one day this time was then 
reduced to 10 minutes for context X and the next day for context Y. They were then 
introduced to the habituation cage and experiencing the E-maze more than once a 
day. One day (context X) they experienced objects visible for 5 minutes, the 
habituation cage for 5 minutes and then returned to the E-maze for 5 minutes. This 
was repeated the next day using context Y. The final two days involved habituating 
the rats to experiencing both contexts in one day. The first sample for example would 
be 3 minutes in context X, to 3 minutes in the habituation cage, to 3 minutes in 
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context Y, to the habituation cage again and then finally another 3 minutes in either 
X or Y. In total there was twelve days habituation to this procedure.  
2.2.1.5.2 Objects Visible 
Twenty days of objects visible trials were carried out. This method involved two 
sample phases, an habituation phase and a test phase. The rats were individually 
placed into the start arm of the E-maze. For the first sample phase they spent 2 
minutes exploring the E-maze and the objects in one context. They were then 
transferred to the habituation cage (empty) for as long as it took the experimenter to 
change contexts (approximately 1 minute 30s). In the second sample phase they 
then returned to the E-maze for 2 minutes this time experiencing a different context 
and the objects in opposite locations. The habituation phase lasted 8 minutes in 
which they were in the holding cage for 8 minutes habituating to an object 
(determined by the counterbalanced schedule). The final test phase returned the rat 
to the E-maze for 2 minutes in a particular context with two copies of one of the 
objects. This schedule made it possible to interleave the testing of two rats. Whilst 
one rat was habituating to an object for 8 minutes another rat was undergoing the 
sample phases.  After day twelve of objects visible the exploratory behaviour of the 
animals appeared to suggest that odour may have been building up on the objects 
and affecting exploration. Such behaviour was an observable increase in the 
exploration of one object that could not be explained by object interest. It was 
decided therefore to adopt a regime of cleaning the objects with alcohol wipes after 
each cage to eliminate any odour build-up.  
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2.2.1.5.3 Objects Hidden 
A preparation day was carried out after finishing objects visible and before starting 
objects hidden. For this day rats were not habituated to objects they were instead 
just introduced the new position of the objects.   
The same method was followed as that for objects visible apart from the location of 
the objects obviously differed – in this case the objects were hidden in the outer 
arms of the E-maze. Sixteen days of objects hidden were then carried out. 
2.2.2 Results 
All statistical analyses reported are 2 tailed. All figure legends include calculated 
standard error means (SEM) indicated by error bars. Symbol (*) indicates 
significance ≤ 0.05. Where multiple t-tests are conducted Bonferroni corrections are 
made. 
2.2.2.1 Objects Visible 
2.2.2.1.1 First Turn Data 
First Turn data in the Objects Visible stage gives an indication of object preference. 
Over twenty days of Objects Visible the animals significantly preferred turning 
towards the RN (Relatively Novel) object (t (15) = 2.952, p = 0.01) with a mean 
percentage correct score of 56.9. 
After day 12 of Objects Visible observations of the exploratory behaviour of the 
animals indicated that there was the possibility that odour was starting to build up on 
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the objects. Therefore, from day 13 onwards alcohol wipes were used to clean the 
objects after each cage.  
After the twenty days of Objects Visible was complete the data was analysed to 
determine if any difference could be found and possibly attributed to the cleaning 
method. Alpha corrected (Bonferroni) one sample t-tests (p ≤ 0.025) show that 
during the first twelve days of Objects Visible in which no cleaning of the objects took 
place, performance was at chance (t (15) = 1.735, p = 0.103) with an average 
percentage correct of 56.8. During the last eight days where the objects were 
cleaned after each cage performance was also still at chance (t (15) = 1.952, p = 
0.07), resulting in an average percentage correct of 57. Despite the mean values 
being similar to the twenty days as a whole, the lack of a significant result reflects the 
smaller sample sizes.  
Over the twenty days of Objects Visible as a whole a significant object preference 
was shown for the RN object, it was therefore deemed appropriate to move on to the 
experimental stage of the task.  
2.2.2.2 Objects Hidden  
2.2.2.2.1 First Turn Data 
Eacott et al.‟s (2005) results from First Turn data showed a preference for turning 
towards the RN object over 16 days with an average percentage correct of 65.2 (t 
(15) = 5.583, p ≤ 0.001). In the current study over the 16 days of Objects Hidden the 
animals also showed a significant preference for turning towards the RN object with 
an average percentage correct of 56.6 (t (15) = 2.229, p = 0.042). However, the 
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performance of the current study was found to be significantly poorer than the afore-
mentioned task (t (30) = 2.120, p = 0.042) (see figure 2.4). 
  
Figure 2.4: Objects Hidden: First Turn Data (± SEM) 
2.2.2.2.2 D2 Scores 
Average D2 scores over the 16 days of Objects Hidden show that there was a 
significant preference for exploring the RN object demonstrating object familiarity (t 
(15) = 5.888, p ≤ 0.001). However, by looking at the average D2 scores for each 
animal over the 16 days (see Figure 2.5) the variability between them is highlighted. 
* 
* 
* 
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Figure 2.5: Objects Hidden: Average D2 Scores (± SEM) for each animal. 
It also serves to show that the last two cages of animals (animals 8-16) appear to be 
performing significantly more poorly than those in the first two cages (average D2 
score first two cages = 0.249; average D2 score second two cages = 0.108: t (14) = 
2.807, p = 0.014) 
2.2.3 Discussion 
Overall, the 20 days of Objects Visible and 16 days of Objects Hidden did prove to 
be successful and has achieved the objective of replicating Eacott, et al.‟s (2005) 
study. In doing so it demonstrated recollection of the object (what), its location 
(where) and its context (which) that is considered to be episodic-like memory in 
animals. However, when comparing performance of first turns in Objects Hidden, 
performance in the current study was shown to be significantly poorer than that in 
the original task. This led to the question as to what possible factors could be 
contributing to this difference. It is true that testing situations differed between the 
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two studies in several respects. The testing room of the current study was adjacent 
to a corridor which may have been susceptible to disturbance. Whilst the current 
study was taking place there were several other researchers undertaking studies in 
adjacent testing rooms which again may contribute an element of noise disturbance. 
Aside from the testing rooms, the actual E-mazes themselves also differed. In the 
current study the size of the E-maze was larger and the materials used to 
differentiate between the contexts were also different. Another factor to consider is 
that the current study shared objects with other researchers in the area. As this was 
not the case for Eacott, et al. it must be considered as a potential factor and should 
be investigated further.  
The current study also looked at the variability between animals. By doing so it 
showed that the performance of the last two cages was significantly poorer than 
those in the first two cages. It was hypothesised that this could be due to a build up 
of odour on the objects. When object cleaning was brought in during Objects Visible 
performance was not found to be significantly above chance for the first twelve days 
before object cleaning nor the last eight days after cleaning. This result may suggest 
that the cleaning method was not sufficient to eliminate the odours present. Another 
contributing factor may also be that this problem extends back to the habituation 
cages. If odour is built up in the habituation cage it may distract the animals from 
exploring the object inside. This would then result in the object being less familiar 
than intended and so being more attractive when encountered in the E-maze as 
odour would not be a distraction. To investigate this hypothesis further it was 
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necessary to carry out additional days of Objects Hidden with modifications to the 
method.  
2.3 Experiment 2b 
The 16 days of Objects Hidden in Experiment 2a was successful in demonstrating 
episodic-like memory using recollection alone. However, it was clear that not only 
were there significant differences in the level of performance in Eacott, et al.‟s (2005) 
task and Experiment 2a, but also that in Experiment 2a the last two cages‟ 
performance was significantly different to the first two cages. As there are no 
differences in the methodology between the first two cages and the last two cages it 
was hypothesised that this could be due to a build up of odour on the objects. This 
poses a potentially serious problem as any odour on the objects would increase 
exploration in a manner unrelated to the design of the experiment (i.e. the animals 
will explore the objects with interesting odours as opposed to objects which are 
unhabituated) therefore subsequent data will be noisy. Because of this, a cleaning 
method for the objects was introduced during the Objects Visible stage. The cleaning 
method did not appear to be detrimental to performance considering no significant 
difference was found in performance before and after its introduction. However, the 
performance before and after did remain at chance suggesting that the cleaning 
method may not have been sufficient to eliminate the odours present.  In addition, it 
is also possible that the issue of odour extends beyond the objects themselves and 
may actually affect the animals whilst in the habituation cages and in turn still affect 
their performance. Therefore, another eight days of Objects Hidden were carried out 
but now with some modifications to the method.  If in fact the cleaning method that 
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was introduced in Experiment 2a was not effective enough in eliminating the odours 
from the objects it seems likely that this materialises only after the first two cages 
when there will have been a build up of the first eight rat‟s odours on the objects. 
Therefore, by using four objects over two days this would allow for the first two cages 
to be presented with objects A and B (for example) and the last two cages with 
objects C and D. The following day the first two cages would see objects C and D 
and the last two cages would see objects A and B. Adopting this procedure would 
ensure that only eight animals could potentially odorise the objects, which appears 
from the data of Experiment 2a to be the limit for odour.  
2.3.1 Methods and Materials 
The method followed was the same as that for Experiment 2a aside from the 
modifications. With the possibility that the cleaning method used in the second part 
of Objects Visible was not sufficient in eliminating the odours on the objects 
themselves, a modification was devised that instead used four objects over two 
days. Half the group were presented with two objects one day and the other half with 
the other two, the next day this was reversed. This particular modification was used 
in the hope to further limit any odours on the objects. New habituation cages were 
also introduced after the second cage, cleaning the habituation cages with alcohol 
wipes after each cage, whilst continuing to clean the objects after each cage. 
Another eight days of Objects Hidden were carried out with these modifications to 
the methodology.  
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2.3.2 Results 
2.3.2.1 Objects Hidden 
2.3.2.1.1 First Turn Data 
Experiment 2b showed the average first turn percentage correct dropping to 53.9%. 
The rats were not significantly choosing to turn towards the novel object in 
preference to the habituated object (t (15) = 1.159, p = 0.264).  
This drop in performance in terms of First Turn data from Experiment 2a to 
Experiment 2b was not of significance (t (15) = 0.583, p = 0.569) (see Figure 2.6). 
 
  
Figure 2.6: Objects Hidden: First Turn Data (± SEM) Experiment 2a and 2b 
 
 
* 
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2.3.2.1.2 D2 Scores 
Exploration times supported the first turn data by showing no significant preference 
for the novel object with a mean D2 score of 0.053 (t (15) = 1.120, p = 0.28). 
  
Figure 2.7: Objects Hidden: Average D2 Scores (± SEM) Experiment 2a and 2b 
However, although there was seen to be no significant drop in First Turn data from 
Experiment 2a to 2b, there was found to be a significant drop regarding D2 scores (t 
(15) = 2.383, p = 0.031) (see Figure 2.7).  
2.3.3 Discussion 
It is clear from the results that the change in methodology from using two objects in 
one day to using four objects over two days has not been effective. In fact, when 
analysing D2 scores it is apparent that exploration of the RN object has dropped 
significantly. As it is D2 scores i.e. object interest that influences First Turn data i.e. 
object preference, it appears that object interest in this case has diminished prior to 
* 
* 
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object preference, which would explain the fact that there was no significant object 
preference in this experiment compared to Experiment 2a. 
The methodology of Experiment 2b differed to that of Experiment 2a in that four 
objects were used over two days and a new cleaning method regarding the 
habituation cages was introduced. As performance was seen to drop significantly it is 
not clear as to whether it is the change in the use of objects or the change in the 
cleaning method that is having this effect. As there was seen to be no significant 
drop in performance in Experiment 2a before the cleaning method was introduced 
and after, the significant drop in performance observed the current study was 
thought to be a result of the change in the use of objects. The new cleaning method 
was introduced to improve the performance of the last two cages. However, these 
results are blurred by the apparent drop in performance. In order for these results to 
become clearer it is necessary to alter the methodology once more.   
2.4 Experiment 2c 
Experiment 2b showed that despite the change in methodology performance 
dropped even further. Although there was no significant difference between First 
Turn data from Experiment 2a to 2b there was a significant difference in D2 scores. 
The two changes in methodology were regarding object use and cleaning method. 
The decision to keep this new cleaning regime was based on the fact that after the 
introduction of the cleaning method in the Objects Visible phase of Experiment 2a 
there was no significant difference in performance, therefore although not improving 
performance significantly it was also not detrimental to it. In addition, during Objects 
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Hidden, performance of the last two cages differed from that of the first two cages. 
However, any possible improvement in performance in Experiment 2b may have 
been masked by the change in use of the objects. As mentioned previously, carrying 
out many days of testing is a necessity when conducting behavioural experiments in 
the E-maze, particularly when also investigating modifications to the methodology. It 
would not be surprising therefore if at some point performance dropped that was not 
only due to factors such as odour, but also the fact that the task itself was becoming 
less novel. One potential way of boosting performance when this occurs would be to 
introduce a „genuinely novel‟ object, an object not previously seen during the sample 
phases. With this added novelty, object interest and consequently object preference 
should be enhanced.   
With the above in mind, a further thirty days of Objects Hidden were carried out to 
test the object modification outlined above, and also to determine if this would result 
in performance stabilising over time. 
2.4.1 Methods and Materials 
The method used was the same as that for 2a with regard to the schedule. With 
regard to cleaning method it was decided to continue with the method used in 
Experiment 2b as any possible improvement due to this cleaning method may not 
have become apparent due to the change in the use of objects.  
Modifications to the method involve reverting back to using two objects over one day, 
however, there was also the introduction of a „genuinely novel‟ (GN) object at test 
(this required two copies of an extra object to be made).This would be an object that 
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the rats were not previously habituated to. Previously the rats were experiencing an 
object, either habituated or non-habituated. This non-habituated object was not 
completely novel as they had seen it before in the two sample phases. The aspect 
that was novel was its location in a specific context. This GN object was new in all 
these aspects and should therefore prove more interesting to the rats. The non-
habituated object and the GN object were paired at test. This GN object was not 
cleaned as it was only used for the test phase.  
With these modifications another 30 days of Objects Hidden were carried out. This 
high number of days was carried out to investigate whether performance could be 
sustained over long periods of time. 
2.4.2 Results 
2.4.2.1 Objects Hidden 
2.4.2.1.1 First Turn Data 
The modifications to the methodology resulted in a significant preference for turning 
towards the now GN object over thirty days (t (15) = 3.044, p = 0.008) with an 
average percentage correct of 59.1.  
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Figure 2.8: Objects Hidden: First Turn Data (± SEM) Experiment 2a, 2b and 2c 
However, there was found to be no significant effect of group (experiment) on 
performance (F (2, 30) = 0.825, p = 0.448) (see Figure 2.8)  
When considering performance over time, for analyses purposes the thirty days were 
split into days 1 to 15 and days 16 to 30 to investigate whether performance was 
significantly different in the first half of the testing period compared to the second 
half. Alpha corrected (Bonferroni) one sample t-tests (p ≤ 0.025) show that during the 
first half of the testing period (days 1 to 15) performance was significantly above 
chance levels with an average percentage correct of 57.9 (t (15) = 2.515, p = 0.024). 
During the second half of the testing period (days 16 to 30) there was also a 
significant preference for turning toward the GN object with an average percentage 
correct of 58.8 (t (15) = 3.120, p = 0.007). There was found to be no significant 
difference in the performance between the first half and the second half of these 
thirty days (t (15) = -0.357, p = 0.726), indicating that performance was stable. 
* 
* 
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2.4.2.1.2 D2 Scores 
The introduction of the GN object resulted in a significant preference for exploring 
the GN object (t (15) = 39.148, p ≤ 0.001). 
 
Figure 2.9: Objects Hidden: Average D2 Scores (± SEM) Experiment 2a, 2b and 2c 
The GN object also resulted in an effect of group (experiment) on performance (F (2, 
45) = 90.841, p ≤ 0.001). Alpha corrected (Bonferroni) post hoc analyses (p ≤ 0.016) 
found there to be a significant increase in D2 scores from Experiment 2b to 2c (t (15) 
= -12.685, p ≤ 0.001) and from Experiment 2a to 2c (t (15) = 13.516, p ≤ 0.001) (see 
Figure 2.9).  
Again, when considering the performance over time, alpha corrected (Bonferroni) 
one sample t-tests (p ≤ 0.025) showed exploration to significantly favour the GN 
object during the first 15 days with an average D2 score of 0.604 (t (15) = 27.138, p 
≤ 0.001) and also the last 15 days with an average D2 score of 0.734 (t (15) = 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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36.352, p ≤ 0.001). Unlike for First Turn data however, there was a significant 
increase in the exploration of the GN object during the second half of the experiment 
compared to the first half (t (15) = -4.619, p ≤ 0.001).  
2.4.3 Discussion 
The addition of the GN object resulted in First Turn data being significantly above 
chance and so again demonstrating episodic-like memory using recollection alone. 
However, this was not a significant improvement from Experiment 2a or Experiment 
2b. D2 scores were also significantly above chance and this was a significant 
improvement from both Experiment 2a and 2b.  
The current experiment also examined the stability of performance over a relatively 
long period of time. By splitting the experiment into two blocks of fifteen days 
performance was shown both in the first half of the experiment and the second half 
to be above chance levels.  There was also found to be no significant difference in 
First Turn data between the first half and the second half of the experiment.  
Although the improvement in First Turn data did not reach significance, there was 
seen to be a significant improvement in D2 scores. It would be logical to surmise that 
increased object interest (i.e. D2 scores) would lead to an object preference which 
would be observed in improved First Turn data. As this was not seen, perhaps then 
this reflects that object preference does not necessarily mirror the level of interest in 
the object. First Turn scores did not have to significantly improve for D2 scores to 
significantly improve. It could be that the first turn is not so important for the animals 
as they have been habituated to two minutes in the maze and they have learnt that 
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even if they turn towards the habituated object first they will still then have time to 
explore the GN object. This is also seen in the results that show First Turn data does 
not significantly differ from the first half of the experiment to the second half, yet 
exploration of the GN object does, in fact it improves as the experiment continues. 
However, this could also suggest that stability of First Turn data is necessary for D2 
scores to improve. 
2.5 Experiment 2d: Probe Day 
A probe day was carried out that followed the same procedure as Experiment 2c, 
however no objects were placed in the habituation cages. This was to determine 
whether or not the episodic-like memory observed was based on memory or whether 
it was based on the animals being able to locate the GN object from the start arm 
using odours or other unintended cues. If these results were seen to be above 
chance this would suggest that the animals are using unintended cues to locate the 
GN object instead of using memory. Results from D2 scores should still be 
significantly above chance as even though the animals have not habituated to an 
object, the GN object has not been seen before, whereas the other two objects were 
seen during the sample phases of the task. 
2.5.1 Results 
2.5.1.1 First Turn Data 
As expected First Turn data for the probe day showed no preference for the GN 
object with an average percentage correct of 56.3 (t (15) = 0.488, p = 0.633) lending 
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reassurance that the performance demonstrated in Experiments 2a to 2c was based 
on memory and the animals were not locating the GN object using unintended cues. 
  
Figure 2.10: Objects Hidden: First Turn Data (± SEM) Experiment 2c and Probe Day 
Although Experiment 2c saw First Turn data above chance and the Probe day did 
not, there was no significant drop in performance (t (15) = -0.211, p = 0.835).  
2.5.1.2 D2 Scores 
A one sample-t-test confirms as expected, a continued significant preference for 
exploring the GN object with an average D2 score of 0.751 (t (15) = 17.299, p ≤ 
0.001). 
* 
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Figure 2.11: Objects Hidden: Average D2 Scores (± SEM) Experiment 2c and Probe Day 
There was however, no significant difference in the exploration of the GN object from 
Experiment 2c to the Probe day (t (15) = -1.343, p = 0.199).  
2.5.2 Discussion 
Reassuringly, First Turn data from the Probe day was at chance, confirming that the 
episodic memory demonstrated in Experiment 2c was not a result of being able to 
locate the GN object by odour or other unintended cues. There was a continued 
significant preference for exploring the GN object which was also as expected. As 
explained previously, as the GN object was only seen at test and not in either of the 
sample phases it still holds its novelty and so according to the rats‟ innate preference 
for novelty (Ennaceur & Delacour, 1988) exploration should favour this object. 
 
 
* 
* 
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2.6 Discussion 
The current chapter has been successful with regard to the original aim of replicating 
Eacott, et al.‟s (2005) study demonstrating the what-where-which memory triad that 
can be considered episodic-like in animals. This replication reinforced the claim by 
Eacott et al. that the task cannot be solved based on familiarity, instead it 
necessitates the need to recollect a prior experience in order to be successful.  
Despite this successful replication, the results were found to be significantly different 
to the original study (Eacott et al., 2005). The observed difference in First Turns may 
have been due to differences in the E-maze that was used. The E-maze used in the 
current chapter used contexts to differentiate between different occasions, however it 
may be that in the maze used here that these occasion setters were more difficult to 
differentiate than in the original study. Contexts in the original study were one of two 
colours (black or grey) and had different textures (plain or mesh), whereas in the 
current maze the context were either grey or a mixture of black, white and grey with 
no textures. It is possible that the simple block colours and textures made it easier 
for the animals to differentiate from one context to another. Testing in the original 
study was also not hampered by other experiments taking place in neighbouring 
testing rooms, yet the current study saw neighbouring testing rooms occupied which 
again may have caused stress induced neophobia. 
The results of the current chapter also highlight other methodological issues that 
require attention before any further manipulations such as lesion studies can be 
carried out. When conducting lesion studies it is necessary to have a task that not 
 96 
 
only shows true episodic-like memory, but also to have a task that is consistent over 
time.  
By analysing the data further it is clear that such spontaneous tasks can be 
vulnerable to extraneous variables that upon detailed analyses clearly influence the 
results. A method of cleaning the objects was introduced during the Objects Visible 
stage, and although not having a detrimental effect of the results, performance 
before and after its introduction remained at chance, suggesting that the cleaning 
method may not have been sufficient to eliminate the odours present. The observed 
drop in performance of the last two cages suggested that further manipulations to the 
methodology were needed to rectify this issue. If odour is having an impact on the 
animals‟ exploratory behaviour then what has previously been concluded to be 
demonstrations of episodic-like memory, may in fact be a misconception. It could be 
that the animals are locating the non-habituated object via odour pathways or other 
unintended cues and not through the recollection of any memory. However, the 
deterioration of the last two cages also suggests that these pathways can become 
saturated to the point where exploratory behaviour indicates neither an object 
preference nor navigation via odour.  
Experiment 2b addressed this problem by altering the methodology regarding object 
use and cleaning. Object use was spread out over two days and the cleaning 
method no longer restricted itself to the object but instead included the habituation 
cages also. However, this alteration in methodology did not have the desired effect 
as even though first turn data did not drop significantly, the results were at chance 
level and so not demonstrating the episodic-like memory seen in Experiment 2a. 
 97 
 
There was however, a significant drop in D2 scores that resulted in no preference for 
exploring the RN object, which explains why First Turn data was at chance. As the 
manipulations to the methodology were two-fold it was not clear what was causing 
this result. It was hypothesised that the change in objects from having one set of 
objects made each day to having two sets over two days and interchanged between 
the cages was more likely to have caused the results rather than the cleaning 
method due to the fact performance was not seen to drop following its introduction in 
the Objects Visible phase of Experiment 2a. The issue of odour was a problem that 
could only deteriorate further and so the new cleaning regime was adopted as 
standard for future experiments. It was also hypothesised that as many days of the 
task had been carried out that it was the task itself that may have lost its novelty 
factor.  
Considering this Experiment 2c saw the introduction of the GN object was with the 
hope of not only enhancing the novelty of the task but also boosting performance. 
This particular manipulation to the methodology did have the desired effect. First 
Turn data showed the animals now demonstrating episodic-like memory using 
recollection alone, this was also reflected in a significant improvement in D2 scores. 
In addition to this it was also important to determine whether this performance could 
be maintained over relatively long periods of testing which would be necessary if 
future experiments were to involve lesion experiments. Thirty days of Objects Hidden 
were carried out and to further analyse the performance over time these days were 
split into two blocks of fifteen days. With regard to First Turn data, performance was 
found to be above chance levels during both the first and the second half of the 
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experiment, with no significant difference between the first fifteen days and the 
second fifteen days. D2 scores however significantly improved in the second half. 
This can be explained by the fact that it is D2 scores that drive First Turn data. In 
other words, in order for object preference to significantly improve, object interest 
has to improve first. It also implies that the stability of First Turn data may impact on 
D2 scores. These results also suggest that the data from Experiment 2b was a 
culmination of odour saturation on the objects and in the maze and the fact that the 
task was beginning to lose its novelty aspect. Reassuringly, the probe day confirmed 
that the episodic-like memory seen in Experiments 2a and 2c were not the result of 
the rats using odour or other unintended cues to locate the RN/GN object but rather 
the observed result was a true reflection of their memory. 
Regarding the introduction of the GN object, in retrospect although it improved 
performance as expected, as a permanent change in methodology it is not viable. 
This is due to the fact that a) it served its purpose in adding novelty to the task and 
improving performance, and b) that further investigations using this method (e.g. 
lesion studies) may produce data that cannot be decisively explained. It could be that 
if a lesion group were impaired on the task that this impairment may lie in the fact 
that the lesion affects the ability to recognise that there is a GN object and that this is 
replacing the RN object. However, differentiating this from an impairment in episodic-
like memory would be impossible. In addition, there is the fact that First Turn data in 
Experiment 2c was not significantly improved. Therefore, it would be appropriate to 
revert back to the RN object and determine if the temporary novelty that the GN 
object brought to the task was enough to bring performance above chance. 
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The current chapter has highlighted several important issues that impact on 
spontaneous tasks such as the one described here. It is clear that data from such 
tasks needs to be analysed in depth to determine if there are any unusual patterns of 
data that indicate the influence of extraneous variables such as odour. As explained 
previously, the influence of such variables can lead to illusory data and inaccurate 
conclusions. In addition, it is apparent that the aspect of novelty that is so intrinsic to 
such tasks can also have a detrimental effect on the results. Although it is important 
to have a task that is stable over time, this stability requires consistent levels of 
novelty which is not an easy balance to find. However, the flexibility of such tasks 
allows for manipulations to the methodology that can readdress this balance if 
necessary. 
This chapter has resulted in a task that successfully demonstrates episodic-like 
memory using recollection alone, and a task that appears to be stable over time. 
Therefore it was deemed appropriate to further investigate episodic-like memory in 
the E-maze, in particular to investigate the effect of lesions to the hippocampus. 
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3 EPISODIC-LIKE MEMORY AND THE HIPPOCAMPUS 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 was important in highlighting the significance of the now modified What-
Where-Which task created by Eacott, Easton and  Zinkivskay (2005). Normally, 
object memory tasks rely on recognition, that is, the animal has a choice between a 
visible object that is novel and a familiar object in an open field arena. In an Open 
Field arena, the fact that the both objects are visible to the animal at the start of the 
test phase of the task, apparent preference for the novel object may be more related 
to object familiarity rather than actual object recollection. When investigating episodic 
memory, tasks that demand free recall have been suggested to be of more value 
than recognition tasks as the latter can involve correct responses based on 
familiarity which is not episodic in nature (Kelley & Jacoby, 2000). Unlike previous 
tasks (Eacott & Norman, 2004; Gaffan, 1994), the task developed by Eacott et al. 
(2005) successfully demonstrated episodic-like memory in animals through the use 
of recollection processes only. As the objects were hidden, the task did not allow for 
familiarity cues and so was not solved using recognition. Differentiating between the 
tasks that measure episodic-like memory using recall (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998; 
Eacott & Gaffan, 2005) or recognition (Kart-Teke, De Souza Silva, Huston, & Dere, 
2006) is crucial when considering that human recognition memory allows for both 
familiarity and recall (Yonelinas, 2001).  
Although studies have attempted to dissociate recollection and familiarity through the 
analyses of ROC curves (Fortin et al., 2004; Sauvage et al., 2008), direct 
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behavioural evidence in the rat has been lacking. However, in a recent study Easton 
et al. (2009) were able to behaviourally separate measures of familiarity and recall 
and in doing so implicate the fornix in the recall circuit but not the familiarity circuit, 
therefore lending support to the two separate neural circuitry systems proposed by 
Aggleton and Brown (1999). The nature of the task according to Easton et al. 
defends itself against apparent contradictory evidence (Eacott and Norman, 2004). 
The current experiment aimed to investigate the effect of bilateral lesions to the 
hippocampus on episodic-like memory using Eacott et al.‟s (2005) what-where-which 
task in the E-maze. The benefit of such a task is that it allows for the measurement 
and differentiation of familiarity and recall in the same animals in the same trials. It 
also then allows for the measurement of the separate components of episodic-like 
memory to be assessed and the effect of hippocampal lesions on these individual 
components to be determined. The nature of previous studies such as Langston & 
Wood (2006) have not allowed for this differentiation between familiarity and recall 
due to the fact that the task was conducted in the open field. The relevance of these 
bilateral hippocampal lesions is also related to the studies investigating fornix lesions 
due to the fact that the fornix contains a variety of pathways that project both to and 
from the hippocampus.  
Cutting the fornix often mimics the effects of hippocampectomies (Aggleton & Brown, 
1999), yet does not result in retrograde cell loss in the medial temporal lobe (Diaitz 
&Powell, 1954), therefore the resultant loss of memory must be due to the 
disconnection of pathways and not simply the loss of hippocampal cells (Fujii, 2008). 
It has also been hypothesised that the fornix may be less of an important conduit of 
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hippocampal afferent and efferent projections in the monkey compared to the rat 
(Zolamorgan, Squire, & Amaral, 1989). Eacott & Gaffan (2005) suggest that the 
hippocampus, as evidenced by lesions of the fornix, has a distinct function of its own 
which encompasses information regarding objects, positions and contexts. 
Considering the results reported by Easton et al., (2009) and the successful 
replication of Eacott et al. in Chapter 2, the next logical step is to investigate this 
further by undertaking the same task but with rats that have bilateral lesions to the 
hippocampus. The effect of these lesions on overall what-where-which memory and 
the individual components of episodic-like memory can then be observed. 
3.2 Experiment 3 
3.2.1 Methods and materials 
3.2.1.1 Subjects 
Twenty experimentally naïve Dark Agouti male rats (Harlan laboratories, UK) 
underwent surgery. Two animals died in the immediate postoperative period and so 
18 were used in the studies described in the current chapter. They were housed in 
cages of four and were subject to diurnal conditions (12 hour light/12 hour dark 
cycles). It should be noted that Sham animals and the Hippocampal lesioned 
animals were housed together in their cages, they were not separated into their 
respective lesions/sham groups. 
Testing always took place during the light cycle and never started before 7am or 
finished after 7pm.  Access to food and water was ad libitum, levels of which were 
 103 
 
monitored daily as governed by the Animal (Scientific Procedures Act) (1986) and 
approved by the Home Office Project licence. 
3.2.1.2 Surgery 
In order for surgery to begin rats had to reach a weight of 180 grams. The surgical 
procedures were carried out by Dr Anthony McGregor and were carried out over a 
period of 17 days. The surgical procedure was chosen due to its success in previous 
studies (Jones, Pearce, Davies, Good, & McGregor, 2007; McGregor, Good, & 
Pearce, 2004; Pearce, Good, Jones, & McGregor, 2004). 
3.2.1.2.1 Hippocampal lesion group (n=8) 
The method for anaesthesia was a mixture of isoflurane and oxygen (5% isoflurane 
for induction and 2% for maintenance). Once under deep anaesthesia each rat was 
then placed into a stereotaxic frame (Kopf Instruments, Tujunga, CA). The primary 
incision was made along the midline of the scalp and through use of a dental burr it 
was then possible to remove the bone overlying the neocortex. Using the stereotaxic 
frame allowed secure positioning of a 2 μl Hamilton syringe containing ibotenic acid. 
An electronic microdrive (Model KDS 310, KD Scientific, New Hope, PA) was 
attached to the plunger of the Hamilton syringe in order to regulate the volume and 
rate of infusion of the excittoxin. Ibotenic acid (Tocris, Bristol, UK) was dissolved in 
phosphate-buffered saline (pH 7.4). The resultant solution was of a 63 mM quantity 
and was infused (0.05 – 0.10 μl) at a rate of 0.03 μl/min at 28 sites (for details of the 
stereotaxic coordinates of the injection sites refer to Coutureau, Galani, Gosselin, 
Majchrzak, & Di Scala (1999). After each infusion the Hamilton syringe was left in 
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place for 2 minutes. This allowed the solution to diffuse away from the injection 
material and into the surrounding tissue.  
At the end of the procedure the incisions of the scalp were closed with clips. All rats 
received a 10ml injection of saline and glucose solution, and 1ml of buprenorphine 
as an analgesic. The animals were then placed in a recovery box. The temperature 
of the recovery box was maintained at a constant 40°C for 3-4 hours. From the 
recovery box the rats were then housed alone for an appropriate period of time (1 to 
2 days) until it was deemed that sufficient recovery had taken place and only then 
were they transferred back to their original home cages. Testing of these animals did 
not begin until a minimum of 14 post-operative days of recovery had passed. Two 
animals died during recovery leaving a total of 10 animals for this group. 
3.2.1.2.2 Sham Group (n = 8) 
The surgical procedure for the Sham group was intended as a control for the effects 
of the surgical procedures undergone by the Hippocampal lesion group so a similar 
surgical procedure was adhered to. The skin was incised and the neocortex was 
exposed. Perforation of the dura was carried out using a Microlance3 25 gauge 
needle to control for the possibility of mechanical damage to the underlying parietal 
cortex but critically no injection was administered. 
The procedure following surgery for the sham group followed the same protocol as 
outlined for the hippocampal lesioned group. 
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3.2.1.3 Perfusion 
For histological purposes, at the end of testing, or if necessary after an animal was 
euthanized, animals were perfused intracardially with a 5% formol-saline solution. 
The brains were removed, placed in 10% formol-saline for at least 4 hours and then 
placed into 25% sucrose solution for 24-48 hours before being sectioned. They were 
sectioned horizontally into 50μm slices and every 5th section was stained with cresyl 
violet (Nissl stain). 
3.2.1.4 Apparatus 
Apparatus is the same used and described in Chapter 2. 
3.2.1.5 Design 
Design is the same used and described in Chapter 2. Counterbalancing in this case 
also took into account counterbalancing within as well as across the two groups. 
3.2.1.6 Data Collection 
The same method of data collection was used as that described in Chapter 2.  
3.2.1.7 Procedure 
3.2.1.7.1 Habituation 
Habituation was carried out in stages to minimise the effects of stress on the 
animals. Habituation for this experiment was different to the habituation procedure 
followed in Chapter 2 due to the fact that the animals had undergone extended 
recovery following surgery therefore the habituation procedure was extended. The 
initial stage of habituation allowed the rats to explore the E-maze in groups of two. 
Each cage housed four rats and so each cage had two pairs for habituation. Two of 
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the cages however (cages 1 and 5) housed only three rats (due to the loss of rats 3 
and 17) and so were simply kept in their cage group. 
For two days the rats were placed in the E-Maze in their groups in context X (grey) 
for 30 minutes with the objects in the objects visible position (refer to chapter 2). 
Following this they then had four days of context X in groups for 20 minutes, with 
objects in the visible position. These six days were then repeated using context Y 
(wallpaper and mesh floor). Day 13 of habituation the rats were again in groups for 
20 minutes in context X with objects in the visible position. Day 14 followed the same 
procedure but in context Y.  
Once the rats had been sufficiently habituated to the E-maze and both contexts it 
was then possible to expose them to the E-maze individually. Four days of alternate 
contexts were then used. In these four days the rats were exposed to the E-maze 
individually for 15 minutes with objects in the visible positions.  
The habituation cage was then introduced. Day 19 exposed the rats to 10 minutes 
alone in the E-maze with objects visible and then to 10 minutes alone in the 
habituation cage (without an object) before being returned to the holding cage. Day 
20 followed the same procedure but using context Y. Having introduced the 
habituation cage it was now necessary to introduce an object in the habituation cage. 
Day 21 of habituation allowed the individual rats to explore the E-maze in Context X 
with objects visible for 2 minutes. They were then placed in the habituation cage for 
8 minutes, during the first 7 minutes the habituation cage contained no object, it was 
only for last minute that an object was introduced. This was to try and increase 
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object interest during habituation immediately prior to entering the maze. After these 
8 minutes the rat was returned to the E-maze for a final 2 minutes in the same 
context and then returned to the holding cage. Day 22 of habituation followed the 
same procedure but used context Y. Up to this point the context of the E-maze was 
never changed within a day. Therefore day 23 of habituation saw individual rats 
exploring the E-maze in context X with objects visible for 2 minutes. They were then 
placed in the habituation cage (empty) whilst the context was changed. They then 
were placed back in the E-maze, this time in context Y for a further 2 minutes. They 
were then placed in the habituation cage for 8 minutes (empty except for the final 
minute when an object was introduced). They were returned to the E-maze for a final 
2 minutes in context Y before being returned to the holding cage. Day 24, the final 
day of habituation, saw the same procedure followed but on this day the context 
order was XYX.  
3.2.1.7.2 Cleaning Procedure and Object Details 
The cleaning procedure followed was that used in experiments 2b, 2c and 2d. 
Objects were cleaned after every cage, habituation cages were cleaned after every 
cage and these cages were changed after cage 3. The maze was also cleaned at 
the end of every testing day. With regard to objects, despite the initial success of the 
„genuinely new novel‟ object it was deemed inappropriate to use this object as it may 
mask the true effects of the lesion on any episodic-like memory observed. Therefore, 
the original method of using a „relatively novel‟ (RN) object was again adopted. 
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Sixteen days of Objects Visible were carried out. The procedure for Objects Visible is 
the same to that detailed in Chapter 2, Experiment 2a but counterbalanced for a 
different number of animals and for between groups. 
3.2.1.7.3 Objects Hidden 
After 16 days of Objects Visible, a blank day of Objects Hidden was carried out. This 
involved the objects being placed in the hidden locations but no exposure to objects 
in the habituation cages (see Chapter 2 Experiment 2a for details).  
Following this blank day, 16 days of Objects Hidden were carried out. Methodology 
regarding the objects were the same as detailed in Chapter 2, Experiment 2a and 
cleaning method followed the procedure outlined in Experiment 2b.  
3.2.2 Results 
3.2.2.1 Histology 
Volume of damage was calculated by using images from Paxinos & Watson (1999) 
magnified to 160%. Once the appropriate lesions were drawn onto these images 
transparent graph paper (0.5mm x 0.5mm squares) was then used to count the area 
of lesion damage which could be used to calculate percentage of volume damage. 
Due to the histological process slides for all the animals were not at identical levels 
related to Bregma and Interaural, therefore for consistency and comparative 
purposes measurements were taken at three levels where the hippocampus for all 
animals appears most dorsal, ventral and midway between the two. Volume of 
damage to the Subiculum, Parietal Cortex (for the one animal sectioned corronally) 
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and Hippocampal White Matter were also included.  Although the Subiculum was not 
intended to be damaged, the proximity of it to the CA1 field of the Hippocampus 
means unintended damage is common. Unintended damage to other areas will be 
discussed as necessary. 
Histological analyses indicated that of the 10 animals that survived surgery and 
completed testing, only 5 had hippocampal lesions which were considered sufficient 
(≥70% bilaterally) for the purposes of the study. This criteria was adopted from 
previous studies using the same surgical procedure (Jones et al., 2007) but made 
more stringent (i.e. ≥70% bilaterally not ≥65% bilaterally) under the guidance of 
surgeon Dr Anthony McGregor. The criterion was also reinforced by the results of 
studies investigating hippocampal lesion size on spatial memory (Broadbent, Squire 
& Clark, 2004), the significance of which is that episodic memory must involve some 
degree of spatial encoding. 
3.2.2.1.1 Partial Hippocampal Group (Partial HPC) (n = 5) 
Of those 5 animals that were excluded (but included in separate analyses) lesions 
ranged from 37% to 69.2% (see Table 3.1 and Figures 3.1 to 3.5). This group is to 
be referred to as the Partial HPC group. The lesions extended from approximately 
3.10mm to -8.42mm posterior to Bregma. Possible reasons for the surgery being 
partially successful with respect to the aforementioned criteria include the fact that 
an unpiloted analgesic post-surgery was used which may have interacted with the 
excitotoxin. In addition, the supplier of the excitotoxin was new to the surgeon as 
was the surgery set up. 
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Table 3.1: Percentage of damage for animals considered insufficient to be regarded as a full hippocampal 
lesion (see also corresponding Figures 3.1 to 3.5). 
Animal   Hippocampus Subiculum Parietal Cortex Hippocampal White Matter 
    L % R % M L % 
R 
% M 
L 
% 
R 
% M L % R % M 
PHPC 
2* Bregma -3.60mm/Interaural 5.40mm 91 97 94 0 0 0 33 93 63 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -4.80mm/Interaural 4.20mm 91 96 93.5 0 0 0 43 81 62 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -6.04mm/Interaural 2.96mm 10 30 20 4 10 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Mean 64 74.3 69.2 1 3 2 25 58 41.7 0 0 0 
PHPC 5 Bregma -3.10mm/Interaural 6.90mm 54 59 56.5 3 3 3 - - - 0 30 15 
 
Bregma -5.60mm/Interaural 4.40mm 41 25 33 0 0 0 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm 17 26 21.5 11.5 16 13.75 - - - 0 0 0 
  Mean 37.3 36.7 37 4.8 6.3 5.6 - - - 0 10 5 
PHPC 
11 Bregma -3.10mm/Interaural 6.90mm 59 65 62 13 10 11.5 - - - 0 12.5 6.25 
 
Bregma -5.60mm/Interaural 4.40mm 34 25 29.5 0 0 0 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm 13 26 19.5 3 7 5 - - - 0 0 0 
  Mean 35.3 38.7 37 5.3 5.7 5.5 - - - - 4.2 2.1 
PHPC 
15 Bregma -3.10mm/Interaural 6.90mm 56 63 59.5 0 10 10 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -5.60mm/Interaural 4.40mm 66 55 60.5 0 0 0 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm 9 22 15.5 3 10 0 - - - 0 0 0 
  Mean 43.7 46.7 45.2 0 6.7 3.3 - - - 0 0 0 
PHPC 
19 Bregma -3.10mm/Interaural 6.90mm 70 75 72.5 11 6 8.5 - - - 30 0 15 
 
Bregma -5.60mm/Interaural 4.40mm 66 41 53.5 0 0 0 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm 30 17 23.5 8.3 5 0 - - - 0 0 0 
  Mean 55.3 44.3 49.8 6.4 3.7 2.8 - - - 10 0 5 
*coronal sections 
Table 3.1 shows the 5 animals that were considered to have insufficient bilateral 
lesions to the hippocampus based on the criteria outlined previously.  
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Figure 3.1: Partial HPC Group: Coronal Sections (starting at Bregma 360mm, Interaural 5.40mm and 
finishing at Bregma -6.04, Interaural 2.96mm) showing an individual animal (PHPC 2). The associative 
parietal cortex is indicated by red lines. Hippocampal cell loss and/or associative parietal cortex damage 
is shaded gold. See Table 3.1 for corresponding volume figures. Taken from  Paxinos and Watson (2007). 
Figure 3.1 shows corronal sections from an animal from the Partial HPC group. In 
addition to hippocampal cell loss there is also shown to be some associative parietal 
cortex damage that is not uniformly distributed. 
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Figure 3.2: Partial HPC Group: Horizontal sections (starting at Bregma -3.10mm Interaural 6.90mm 
and finishing at Bregma -8.42mm Interaural 1.58mm) showing an individual animal (PHPC 19). 
Hippocampal cell loss is shaded gold. Thinning of Hippocampal White Matter is highlighted on the figure. 
See Table 3.1 for corresponding volume figures. Taken from  Paxinos and Watson (2007). 
  Thinning of 
Hippocampal White 
Matter 
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Figure 3.3: Partial HPC Group: Horizontal Sections (starting at Bregma -3.10mm Interaural 6.90mm 
and finishing at Bregma -8.42mm Interaural 1.58mm) showing an individual animal (PHPC 5). 
Hippocampal cell loss is shaded gold. Thinning of Hippocampal White Matter is highlighted on the figure. 
See Table 3.1 for corresponding volume figures. Taken from  Paxinos and Watson (2007). 
 
  
Figure 3.4: Partial HPC Group: Horizontal Sections (starting at Bregma -3.10mm Interaural 6.90mm 
and finishing at Bregma -8.42mm Interaural 1.58mm) showing an individual animal (PHPC 11). 
Hippocampal cell loss is shaded gold. Thinning of Hippocampal White Matter is highlighted on the figure. 
See Table 3.1 for corresponding volume figures. Taken from  Paxinos and Watson (2007). 
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Figure 3.5: Partial HPC Group: Horizontal Sections (starting at Bregma -3.10mm Interaural 6.90mm 
and finishing at Bregma -8.42mm Interaural 1.58mm) showing an individual animal (PHPC 15). 
Hippocampal cell loss is shaded gold. See Table 3.1 for corresponding volume figures. Taken from  
Paxinos and Watson (2007). 
Displacement of structures and gliosis possibly caused by partial hippocampal cell 
loss was noted in three of the above animals. Displacement was found in the areas 
of the lateral amygdaloid nucleus (see Figure 3.6), the stria terminalis (see Figure 
3.7) and the globus pallidus (see Figure 3.8).  
 
Figure 3.6: Photograph of Nissl-stained horizontal section showing an expanded right ventricle in an 
animal from the Partial HPC group. The expanded right ventricle has caused the lateral amygdaloid 
nucleus to be displaced as highlighted. Unknown if gliosis originates from slight hippocampal damage. 
   
Lateral Amygdaloid 
Nucleus Displaced 
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Figure 3.7: Photograph of Nissl-stained horizontal section showing an expanded right ventricle in an 
animal from the Partial HPC group. The expanded right ventricle has caused the stria terminalis to be 
displaced as highlighted. Unknown if gliosis originates from slight hippocampal damage. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Photograph of Nissl-stained horizontal section showing an expanded right ventricle in an 
animal from the Partial HPC group. The expanded right ventricle has caused the internal capsule and 
medial globus pallidus to be displaced. Unknown if gliosis originates from slight hippocampal damage. 
Figures 3.6 to 3.8 shows evidence of displacement of certain structures due to the 
expansion of the ventricles. It is more likely that the gliosis near to these areas 
actually originates from slight hippocampal cell loss rather than actual damage to 
surrounding structures. 
Stria Terminalis Displaced 
Medial Globus Pallidus and 
Internal Capsule Displaced  
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3.2.2.1.2 Hippocampal Lesion Group (HPC) (n = 5) 
Those 5 animals that were included, whose lesions were sufficient with regard to the 
aim of the study, had lesions ranging from 70% to 75.2% (see Table 3.2 and Figures 
3.9 to 3.13). This group is to be referred to as the HPC group (n = 5). The lesions 
extended from 3.10mm to -8.42mm posterior to Bregma.  
Table 3.2: Percentage of damage for animals considered sufficient to be regarded as a full hippocampal 
lesion. 
Animal   Hippocampus Subiculum Parietal Cortex Hippocampal White Matter 
    L % R % M L % R % M L % R % M L % R % M 
HPC 6 Bregma -3.10mm/Interaural 6.90mm 96 95 95.5 11 9 10 - - - 0 25 12.5 
 
Bregma -5.60mm/Interaural 4.40mm 84 89 86.5 0 0 0 - - - 0 43 21.5 
 
Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm 30 26 28 50 20 35 - - - 0 0 0 
  Mean 70 70 70 20.3 9.7 15.0 - - - 0 22.7 11.3 
HPC 9 Bregma -3.10mm/Interaural 6.90mm 98 97 97.5 17 14 15.5 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -5.60mm/Interaural 4.40mm 91 100 95.5 40 20 30 - - - 43 0 21.5 
 
Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm 26 35 30.5 23 17 20 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Mean 71.7 77.3 74.5 26.7 17.0 21.8 - - - 14.3 0.0 7.2 
HPC 12 Bregma -3.10mm/Interaural 6.90mm 96 98 97 89 94 91.5 - - - 0 0 
 
 
Bregma -5.60mm/Interaural 4.40mm 77 89 83 0 0 0 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm 48 43 45.5 37 30 33.5 - - - 0 0 0 
  Mean 73.7 76.7 75.2 42.0 41.3 41.7 - - - 0 0 0 
HPC 13 Bregma -3.10mm/Interaural 6.90mm 97 93 95 74 69 71.5 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -5.60mm/Interaural 4.40mm 81 95 88 0 0 0 - - - 17 0 8.5 
 
Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm 35 26 30.5 10 7 8.5 - - - 0 0 0 
  Mean 71 71.3 71.2 28 25.3 26.7 - - - 5.7 0.0 2.8 
HPC 18 Bregma -3.10mm/Interaural 6.90mm 98 100 99 83 94 88.5 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -5.60mm/Interaural 4.40mm 66 95 80.5 0 0 0 - - - 0 0 0 
 
Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm 52 39 45.5 13 10 11.5 - - - 0 0 0 
  Mean 72 78 75 32 34.7 33.3 - - - 0 0 0 
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Figure 3.9: HPC Group: Horizontal sections (starting at Bregma -3.10mm Interaural 6.90mm and 
finishing at Bregma -8.42mm Interaural 1.58mm) showing an individual animal (HPC 12). Hippocampal 
cell loss is shaded gold. See Table 3.2 for corresponding volume figures. Taken from  Paxinos and 
Watson (2007). 
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3.10: HPC Group: Horizontal Sections (starting at Bregma -3.10mm Interaural 6.90mm and finishing 
at Bregma -8.42mm Interaural 1.58mm) showing an individual animal (HPC 6). Hippocampal cell loss is 
shaded gold. Thinning of Hippocampal White Matter is highlighted on the figure. See Table 3.2 for 
corresponding volume figures. Taken from  Paxinos and Watson (2007). 
 
  
Figure 3.11: HPC Group: Horizontal Sections (starting at Bregma -3.10mm Interaural 6.90mm and 
finishing at Bregma -8.42mm Interaural 1.58mm) showing an individual animal (HPC 9). Hippocampal cell 
loss is shaded gold. Thinning of Hippocampal White Matter is highlighted on the figure. See Table 3.2 for 
corresponding volume figures. Taken from  Paxinos and Watson (2007). 
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Figure 3.12: HPC Group: Horizontal Sections (starting at Bregma -3.10mm Interaural 6.90mm and 
finishing at Bregma -8.42mm Interaural 1.58mm) showing an individual animal (HPC 13). Hippocampal 
cell loss is shaded gold. Thinning of Hippocampal White Matter is highlighted on the figure. See Table 3.2 
for corresponding volume figures. Taken from  Paxinos and Watson (2007). 
 
  
Figure 3.13: HPC Group: Horizontal Sections (starting at Bregma -3.10mm Interaural 6.90mm and 
finishing at Bregma -8.42mm Interaural 1.58mm) showing an individual animal (HPC 18). Hippocampal 
cell loss is shaded gold. See Table 3.2 for corresponding volume figures. Taken from  Paxinos and 
Watson (2007). 
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Displacement of structures and gliosis possibly caused by partial hippocampal cell 
loss was noted in two of the above animals. Displacement was found in the areas of 
the Stria Terminalis (see Figure 3.14) and slight damage was noted to the lateral 
septal nuclei (see Figure 3.15).  
 
 
Figure 3.14: Photograph of Nissl-stained horizontal section showing an expanded right ventricle in 
an animal from the HPC group. The expanded right ventricle has caused the stria terminalis to be 
displaced as highlighted. Unknown if gliosis originates from slight hippocampal damage. 
 
Figure 3.15: Photograph of Nissl-stained horizontal section from an animal from the HPC group 
showing a tear in the lateral septal nuclei. 
 
Stria Terminalis Displaced 
Lateral Septal Nuclei Torn 
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Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show evidence of the displacement of the stria terminalis due 
to the expansion of ventricles and damage to the lateral septal nuclei. It is unclear if 
the latter is caused by the histological process. Visible gliosis is likely to originate 
from slight hippocampal cell loss rather than actual damage to surrounding 
structures.  Damage to the lateral septal nuclei did not appear to affect the behaviour 
of the animal in any notable way. 
3.2.2.2 Objects Visible 
All statistical analyses reported are 2 tailed. All figure legends include calculated 
standard error means (SEM) indicated by error bars. Symbol (*) indicates 
significance ≤ 0.05. Where multiple t-tests are conducted Bonferroni corrections are 
made. Regarding tests for correlations, outliers were considered such if they were ± 
2 SD‟s away from the mean). 
3.2.2.2.1 First Turn Data 
First Turn Data in the Objects Visible stage reveals which object the animals 
explored first, be it the habituated or relatively novel (RN) object. Analyses reveal 
that over 16 days of Objects Visible neither the Sham group (t (7) = 1.680, p = 
0.137), the HPC group (t (4) = -0.720, p = 0.512), nor the Partial HPC group (t (4) = 
0.791, p = 0.473) showed a significant preference for turning towards the RN object 
for their first turn with mean percentage correct scores of 56.3, 44.4 and 54.4 
respectively. 
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3.2.2.2.2 D2 Scores 
D2 scores in the Objects Visible stage, indicate if the animals are showing any object 
preference. Over the 16 days of Objects Visible, the Sham group show a preference 
for exploring the RN object (t (7) = 2.844, p = 0.025) with a mean D2 score of 0.08. 
The HPC group (t (4) = -1.149, p = 0.315) and the Partial HPC group (t (4) = 1.966, p 
= 0.121) showed no such preference with mean D2 scores of -0.11 and 0.07 
respectively indicating the variance between the groups. 
A one-way ANOVA shows that there is an effect of group on average D2 scores (F 
(2,15) = 3.757, p = 0.048). An alpha corrected (Bonferroni) independent t-test (p ≤ 
0.016) revealed that this difference lies between the performance of the Sham group 
and the HPC group (t (11) = 2.327, p = 0.013). Analyses of the differences between 
the other groups did not yield significant results (see Figure 3.16).  
 
Figure 3.16: Objects Visible: Average D2 Scores (± SEM) 
 * 
 * 
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3.2.2.2.3 Relationship between first turn data and D2 scores 
The above results appear to show that First Turn data and average D2 scores do not 
always reflect each other. It would be expected for the Sham group that high D2 
scores would be reflected in high levels of performance in First Turn data and vice 
versa, however, over 16 days the Sham group do in fact show a preference for 
exploring the RN object, yet their performance on First Turns is at chance. In fact, 
the Sham group almost approach a significant negative correlation between their 
average First Turn data over the 16 days and their average D2 scores over the 16 
days (n = 8, r = -0.706, p = 0.051). This suggests that despite the fact they showed a 
preference for exploring the RN object, they did not turn toward the RN object first. 
They only showed this preference after exploring the original habituated object. No 
correlation was expected for the HPC group as recall (and so First Turn data) should 
be impaired. After removing an outlier according to the parameters stated previously, 
the HPC group showed no correlation between their average First Turn data over the 
16 days and their average D2 scores over the 16 days (n = 4, r = -0.789, p = 0.211). 
Over these 16 days the HPC group did not show an object preference for the RN 
object, which was reflected in their relatively poor First Turn data. The Partial HPC 
group also showed no such correlation between their First Turn data and their D2 
scores over the 16 days. There was no relationship between the direction of their 
First Turn and their object preference at exploration (n = 4, r = 0.565, p = 0.320). 
As First Turn data is either correct or incorrect a correlation between D2 scores and 
First Turn data was conducted using average scores over the 16 days. This showed 
that overall for the three groups there was no relationship between the direction of 
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their First Turn and their object preference at exploration (n = 17, r = -0.073, p = 
0.780).  
3.2.2.2.4 Exploration Times 
Despite the aforementioned results, it is possible that First Turn scores can be 
affected by noise at the time of turning. Any noise at this stage may cause the animal 
to freeze or react differently to what is considered their normal behaviour. It is also 
possible that D2 scores can hide the true nature of exploration. Exploration of 1 
second of the RN object and no exploration of the habituated object would lead to a 
perfect positive D2 score, yet it hides the fact that exploration was poor. One way to 
overcome this is to look at exploration times. 
 
Figure 3.17: Objects Visible: Total Exploration time (± SEM) of each group for the RN and Original 
object. 
Figure 3.17 above shows the differences in explorations times for each group for 
both the RN object and the Habituated object. 
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A repeated measures ANOVA (3x2: 3 x group, 2 x object) reveals that there is no 
effect of object on exploration (F (1,15) = 0.499, p = 0.491), no interaction between 
object and group (F (2,15) = 2.323, p = 0.491) and no effect of group overall (F 
(2,15) = 1.669, p = 0.222). 
Although these differences between the groups regarding exploration times was not 
significant, the actual difference highlights the need to analyse exploration times 
along with D2 scores. It also raises a question for future analyses as to whether 
exploration is higher in the Objects Visible task compared to the Objects Hidden 
task. This will lead to further questions regarding habituation times and the length of 
tasks. 
Over the 16 days of Objects Visible only the Sham group showed a preference for 
exploring the RN object, however, exploration was still high, therefore the task was 
changed to Objects Hidden. It was theorised that a change in task may increase 
interest and boost performance. 
3.2.2.3 Objects Hidden 
3.2.2.3.1 First Turn Data 
Over 16 days of Objects Hidden neither the Sham group (t (7) = -0.733, p = 0.487), 
the HPC group (t (4) = 0.526, p = 0.627), nor the Partial HPC group (t (4) = -1.304, p 
= 0.262) showed a significant preference for turning towards the RN object for their 
first turn with mean percentage correct scores of 46.5, 47.5 and 42.5 respectively. 
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3.2.2.3.2 D2 Scores 
D2 scores show that over 16 days of Objects Hidden the Sham group did not show 
familiarity of the RN object (t (7) = 0.682, p = 0.517) with an overall mean D2 score of 
0.05. The HPC group (t (4) = 1.009, p = 0.37) and the Partial HPC group (t (4) = 
0.757, p = 0.491) also showed no preference for exploring the RN object, with mean 
D2 scores of 0.08 and 0.03 respectively. 
Unlike in the Objects Visible phase, a one-way ANOVA shows that there is no effect 
of group on performance (F (2,15) = 0.098, p = 0.907). 
3.2.2.3.3 Relationship between First Turn data and D2 scores 
A significant positive correlation was found between average First Turn Data and D2 
scores over the 16 days for the groups overall (n = 18, r = 0.523, p = 0.026). 
Corresponding analysis of residuals employing a one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test revealed the data to be normally distributed (n = 18, d = 0.958, p = 0.508). As 
individual groups however, it was only the Sham group that neared a significant 
correlation between First Turn and D2 scores (n = 8, r = 0.690, p = 0.058). 
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Figure 3.18: Objects Hidden: Significant positive correlation between First Turn and D2 Scores over 
16 days for all 3 groups. 
Although First Turn data and D2 scores are positively correlated for the three groups 
as a whole over the 16 days of Objects Hidden (Figure 3.18), this may not 
necessarily equate to a successful episodic-like task.  
3.2.2.3.4 Exploration Times 
As mentioned previously, First Turn data and D2 scores can be affected by noise 
and the mathematical nature of the D2 score can hide the true extent of exploration 
and therefore familiarity of an object. Analysis of exploration times therefore gives a 
clearer picture of the animals behaviour. 
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Figure 3.19: Objects Hidden: Total exploration time (± SEM) of each group for the RN and Original 
object. 
Figure 3.19 shows the differences in exploration for the three groups regarding both 
objects. 
A repeated measures ANOVA (3x2: 3 x group, 2 x object) determines that there is no 
effect of object type on exploration times (F (1,15) = 2.518, p = 0.133), no overall 
effect of group on exploration times (F (2,15) = 2.477, p = 0.118) and no interaction 
between object type and group (F (2,15) = 0.484, p = 0.626). 
Comparisons of exploration times between those seen in the Objects Visible task to 
those in the Objects Hidden task will indicate if the animals‟ exploration times 
decrease after completing the Objects Visible task.  
 A repeated measures (3x4: 3 x group, 4 x Objects (RN Objects Visible; Original 
Objects Visible; RN Objects Hidden; Original Objects Hidden)) ANOVA show that 
there is no effect of group on exploration times for either object during both tasks (F 
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(2,15) = 2.000, p = 0.170), no interaction between group and object type during the 
two tasks (F (6,45) = 1.545, p = 0.185), yet there is an effect of object type on 
exploration times between the two tasks (F (3,45) = 49.360, p ≤ 0.001).  
Alpha corrected (Bonferroni) posthoc paired sample t-tests (p ≤ 0.004) show that the 
Sham group explore the habituated object significantly more in the Objects Visible 
phase than in the Objects Hidden phase (t (7) = 6.311, p ≤ 0.001) and also for the 
RN object (t (7) = 4.885, p = 0.002). The Partial HPC group, comparable to the Sham 
group again, also explored the habituated object and the RN object more so in the 
Objects Visible task (t (4) = 7.051, p = 0.002; t (4) = 8.366, p = 0.001 respectively). 
After correctional analyses the HPC group yielded no significant results. 
When looking at exploration times it is also worthwhile to note if there is a difference 
between exploration in the first half of the test phase to the second half of the test 
phase. It could be possible that the majority of exploration is carried out in this first 
phase until such a point is reached where the novelty has worn off. If such a point 
exists then data should be analysed up until this point as this should reflect true 
object interest. Data from the Sham group in the Objects Hidden phase was used to 
investigate this theory further as this group consists of the greatest number of 
animals and will therefore increase the power of analyses. As the test phase was a 
total of two minutes, this was split up into the first and second minute.  
Alpha corrected (Bonferroni) paired-sample t-tests (p ≤ 0.025) showed that over the 
16 days of Objects Hidden, the Sham group showed no significant difference in their 
preference (D2 scores) for exploring the RN object between the first minute and 
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second minute of the test phase (t (7) = -0.085, p = 0.935). Yet, when looking at raw 
explorations times (seconds) (p ≤ 0.012), the Shams actually explore the RN object 
and the Habituated object significantly less in the second minute compared with the 
first minute (t (7) = 4.275, p = 0.004; t (7) = 4.139, p = 0.004). 
This data serves to highlight that although there may be no significant differences in 
D2 scores, raw exploration times tell a different story. However, as it has been 
shown previously that there is a positive correlation between First Turn data and D2 
scores, it should be D2 scores that determine when object interest deteriorates and 
not exploration times. Raw exploration times may still prove useful in determining 
levels of exploration, considering that D2 scores, as stated previously, can hide the 
true extent of exploration. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
The current experiment aimed to investigate the effect of bilateral lesions to the 
hippocampus on episodic-like memory in a task which allows for recollection and 
familiarity to be dissociated. It was hypothesised that the HPC lesion group would 
perform at chance on the first turn (reflecting impaired episodic-like memory) but 
have intact D2 performance (reflecting intact familiarity) as previous studies have 
implicated the hippocampus in recollection but not familiarity (Fortin, et al., 2004; 
Langston & Wood, 2006; Manns, et al., 2003; Sauvage, Fortin, Owens, Yonelinas, & 
Eichenbaum, 2008). However, despite the successful replication of previous studies 
using this task (Eacott et al., 2005; Easton et al., 2009) in Chapter 2 with intact 
animals, the current experiment did not successfully demonstrate episodic-like 
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memory in the Sham group making the failure to demonstrate episodic-like memory 
in the groups with partial or full hippocampal lesion groups difficult to interpret. 
The Partial Hippocampal group consisted of 5 animals that were considered to have 
insufficient bilateral lesions to the hippocampus based on the criteria outlined 
previously (see Section 3.2.2.1.1.) Although these animals were grouped separately, 
it is nevertheless important to consider the implications of such partial lesions on any 
observed behaviour. One could suggest that those animals with incomplete lesions 
would behave akin to the Sham group considering the criteria for what constitutes a 
sufficient lesion. The histology also shows that these partial lesions tend to be more 
dorsal than ventral in their location. It is apparent from Table 3.1 (see Section 
3.2.2.1.1.) that at its most dorsal measurement (Bregma -3.60mm/Interaural 
5.40mm), hippocampal cell loss was greater than for the comparable ventral points 
measured (i.e. Bregma -8.42mm/Interaural 1.58mm).  Previous studies have 
implicated the dorsal, not ventral hippocampus in spatial memory tasks (Bannerman 
et al., 1999; Bannerman et al., 2002a; Bannerman et al., 2002b; Bannerman et al., 
2004; Hock & Busney, 1998; Kjelstrup et al., 2002; McHugh, Deacon, Rawlins & 
Bannerman, 2004; Pothuizen, Zhang, Jongen-Relo, Feldon & Yee., 2004), although 
other studies have suggested that the ventral hippocampus may contribute to spatial 
learning at least under some conditions (De Hoz, Knox & Morris, 2003; Ferbinteanu 
& McDonald, 2000; Ferbinteanu, Ray & McDonald, 2003). However, the effect of 
dorsal versus ventral lesions on episodic tasks such as those presented here is not 
known. In addition, the partial lesions in the current study were not targeted partial 
lesions and so cannot be considered as either dorsal or ventral. It is therefore not 
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possible with the current data to predict the effect of such partial lesions on episodic 
memory and any associated interpretations must be treated with caution. 
Although the results are not in agreement with previous findings, there are several 
noteworthy points to discuss that appear to suggest that although none of the three 
groups show episodic-like memory, it is not due to an ineffective task, but rather it is 
due to extraneous factors affecting the performance of all three groups. This 
suggestion stems from some interesting results in both the Objects Visible and 
Objects Hidden phase of the task. In-depth analyses of not only First Turn scores 
and D2 scores, but also of exploration times reveal that the Sham group and the 
Partial HPC group appear to behave comparably throughout the task, with significant 
differences in performance lying between the Sham and HPC lesion group in the 
Objects Visible task. This also is taken as validation for the groupings of the animals 
based on the criteria outlined previously in the chapter. 
 To summarise, after 16 days of Objects Visible neither the Sham group, the Partial 
HPC group nor the HPC group showed a preference for turning toward the RN 
object. However, the Sham group did show an object preference which was a 
significantly better performance than the HPC group. Animals in the HPC group 
appeared to behave in the opposite manner and tended to explore the habituated 
object more so than the RN object, although not significantly so. This may signify 
outside stressors impacting on performance levels. Performance of the Partial HPC 
group, although tentatively comparable (due to low numbers) to the Sham group, did 
not reach above chance levels. Analyses of exploration times during this Object 
Visible stage again did not yield significant results, although to an observable extent 
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(see Figures 3.16 (section 3.2.2.2.2.) and 3.17 (section 3.2.2.2.4.) to highlight) the 
HPC group remain fairly distinct with regard to their exploration of the habituated 
object. 
Further analyses in the Objects Visible stage aimed to clarify the relationship 
between First Turn data and D2 scores as the aforementioned results appear to 
suggest that they do not always reflect each other. It would be expected for the 
Sham group that high D2 scores would be reflected in high levels of performance in 
First Turn data and vice versa. Overall for all three groups over the 16 days there 
was found to be no relationship between the direction of their first turn and their 
object preference at exploration. In fact the Sham group approach a significant 
negative correlation between their average First Turn over the 16 days and their 
average D2 scores suggesting that despite the fact that they showed a preference 
for exploring the RN object, they did not turn towards the RN object first. 
After 16 days of Objects Hidden neither the Sham group, the Partial HPC group or 
the HPC group demonstrated episodic-like memory using recall alone. D2 scores 
reveal that none of the groups show significant familiarity for the RN object. First 
Turn data and D2 data was significantly correlated for all three groups over the 16 
days of Objects Hidden, however it was only the Sham group that approached a 
positive correlation i.e. continued to explore the RN object after it had made its first 
turn. Indeed a positive correlation would be hypothesised for the Sham group as 
unlike the HPC group, both familiarity (D2 scores) and recall (First Turn data) remain 
intact.  
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Exploration times show that there are no significant differences or interactions 
regarding exploration of the objects for each group during the Objects Hidden phase. 
It was hypothesised that a change in task from Objects Visible to Objects Hidden 
may increase interest and boost performance. However, when comparing 
exploration in the Objects Visible phase to that in the Objects Hidden stage, both the 
Sham and Partial HPC group explore both objects significantly more in the Objects 
Visible phase. It is possible that the change in task was not novel enough in nature, 
or that the poor performance in the Objects Visible phase was highlighted in the 
more difficult Objects Hidden phase. 
 The Sham group also show no difference in exploration times (D2 scores) between 
the first and second minute of exploration yet when using raw exploration times 
(seconds) the Sham group are actually found to explore both objects significantly 
less so in the second minute compared to the first minute of the test phase. This 
serves to show that even though there may be significant differences in exploration 
times this does not necessarily result in a significantly positive or negative D2 score. 
Even though some of the results from this study appear to suggest that First Turn 
scores do not always mirror themselves in D2 scores, the significant positive 
correlation between First Turn and D2 scores, and the fact that significant 
differences in exploration times do not equate to significant D2 scores, it actually 
should be D2 scores that determine object familiarity. 
Despite the fact that the low numbers of animals contribute to a deficit in power of 
analyses, the data summarised above still provides a few useful points for 
discussion. The similarities in the behaviour of the Sham and Partial HPC group and 
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the significant difference found between the Sham and the HPC group in the Objects 
Visible task appear to validate the histological groupings and suggest the possibility 
that these partial lesions would not be substantial enough to have a significantly 
different effect on episodic-like memory. This is also reinforced by the exploratory 
behaviour of the HPC lesion group noted in the Objects Visible phase of the task. 
This suggests that the observed parietal damage noted in the coronal sections (see 
section 3.2.2.1.1) is not representative of all the animals. If this were the case then 
all animals in both groups should show a comparable deficit.   
It is not thought that such damage is a result of the chosen surgical procedure as 
previous studies (Jones, Pearce, Davies, Good, & McGregor, 2007; McGregor, 
Good, & Pearce, 2004; Pearce, Good, Jones, & McGregor, 2004) have employed 
the same surgical procedure successfully. It is also not believed to be a result of 
seepage of excitotoxin along the injection tracts in the overlying cortex. If this was 
the case it would be expected that only the associated parietal cortex overlying the 
dorsal region only would be damaged, yet Figure 3.1 (see Section 3.2.2.1.1.) shows 
that the damage is not uniformly distributed as where there is most dorsal 
hippocampal cell loss no such parietal cortex damage is seen. Additionally, the rate 
of infusion (0.03 µl/min) was considerably slower, and the needle left in place longer, 
than in many other studies that employed hippocampal lesions, but with no reported 
cortical damage (e.g. Gilbert, Kesner, & Lee, 2001). It is deemed possible that 
experimental error, such as mechanically piercing the dura prior to insertion of the 
needle, may be the cause of the damage to the overlying parietal cortex. In addition, 
any thinning or loss in density of the temporal lobe may allow for damage post-
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histology. Although it is not possible to quantify the degree of parietal cortex damage 
in those sliced horizontally, observations by the surgeon of the perfused brains prior 
to slicing suggested no severe parietal damage.  
The impact of extraneous stressors such as noise on First Turn scores and overall 
exploration needs to be considered. Indeed the behaviour of the HPC group may be 
compounded by such issues. In fact there is evidence that infrasound exposure can 
lead to an impairment of hippocampal related learning and memory (Yuan et al., 
2009; Yuan, Long, Mu, Liu, & Chen, 2009). During the current study it was noted that 
there was building work being carried out in the vicinity of the laboratories, therefore 
even if the experimenter was not able to hear such noise it is possible that the 
animals detected such infrasounds and their behaviour was subsequently affected. 
Considering that the Sham group showed a preference for the RN object during the 
Objects Visible stage it would have been expected that this performance would then 
transfer over to the Objects Hidden stage and exhibit itself as episodic-like memory. 
However, if such noise was detectable to the animals then this may have caused 
stress induced neophobia and resulted in the unexpected result of the animals 
preferring to explore the habituated object more so than the RN object during the 
Objects Hidden stage.  
Another interesting point that extends from the post-hoc analyses is the fact that 
there was found to be a significant decrease in exploration from the Objects Visible 
to the Objects Hidden stage for both the Sham and Partial HPC group. This could be 
considered unexpected if one were to theorise that a change in task would lead to a 
renewed interest in the task. If this were the case then exploration should increase 
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from one stage to another which may then lead to an increase in performance. The 
Sham group were demonstrating preference for the RN object during the Objects 
Visible stage and so would have been expected to be able to transfer this 
performance to the Objects Hidden phase. As this was not the case and 
performance actually decreased, the assumption that the task was unsuccessful due 
to extraneous factors is to an extent supported.  
The slightly poorer results seen in the replication in chapter 2 combined with the low 
power of the current study may explain the failure to see significant results here. 
Despite this task having been replicated on more than one occasion (Easton, 
Zinkivskay, & Eacott, 2009; Easton, Eacott, Zinkivskay, & Jiménez-Rodriguez, 2006), 
the current findings seem to highlight the sensitivity of such a task to extraneous 
factors, preventing the planned investigation into the individual components of 
episodic-like memory in this task. Awareness of these issues and investigation of the 
factors which affect performance in this task is of importance to future research.  
However, given the difficulties with the current task, it was appropriate to alter the 
methodology and conduct the behavioural experiments in the open field. It is based 
the natural tendency of an animal to explore its environment and has also previously 
been shown to be successful over fewer testing days (Norman & Eacott, 2005) 
allowing it to be a more robust test of episodic-like memory. 
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4 WHAT-WHERE-WHICH IN THE OPEN FIELD 
4.1 Introduction 
Considering the results of Chapter 3 it was deemed appropriate to move from using 
the E-maze to the Open Field in order to further investigate the effect of bilateral 
lesions to the hippocampus on episodic-like memory.  
The justification for which lies in the fact that it has demonstrated its reliability in 
previous tasks (e.g. Ainge, et al., 2006; Eacott & Gaffan, 2005; Eacott & Norman, 
2004; Langston & Wood, 2006; Norman & Eacott, 2005). In addition as there is no 
Objects Hidden stage, First Turn data plays no role, therefore any extraneous 
variables potentially affecting performance should present themselves in exploratory 
behaviour only. Previous studies have also shown that the Open Field allows for 
complete experiments to be carried out over shorter periods than the E-maze 
requires (Norman & Eacott, 2005). This change in procedure will also allow for any 
reflections to be made regarding what would be the best modus operandi for such 
tasks.  
4.2 Experiment 4a 
The Open Field arena is a common apparatus used to assess an animals‟ 
exploratory behaviour. Although the E-maze can demonstrate episodic-like memory 
using recall alone using the same animals in the same trial, Eacott and Gaffan 
(2005) argued that the Open Field to an extent is also able to differentiate between 
recall and familiarity. As this arena has proved successful in similar tasks (Langston 
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and Wood, 2009) it was deemed a suitable and justified change in methodology. In 
addition, previous studies (Norman & Eacott, 2005) have also shown that 
experiments can be carried out successfully over substantially shorter four day 
periods allowing for potential manipulations to the methodology to be carried out 
more efficiently. 
Despite the change in arena type, there was no change in task type as the results 
from the previous chapter point to extraneous factors impacting on performance 
rather than an ineffective task. In addition, if any impairment is seen in this task it 
would be then possible to conduct tasks of a more simple nature in the hope of 
pinpointing the location of the impairment to one or possibly more individual 
components of episodic-like memory. 
4.2.1 Methods and materials 
4.2.1.1 Subjects 
The twenty Dark Agouti rats were the same animals that underwent the surgery 
detailed in Chapter 3. However, at the end of Chapter 3, two animals from the Partial 
HPC group were euthanized after developing seizures. Consequently, the Partial 
HPC group consisted of three animals. Considering the effect that such a small 
number of animals would have on the power of any analyses conducted, and that 
Chapter 2 highlighted their similarity to the Sham group, this group was excluded 
from any further analyses.  
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4.2.1.2 Apparatus 
4.2.1.2.1 Open Field 
The Open Field used in this task measured 19.5 x 39.5 x39.5 inches. Made from mdf 
the walls and the floor were coloured grey. This served as context X. Removable 
white Perspex walls and a white Perspex floor with a metal mesh covering were 
inserted over the grey context and held in place by hooks to form context Y.  
4.2.1.2.2 Objects 
As before, objects consisted of three items (e.g. lego or toys) put together to form a 
more complex object. Three copies of each object were made, one for use in the 
acquisition phases and two for use at test.  
4.2.1.2.3 Objects and the Open Field 
Objects were placed in the maze 10 inches from the side walls and 10 inches from 
the top and bottom walls at all times. Slight indentations were made in the Open 
Field for the experimenter to know where exactly to place the objects but were not 
visible to the animal as objects were placed over them. Rats were placed at the 
centre point of the maze facing forward (forward is indicated by the green S in Figure 
4.1). All object exploration was recorded. The criterion for exploration was the nose 
of the rat touching the object this. Exploration was measured from video footage 
using a stop watch. 
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Figure 4.1: Sample Phase 1  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Sample Phase 2  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Test Phase 
Figures 4.1 to 4.3 illustrate the Open Field and the locations of the objects in the two 
sample phases and the test phase.   
4.2.1.2.4 Test Room and Experimenter 
The testing room for tasks using the Open Field differed from that used in Chapter 2 
and 3 and was larger and contained more workspace. Lighting consisted of two 25w 
bulbs shone off the walls of the room at an angle to ensure that the open field was 
2 Minutes 
2 Minutes 
       2 Minutes 
1 Minute 
1 Minute 
S 
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equally lit in all areas and there were no shadowed corners. During the task the 
experimenter was sat out of sight in complete silence. Behaviour was observed on a 
monitor and recorded for analysis. 
4.2.1.3 Design 
The same design was used as in Chapter 2 with the additional counterbalancing 
described in Chapter 3 with regard to the two groups. Counterbalancing was 
adjusted when an animal was euthanised. The independent variables were therefore 
object location and context. The dependent variable measure was the amount of 
time spent exploring the object.  
4.2.1.4 Data Collection 
The same method of data collection was used as that described in Chapter 2 with 
regard to exploration.  
4.2.1.5 Procedure 
4.2.1.5.1 Habituation 
Habituation to the new room and apparatus was carried out in stages to keep the 
stress levels of the animals to a minimum. In total twelve days of habituation were 
carried out. The first two days exposed the rats in their cage groups to the Open 
Field for 30 minutes with no objects present. The first day used context Y and the 
second context X. Days three to four exposed the rats to the Open Field individually 
for 10 minutes (no objects) and then to the holding cage for 10 minutes in context Y. 
The mesh floor of context Y for these two days was proving difficult to clean and so a 
larger mesh floor was used to replace it. Days 5 to 6 followed the same procedure 
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using context X. Days seven to eight used context Y but with the new mesh floor. 
The final four days (days nine to twelve) followed the same procedure but with 
objects placed in the Open Field. The context was alternated XYXY.  
4.2.1.5.2 Cleaning Procedure and Object Details 
The cleaning procedure followed was that used in Experiments 2b and 2c of Chapter 
2 (until stated otherwise). Objects used during the sample phases were cleaned after 
every cage and objects used during the test phase were cleaned after every animal. 
Habituation cages were cleaned after every cage and these cages were changed 
after the third cage. The Open Field was cleared of any mess after each animal and 
was also cleaned at the end of every testing day. Context X was wiped with a dry 
paper towel and the Perspex Context Y was wiped with alcohol wipes.  
4.2.1.5.3 What-Where-Which in the Open Field 
After the habituation phase was complete a total of twelve days of What-Where-
Which were conducted in the Open Field. This task involved two sample phases and 
a test phase. For the first sample phase (either in context X or Y) the rats were 
individually placed in the centre of the open field facing the far wall (see Figure 4.1), 
at an equal distance from each object. After two minutes they were removed from 
the open field and placed in the empty habituation cage while the context was 
changed. They were then returned to the Open Field for another two minutes to 
explore the objects in the second context with the objects in alternative positions 
(see Figure 4.2). For example, in context X object A would be on the left and B on 
the right while in context Y, B would be on the left and A on the right. After the 
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second sample phase the rat was again placed in the empty habituation cage whilst 
the context and objects were changed. The test phase consisted of two minutes in 
the open field with either context X or Y and either two copies of object A or two 
copies of B (counterbalanced over rats and trials). For an illustration of this 
procedure refer to Figures 4.1 to 4.3. 
4.2.2 Results 
4.2.2.1 What-Where-Which (12 days) 
All statistical analyses reported are 2 tailed. All figure legends include calculated 
standard error means (SEM) indicated by error bars. Symbol (*) indicates 
significance ≤ 0.05. Where multiple t-tests are conducted Bonferroni corrections are 
made. 
4.2.2.1.1 D2 Scores 
Average D2 scores over the 12 days of What-Where-Which in the open field showed 
that neither the Sham group (t (7) = 0.632, p = 0.547) nor the HPC group (t (4) = 
0.741, p = 0.500) showed a significant preference for exploring the object in the 
novel what-where-which combination with mean D2 scores of 0.04 and 0.04 
respectively. Therefore over these 12 days of What-Where-Which there was no 
demonstration of episodic-like memory from either of the two groups.   
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Figure 4.4: Average D2 Scores over 12 days of What-Where-Which (± SEM) 
An independent t-test shows that there is no effect of group on average exploration 
time (t (11) = 0.018, p = 0.986). 
 
Figure 4.5: Average D2 Scores over 4 day blocks (± SEM) 
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Analysis of the average D2 scores over three blocks of four days reveals that 
exploration of the object in the novel what-where-which combination was at chance 
levels for both groups (see Figure 4.5).  
A repeated measures ANOVA (2x3: 2 x group, 3 x block) revealed an effect of block 
on performance (F (2, 22) = 4.650, p = 0.021) but no interaction between block and 
group (F (2, 22) = 0.116, p = 0.891) and no effect of group on performance (F (1, 11) 
= 0.003, p = 0.986).  
Alpha corrected (Bonferroni) paired samples t-tests (p ≤ 0.016) reveal that there was 
no difference in performance from the first block of four days (days 1 to 4) to the 
second block of four days (days 5 to 8) (t (12) = -0.064, p = 0.95). There was 
however a marginal drop in performance from the first block of four days to the last 
block of four days (days 9 to 12) (t (12) = 2.51, p = 0.027) and a significant drop in 
performance from the second block of four days to the last block of four days (t (12) 
= 3.38, p = 0.005).  
4.2.3 Discussion 
Over the 12 days of What-Where-Which in the Open Field neither group 
demonstrated episodic-like memory. The nature of the task in the Open Field allows 
for experiments to be conducted over a minimum of four days. Analyses of the data 
in blocks of four days failed to demonstrate episodic-like memory in either group, 
although it is possible with larger group sizes and therefore greater statistical power 
that the trend observed may have reached significance. However, without such 
group sizes, this pattern can only be considered a possible trend at best. 
 147 
 
The absence of any clear results could be due to a culmination of factors. 
Differences in variance and group size will also have an effect on such results 
considering the lower the group size the less powerful any subsequent analyses will 
be. 
Despite this there may still be extraneous factors still having an effect on 
performance as not only could neither group demonstrate episodic-like memory even 
over a four day period, but also because overall performance dropped significantly 
during the last block of four days. However, it was not due to any stress placed upon 
the animals as there were no indictors of stress such as the animal remaining in a 
corner or the outskirts of the open field and not venturing into the centre. Despite the 
observed poor performance in the E-maze, it was hypothesised that a change in 
testing room may be compounding the issue as the new testing room was 
substantially larger than the previous room used in Chapters 2 and 3. The fact that 
the open field was therefore positioned further away from the walls of the testing 
room may mean that the rats are unable to use any landmarks that may be on the 
walls to aid their navigation in the open field. If this were the case then the animals 
would find it more difficult to relate an objects position in the open field relative to its 
position in space, which in turn may affect the amount of time spent exploring it. 
Considering the significant drop in overall performance during the last block of four 
days there are likely to be other factors affecting performance still unaccounted for. 
However, this issue must be addressed first to determine the level of impact it has 
had on performance. 
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In order to determine if landmarks could serve to boost performance of both groups 
another five days of What-Where-Which were carried out in the Open Field. 
4.3 Experiment 4b 
Considering the results of Experiment 4a, another five days of What-Where-Which 
were carried out in the Open Field with some modifications. 
4.3.1 Methods and Materials 
The same method was followed as described in Experiment 4a. With the possibility 
that the testing room was not providing the animals with enough landmarks to be 
able to navigate or position themselves as effectively as before in the open field, 
landmarks were positioned on two of the testing room walls that were closest to the 
Open Field. The two landmarks were A5 posters of distinct shapes, a black circle 
and a black and white striped rectangle. These were positioned at a height on the 
wall that made them visible from inside the Open Field. On a third wall of the room 
was a vent that could also act as a landmark. The final wall contained the door which 
was not visible from inside the open field. Five days of What-Where-Which were 
carried out with these new landmarks on the walls of the testing room. The first day 
was used as an habituation period to these landmarks and so only the final four days 
were analysed. 
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4.3.2 Results 
4.3.2.1 Four days of What-Where-Which 
Analysis of D2 scores revealed that over the four days of What-Where-Which the 
Sham group preferentially explored the object that was in the novel what-where-
which location (t (7) = 2.725, p = 0.03) with a mean D2 score of 0.36. The HPC 
group (t (4) = 1.344, p = 0.25) did not show such a preference with mean D2 scores 
of 0.12 (see Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6: Average D2 Scores over 4 days of What-Where-Which (±SEM) 
An independent t-test revealed there to be no differences between the exploration of 
the two groups (t (11) = 1.306, p = 0.218). 
Despite the Sham group significantly preferring to explore the object in the novel 
what-where-which location, a repeated measures ANOVA (2x2: 2 x group, 2 x task 
(i.e. with or without landmarks)) revealed that there was no significant effect of these 
* 
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landmarks on average exploration (F (1, 11) = 2.577, p = 0.138) and no interaction 
between group and task (F (1, 11) = 0.921, p = 0.358).  
4.3.3 Discussion 
Although the results show that there was no significant improvement from 
Experiment 4a to 4b, the Sham group preferentially explored the object in the novel 
what-where-which location and so demonstrated episodic-like memory. Although the 
performance of the HPC group remained at chance levels there was found to be no 
significant difference in the performance of the two groups. However, unlike the 
previous experiment the average D2 score of the Sham group was higher than for 
the HPC group. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the episodic-like memory as 
demonstrated in the Sham group and not in the HPC group is a consequence of the 
lesions to the hippocampus. As explained previously, variance in the groups and 
group size could certainly have an impact on the results.  
Nevertheless, if the hippocampus is more involved in the process of recall, then a 
control What-Where task which can be solved using familiarity should see both the 
Sham, and the HPC groups performing above chance. If however, the hippocampus 
is equally involved in the familiarity circuit, only the Sham group should be 
performing above chance, whilst the HPC group should remain at chance level. 
Although without a significant difference shown in the performance of the two groups 
it is not possible to conclude definitively that any differences in the levels of 
performance are attributable to the lesions of the hippocampus. It may however 
provide indicators as to the performance of groups with larger numbers and therefore 
greater statistical power. Therefore a What-Where task needs to be carried out. 
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While the What-Where task does not test the component of context, the task must be 
carried out in either Context X or Context Y. Sixteen days of What-Where were 
carried out whilst simultaneously investigating if there was a context preference that 
would affect the results.  
4.4 Experiment 4c 
Sixteen days of What-Where were conducted to act as a control for Experiment 4b 
and also to investigate whether or not the type of context i.e. a wooden maze or a 
Perspex covered maze with a mesh floor affected performance. It would be predicted 
considering the short delay between acquisition and test, that this control task would 
show the HPC group performing above chance alongside the Sham group if it is the 
case that recognition tasks involving familiarity are not hippocampally dependent. As 
the methodology of the What-Where tasks dictates that it has to be run in only one 
context, the task was carried out in alternating contexts to determine if any patterns 
of preference would emerge. 
4.4.1 Methods and Materials 
Sixteen days of What-Where were carried out in the Open field. As the effect of 
context was being investigated, the first four days were carried out in Context Y, the 
next four days in Context X and then eight days were carried out in alternate YXYX 
contexts.  
4.4.1.1 Procedure 
The task involved a sample phase and a test phase. The same context was used in 
both phases. As in the What-Where-Which task (Experiments 4a and 4b) the rats 
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were placed individually in the centre of the open field facing the far wall, equidistant 
from each object. After two minutes they were removed to the habituation cage 
(empty) while the objects were changed ready for the test phase. They were then 
returned to the open field for this test phase for two minutes with either two copies of 
object A or B, depending on the counterbalancing schedule. In this test phase one of 
the objects was in a novel position for that context. Following this the rat was then 
returned to its home cage. 
4.4.2 Results 
Over the first four days of the What-Where task in Context Y the Sham group 
preferentially explored the object in the novel what-where configuration with an 
average D2 score of 0.08, although this did not reach significance (t (7) = 1.136, p = 
0.293). However there was no significant drop in performance from Experiment 4b (t 
(7) = -1.729, p = 0.128). The HPC group however significantly preferred exploring 
the object that was in the familiar what-where configuration with an average D2 
score of -0.13 (t (4) = -7.355, p = 0.002) which was a significant drop in performance 
from Experiment 4b (t (4) = 2.923, p = 0.043). In addition there was a significant 
difference in the performance of the two groups (t (11) = 2.233, p = 0.047) (see 
Figure 4.7).  
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Figure 4.7: Average D2 Scores over days 1 to 4 of control What-Where Context Y (± SEM) 
As planned and outlined previously, another four days of What-Where were carried 
out, this time in Context X to determine if there is any effect of context. The Sham 
group (average D2 score of -0.03) nor the HPC group (average D2 score of 0.01) 
significantly preferred exploring the object in the novel What-Where configuration (t 
(7) = -0.667, p = 0.520; t (4) = 0.101, p = 0.924, respectively). There was also found 
to be no significant difference in the performance of the two groups (t (11) = -0.457, p 
= 0.657). 
A repeated measures ANOVA (2x2: 2 x Context, 2 x Group) showed no effect of 
context on performance (F (1, 11) = 0.058, p = 0.814) and no effect of group on 
performance (F (1, 11) = 1.423, p = 0.258), but it does reveal an interaction between 
context and group (F (1, 11) = 6.197, p = 0.03). 
* 
* 
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Figure 4.8: Average D2 Scores What-Where Days 1 to 4 (Y) and Days 5 to 8 (X) (± SEM) 
Alpha corrected (Bonferroni) paired samples t-tests (p ≤ 0.025) show that the drop in 
performance of the Sham group is not significant (t (7) = 2.107, p = 0.073). The HPC 
group improves in their performance but not significantly so (t (4) = -1.443, p = 
0.223) (see Figure 4.8).  
The results show that neither group significantly prefer to explore the object in the 
novel What-Where configuration, in fact the first four days show the HPC group 
significantly preferring to explore the object in the familiar What-Where configuration. 
The results from the ANOVA suggest that there is an effect of context on 
performance, yet although the performance of the Sham group drops notably this is 
not of significance. Group size and variance along with the impact of correctional 
analyses could be a causal factor. Another eight days of What-Where were carried 
out as planned to determine if alternating the contexts on a daily basis will have an 
effect on performance. 
* 
* 
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These eight days of What-Where using alternate contexts (YX) showed the Sham 
group were still not significantly preferring to explore the object in the novel What-
Where configuration (t (7) = 0.048, p = 0.963). This was also true of the HPC group (t 
(4) = -0.226, p = 0.832) who, although not significantly so, were exploring the object 
in the familiar what-where-which configuration instead of the novel one. No 
significant difference was found between the performance of the two groups over 
these eight days (t (11) = 0.196, p = 0.848).  
 
Figure 4.9: Average D2 Scores Days 9 to 16 What-Where Alternate Contexts (± SEM) 
When separating the days by context, a repeated measures ANOVA (2x2: 2 x 
Context, 2 x Group) showed no effect of context on performance (F (1, 11) = 0.823, p 
= 0.384) and no effect of group on performance (F (1, 11) = 0.038, p = 0.848), and 
no interaction between context and group (F (1, 11) = 0.067, p = 0.801). 
Despite a substantial number of days being carried out on the What-Where task, 
over the sixteen days as a whole the Sham group were not performing significantly 
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above chance with an average D2 score of 0.01 (t (7) = 0.399, p = 0.702) and nor 
were the HPC group with an average D2 score of -0.04 (t (4) = -1.082, p = 0.340). 
There was also no significant difference in the performance of the two groups over 
these sixteen days (t (11) = 0.952, p = 0.361). 
4.4.3 Discussion 
Although Experiment 4b demonstrated episodic-like memory in the Sham group but 
not in the HPC group (despite the fact that there were no significant differences 
between the levels of performance of the two groups), it was hypothesised that a 
What-Where task would show both groups performing above chance as the task 
may be less hippocampally dependent. However, this task at no point for either 
group in either context, or in alternating contexts, showed memory for What-Where. 
As the Sham group showed the more complex What-Where-Which episodic-like 
memory in Experiment 4b, it may be that extraneous factors are affecting 
performance in the current task. The significant preference of the HPC group for the 
object in the familiar what-where configuration suggests that they are capable of 
discriminating although with a nonstandard preference. Such preference for 
familiarity over novelty may be an indicator of stress but none of the typical 
expressions of stress, such as avoiding the centre of the open field, or defecating, 
were observed.  
Chapter 2 highlighted the sensitivity of the task to extraneous variables such as 
odour. Although this issue was addressed in Chapter 2, results from parallel studies 
by other members of the lab group provide results that show their animals 
performing above chance. The relevance of this is the cleaning method adopted in 
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their studies is different to that of the current study. Cleaning methods of the various 
members of the lab group vary from minimal cleaning to rigorous cleaning. The 
importance of this issue to studies such as the current one must not be taken lightly, 
especially when reviewing the current study‟s results. Therefore, an investigation into 
the different methods of cleaning was warranted and another sixteen days of What-
Where were carried out. 
4.5 Experiment 4d 
The failure of the control What-Where experiment of 4c for both the Sham and the 
HPC group brought to attention again the issue of extraneous variables having an 
effect on the task, in particular the issue of odour on the objects and in the maze 
affecting the exploratory behaviour of the animals. It was thought that this issue had 
been dealt with to a sufficient degree in Chapter 2, however the failure of Experiment 
4c to show memory for What-Where in either group, considering the results of 
Experiment 4b and the fact that the HPC group were exploring the object in the 
familiar what-where configuration, could only reflect a flaw in the methodology. As 
different cleaning regimes were used by different lab members it became apparent 
that this still was an issue to be contended with. The question of whether the alcohol 
cleaning wipes were leaving a residue that the animals were averse to was 
considered. Therefore, two other methods of cleaning the objects and the open field 
were investigated: One involved limited cleaning while the other was intermediary, 
bearing in mind the cleaning method already used in the current studies reported 
here was relatively high. Another sixteen days of What-Where were carried out to 
 158 
 
investigate these differing methods and the effect they would have on performance 
of the What-Where task. 
4.5.1 Methods and Materials  
The same procedure for the What-Where task was followed as outlined in 
Experiment 4c, the differences lying only in the cleaning method. The context used 
for the current experiment was Y as it was the most flexible context to use when 
investigated cleaning method i.e. it can be cleaned or not cleaned. In contrast, due to 
the porous nature of the wood, not all the odours could be so successfully removed 
from Context X. 
The first four days of What-Where were carried out using a method of cleaning that 
is to be referred to as the „Intermediate‟ cleaning method. With this method the 
objects and test objects were cleaned after every cage with alcohol wipes and the 
open field wiped clean after the end of each day. The next twelve days of What-
Where used a cleaning method (to be referred to as the „Minimal‟ cleaning method) 
that required objects to be made one week prior to testing. Once made and cleaned 
these objects were then not further cleaned until the experiment was finished. 
Cleaning of the open field was the same as for the „Intermediate‟ cleaning method 
which was at the end of each testing day.  
The rationale for conducting only four days of What-Where using the „Intermediate‟ 
cleaning method and twelve days of the „Minimal‟ cleaning method was based on the 
following results which suggested that the „Intermediate‟ cleaning method was 
having no discernable effect.  
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4.5.2 Results 
Four days of What-Where using „Intermediate‟ cleaning method did not result in the 
Sham significantly preferring to explore the object in the novel What-Where 
configuration with an average D2 score of 0.003 (t (7) = 0.036, p = 0.972). This was 
also true of the HPC group whose average D2 score was 0.11 (t (4) = 1.65, p = 
0.174) (see Figure 4.10). 
 
Figure 4.10: Average D2 Scores What-Where 4 days using the ‘Intermediate’ cleaning method (±SEM) 
No significant difference was found between the performance of the two groups (t 
(11) = -0.789, p = 0.447). A repeated measures ANOVA (2x2: 2 x Experiment, 2 x 
Group) showed that there was no effect of experiment (experiment 4c to experiment 
4d) on performance (F (1, 11) = 0.642, p = 0.440) and no interaction between 
experiment and group (F (1, 11) = 0.870, p = 3.71). Due to this, another 4 days of 
What-Where were carried out but this time using the „Minimal‟ cleaning method to 
determine if this method of cleaning would improve performance. 
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The change from the „Intermediate‟ cleaning method to the „Minimal‟ cleaning 
method still did not result in the Sham group (average D2 score of 0.03) (t (7) = 
0.890, p = 0.403) or the HPC group (average D2 score of -0.05) (t (4) = -0.971, p = 
0.386) demonstrating memory for What-Where. There was also no significant 
difference in the performance of the two groups over these four days (t (11) = 1.314, 
p = 0.216) (see Figure 4.11). 
 
Figure 4.11: Average D2 Scores What-Where 4 days of using the ‘Minimal’ cleaning method (±SEM) 
Although the results appear to indicate that the Sham group improve using the 
„Minimal‟ cleaning method, a repeated measures ANOVA (2x2: 2 x Group, 2 x 
Cleaning Method) showed there was no effect of cleaning method on performance (F 
(1, 11) = 0.782, p = 0.395) and no interaction between cleaning method and group (F 
(1, 11) = 1.834, p = 0.203). 
As the Sham group have improved in their performance, albeit not significantly, 
another eight days of What-Where were carried out using the „Minimal‟ cleaning 
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method. The reason for this is because it is imperative to increase the performance 
of the Sham group to the point where they are demonstrating memory for What-
Where. As they were shown to demonstrate memory for What-Where-Which in 
Experiment 4b they should therefore be able to demonstrate the more simple What-
Where memory. Although it is expected that the HPC group should also be able to 
demonstrate memory for What-Where there still lies the possibility that the 
hippocampus does play a role in recognition tasks based on familiarity according to 
previous research (Manns, et al., 2003; Wais, Wixted, Hopkins, & Squire, 2006; 
Wixted & Squire, 2004), therefore making decisions based on the performance of the 
HPC group would be misdirected. Eight days of What-Where were carried out using 
the „Minimal‟ cleaning method to determine if performance would increase and/or 
stabilise.  
 
Figure 4.12: Average D2 Scores What-Where over 4 days blocks and as a total of 12 days using the 
‘Minimal’ cleaning method (CM) (± SEM) 
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A repeated measures ANOVA (3x2: 3 x Block, 2 x Group) show that there is no 
effect of block on performance (F (2, 22) = 1.249, p = 0.306), no effect of group on 
performance (F (1, 11) = 0.03, p = 0.867), and no interaction between block and 
group (F (2, 22) = 0.311, p = 0.588).  
Over the 12 days of What-Where using the „Minimal‟ cleaning method neither the 
Sham group (average D2 score of 0.04) (t (7) = 1.112, p = 0.303) nor the HPC group 
(average D2 score of 0.03) (t (4) = 0.601, p = 0.58) show memory for What-Where. 
There was also no significant difference in the performance of the two groups (t (11) 
= 0.192, p = 0.657).  
However, what Figure 4.12 does appear to show is that over these 12 days as a 
whole, although performance is at chance, the two groups are more balanced with 
respect to each other compared to the four days that employed the „Intermediate‟ 
cleaning method which showed the HPC group performing better than the Sham 
group, although not significantly so. Figure 4.12 also shows that performance over 
time is highly variable. Possible explanations for this variability are addressed later. 
4.5.3 Discussion 
As the results of the control What-Where task of Experiment 4c did not show 
memory for What-Where in either the Sham or the HPC group it was hypothesised 
that this could only be due to a flaw in the methodology. Results from similar studies 
by other members of the lab group that use different cleaning techniques have 
shown that this task can be successful. Therefore, further days of the What-Where 
task were carried to investigate these different cleaning methods.  
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The first four days of What-Where used a cleaning method („Intermediate‟) that saw 
the objects and test objects being cleaned after every cage with alcohol wipes and 
the Open Field wiped clean after the end of each day. This did not result in either 
group demonstrating What-Where memory, nor did it results in a significant 
improvement in performance from Experiment 4c. Therefore, another 4 days of 
What-Where were carried out, however for these days a „Minimal‟ cleaning method 
was adopted. Although the Sham group were seen to improve in their performance 
and the HPC group deteriorate, this was not of significance. Despite this, another 8 
days of What-Where were carried out using this „Minimal‟ cleaning method.  
Over the twelve days of What-Where using the „Minimal‟ cleaning method, neither 
group demonstrated memory for What-Where. Splitting the data into blocks of four 
days to analyse more closely performance over time also resulted in no significant 
findings. Looking at the data this way however, does highlight the variability of the 
data over time.  
Therefore, the current experiment, the aim of which was to not only act as a control 
for the What-Where-Which task of Experiment 4b but also to rectify the issues with 
methodology that were highlighted in Experiment 4c was not successful. However, 
the „Minimal‟ cleaning method has been concluded to be the method of choice 
considering mainly the performance of the Sham group but also the balance of 
performance of the two groups. 
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4.6 Experiment 4e (including Experiment 4d) 
The previous experiment and Experiment 4a highlighted the variability in the 
performance of the two groups. Experiments 4a to 4d have attempted to rule out any 
extraneous factors that may be causing this observed variability, such as change in 
testing room and cleaning methods, yet the variability is still apparent. Although the 
open field arena allows for shorter testing periods, the issue of stability and 
sustainment of performance over time remains important. Is it possible that too many 
days on the same task is detrimental to performance? Certainly Chapter 2 
Experiment 2a saw a successful demonstration of episodic-like memory, however 
the subsequent Experiment 2b failed to sustain such performance.  
As the open field allows for experiments to be conducted over periods of four days, it 
is possible to investigate both matters simultaneously in a shorter period of time than 
the E-maze would allow. Therefore, further experiments aimed to investigate 
performance over time and the effect of a change in task on performance. The tasks 
used were the What-Where-Which task and the What-Where task. Experiment 4d 
was included as a starting point to make further use of the data and to maximise the 
possible analyses.   
4.6.1 Methods and Materials 
4.6.1.1 Subjects 
For the purpose of the following experiments which aimed to investigate 
performance over time and the effect of task change on performance, the Sham 
group was split into two sub-groups (Sham group 1 and Sham group 2). This allowed 
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for not only the effect of task change to be observed between the Sham and HPC 
groups, but also within a group. Numbers within the HPC group were too small to be 
able to split up. Although the power of statistical analyses were reduced, analyses 
and observations were still considered worthwhile and valid.  
4.6.1.2 Procedure 
4.6.1.2.1 Split tasks of What-Where and What-Where-Which 
Experiments included both the What-Where-Which task and the What-Where task, 
the procedure of which has been detailed in Experiments 4a and 4c respectively. In 
order to investigate the effect of task change and maximise the analyses available, 
Experiment 4d (12 days of What-Where) was used as a starting point for this 
investigation. Both groups then changed task to nine days of What-Where-Which 
(Experiment 4e). The ninth day was not used in the results in order for even blocks 
to be analysed. Removing the ninth day allowed for the effect of a change in task to 
be observed from Experiment 4d to Experiment 4e. As performance over time was 
also to be investigated the Sham group were split into Sham Group 1 and Sham 
Group 2. Sham Group 1 then continued on the What-Where-Which task for another 
four days (13 days in total), whilst Sham Group 2 and the HPC group transferred to 
eight days of What-Where. The What-Where task of Experiment 4d was carried out 
in context Y due to the fact that this context could be easily cleaned. Therefore, 
Experiments 4e, 4f and 4g were also carried out in context Y. The procedure/timeline 
of these tasks is clearly outlined in Figure 4.13. 
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Figure 4.13: Showing the change in tasks for both the Sham and HPC groups. 
 
Experiment 4d: 
12 days What-Where 
Sham and HPC groups 
Experiment 4e: 
8 days What-Where-Which 
Sham and HPC groups 
Experiment 4e continued: 
4 days What-Where-Which 
Sham Group 1 (7,8,10,14) 
Experiment 4f: 
8 days What-Where 
Sham Group 2 (1,4,16,20), all HPC. 
Experiment 4g: 
4 days What-Where 
Sham Group 1 (7,8,10,14) 
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4.6.2 Results 
4.6.2.1 Experiment 4d: Twelve days of What-Where (Sham and HPC groups) 
The results of Experiment 4d from the previous chapter showed that over twelve 
days of What-Where neither the Sham group (t (7) = 1.112, p = 0.303) nor the HPC 
group (t (4) = 0.601, p = 0.580) showed memory for What-Where. There was also no 
significant difference in the performance of the two groups (t (11) = 0.192, p = 
0.657).  
4.6.2.2 Experiment 4e: Eight days of What-Where-Which (Sham and HPC groups) 
Both groups then changed task to Experiment 4e and completed eight days of What-
Where-Which. The eight days of What-Where-Which did not result in the Sham 
group (average D2 score of 0.06) (t (7) = 1.351, p = 0.219) or the HPC group 
(average D2 score of 0.04) (t (4) = 1.000, p = 0.374) demonstrating episodic-like 
memory. There was also no significant difference in the performance of the two 
groups (t (11) = 0.232, p = 0.82).  
A repeated measures ANOVA (2x2: 2 x Block, 2 x Group) showed that by blocking 
the data into two blocks of four days (see Figure 5.2) there was no effect of block on 
performance (F (1, 11) = 2.69, p = 0.614), no effect of group on performance (F (1, 
11) = 0.353, p = 0.565), and no interaction between block and group (F (1, 11) = 
0.781, p = 0.396) (see Figure 4.14). At no point during any of the blocks of four days 
did either group‟s performance approach significance levels. 
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Figure 4.14: Average D2 Scores Experiment 4e: 8 days of What-Where-Which in blocks and in total (± 
SEM) 
4.6.2.3 Experiment 4d to Experiment 4e (Sham Group 1) 
4.6.2.3.1 Investigating Task Change 
Despite determining that Experiment 4e did not demonstrate episodic-like memory in 
either the Sham or the HPC group, this would not necessarily mean that the change 
in task had not improved performance. Figure 4.15 appears to show that to a degree 
this may be the case for both groups. However, a repeated measure ANOVA (2x2: 2 
x task. 2 x group) revealed that the change in task from twelve days of What-Where 
(Experiment 4d) to eight days of What-Where-Which (Experiment 4e) did not have 
an effect on performance (F (1, 11) = 0.505, p = 0.492). There was also no effect of 
group (F (1, 11) = 0.117, p = 0.739) and no interaction between task and group (F (1, 
11) = 0.009, p = 0.925) (see Figure 4.15). As a more stringent test of the effect of 
task change on performance only the last block of four days of Experiment 4d and 
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the first block of four days of Experiment 4e were compared. This also showed that 
there was no effect of task on performance (F (1, 11) = 0.679, p = 0.427), no effect of 
group on performance (F (1, 11) = 0.634, p = 0.443), and no interaction between 
task and group (F (1, 11) = 0.426, p = 0.528).  
  
Figure 4.4.15: Average D2 Scores: Experiment 4d to Experiment 4e (± SEM) 
4.6.2.4 Experiment 4d to Experiment 4e and 4e continued (Sham Group 1) 
4.6.2.4.1 Investigating Task Change 
Experiment 4e (continued) saw half the Sham group (Sham Group 1) continuing with 
the what-where-which task to allow for subsequent analyses regarding performance 
over time. However, as the task has continued and essentially added another block 
of four days onto the already existing task of 4e, and also considering that the Sham 
group had now been split into two groups, it was appropriate to see if this produced 
any interesting results when compared again to the results from Experiment 4d.  
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The change in task and the analyses of only Sham group 1 result in a marginal, 
albeit not significant difference between Experiment 4d and the first block of four 
days of Experiment 4e (t (3) = 2.772, p = 0.069). Subsequent analyses did not reveal 
any significant or marginal findings (see Figure 4.16). 
4.6.2.5 Experiment 4e continued (Sham Group 1) 
4.6.2.5.1 Investigating Performance Over Time 
As mentioned previously, one of the aims of the current chapter was to observe 
more closely the animals‟ performance over time with regard to its stability or lack 
thereof. Therefore, Experiment 4e (continued) saw half the Sham group (Sham 
group 1) continuing with the What-Where-Which task for another four days in order 
to observe their performance over time. Over the twelve days of What-Where Which 
(Experiment 4e and 4e continued) Sham Group 1 did not demonstrate episodic-like 
memory (average D2 score of 0.16) (t (3) = 2.003, p = 0.139). Splitting up the these 
twelve days into three blocks of four days and conducting alpha corrected 
(Bonferroni) one-sample t-tests (p ≤ 0.016) reveals that during the first four days of 
the task the animals that constitute Sham group 1 although not demonstrating 
episodic-like memory were the closest to approaching significance levels (average 
D2 score of 0.33) (t (3) = 4.328, p = 0.023). Analyses of the subsequent blocks did 
not reveal any significant findings.   
A one-way ANOVA shows a marginal effect of block on performance (F (2, 11) = 
3.576, p = 0.072). As this was marginal, paired samples t-tests were conducted to 
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determine if there were in fact any differences in performance between the three 
blocks. 
Alpha corrected (Bonferroni) paired samples t-tests (p ≤ 0.016) reveal that there was 
a significant drop in performance from the first block of four days (days 1 to 4) to the 
second block of four days (days 5 to 8) (t (3) = 7.107, p = 0.006) and from the first 
block of four days to the last block of four days (days 9 to 12) (t (3) = 5.031, p = 
0.015). There was no difference in performance from the second block of four days 
to the last block of four days (t (3) = -1.671, p = 0.193) (see Figure 4.16).  
  
Figure 4.16: Average D2 Scores: Sham Group 1 Experiment 4d to Experiment 4e and 4e continued 
4.6.2.6 Experiments 4g (Sham Group 1) including Experiment 4e and 4e continued 
4.6.2.6.1 Investigating Task Change 
Following the continuation of Experiment 4e, Sham group 1 then changed task to 
four days of What-Where (Experiment 4g) (refer to Figure 4.13 for clarification of 
* 
* 
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experiments). The change in task did not result in Sham Group 1 showing memory 
for What-Where over these four days (average D2 score of 0.21) (t (3) = 2.384, p = 
0.097). There was also no significant improvement in performance from the last 
block of four days of Experiment 4e (continued) to Experiment 4g (t (3) = -0.779, p = 
0.493) and also no significant improvement from Experiments 4e and 4e continued 
as a whole (i.e. 12 days) to Experiment 4g (t (3) = -0.371, p = 0.735) (see Figure 
4.17).  
  
Figure 4.17: Average D2 Scores: Experiment 4e and 4e continued to Experiment 4g (± SEM) 
4.6.2.7 Experiment 4f (Sham Group 2 and HPC Group) 
Whilst Sham group 1 continued with the What-Where-Which task (Experiment 4e 
continued), Sham Group 2 and the HPC group changed task after Experiment 4e to 
eight days of What-Where. This would allow for comparisons to be made between a 
Sham group and a HPC lesion group but in addition between the two Sham groups. 
If there exists an issue regarding task change then differences between the two 
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Sham groups when one group changes task and one remains on a task should be 
apparent. 
Over these eight days no memory for What-Where was observed by Sham Group 2 
(average D2 score of 0.05) (t (3) = 0.494, p = 0.655) or the HPC group (average D2 
score of -0.007) (t (4) = -0.111, p = 0.917). There was also no significant difference 
between the performance of the two groups over these eight days of What-Where (t 
(7) = 0.508, p = 0.627) (see Figure 4.18).  
Analysing this data in blocks (2x4 day blocks) via a repeated measures ANOVA 
(2x2: 2 x block, 2 x group) revealed that there was no effect of block on performance 
(F (1, 7) = 0.345, p = 0.575), no effect of group on performance (F (1, 7) = 0.492, p = 
0.506) and no interaction between block and group (F (1, 7) = 0.258, p = 0.627). 
4.6.2.8 Experiment 4e to Experiment 4f (Sham Group 2 and HPC Group) 
4.6.2.8.1 Investigating Task Change 
A repeated measures ANOVA (2x2: 2 x Experiment, 2 x Group) showed there was 
no effect of experiment on performance (F (1, 7) = 0.001, p = 0.974), no effect of 
group on performance (F (1, 7) = 0.001, p = 0.972) and no interaction between group 
and experiment (F (1, 7) = 0.680, p = 0.437) (See Figure 4.18).  
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       Figure 4.18: Average D2 Scores: Experiment 4e to 4f Sham Group 2 and HPC Group (± SEM) 
A repeated measures ANOVA also shows that there was no effect of block (last 
block of Experiment 4e and first block of Experiment 4f) on performance (F (1, 7) = 
0.12, p = 0.917), no effect of group on performance (F (1, 7) = 0.164, p = 0.698), and 
no interaction between block and group (F (1, 7) = 0.316, p = 0.591). 
4.6.3 Discussion 
Experiments 4e, 4f and 4g (also including the results of Experiment 4d) aimed to 
investigate performance over time, and also to investigate the effect of task change 
on performance. The open field allowed for both these investigations to be carried 
out simultaneously as any change in task could be carried out over a relatively short 
period of time (4 days) compared to the E-maze and tasks investigating performance 
over time could be manipulated in four day blocks.  
The Sham group was split up into two groups (Sham Group 1 and 2) so it was 
possible not only to observe any difference between the Sham and HPC groups but 
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also to observe the differences within a group between those animals that remained 
on a task for an extended period to those that changed task. The starting point for 
these investigations was Experiment 4d. As this was a What-Where task carried out 
over twelve days it allowed for a change in task immediately to What-Where-Which. 
The results of Experiment 4d showed neither the Sham nor the HPC group 
demonstrating memory for What-Where. There was also no difference in the 
performance of the two groups on this task despite the variability in the data 
observed.  
Experiment 4e saw both groups then completing eight days of What-Where-Which. 
The change in task did not result in episodic-like memory for either group, nor was 
there a difference in the performance of the two groups. Again, splitting the data into 
blocks to observe if performance had improved or deteriorated at a specific point 
during Experiment 4e did not yield any significant results, however, performance of 
the Sham group did approach significance levels in the first block of four days. The 
change in task from Experiment 4d to Experiment 4e also led to no significant 
improvement in performance. Thus far it appears that a change in task is not novel 
enough to improve performance.  One possible reason for this could be that they are 
too habituated to the tasks to find either novel, despite the change. However, the fact 
that the Sham group‟s performance approached significance levels after a change in 
task despite the low group numbers and the resultant lack of power may allude to a 
possible trend. If this behaviour is shown to be consistent then it may be that larger 
group numbers would show a significant improvement in performance following task 
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change. However, if this is not the case then it can only be concluded that there 
exists a level to which the tasks become „over-habituated‟. 
Sham Group 1 continued with the What-Where-Which task to examine the effect of 
continuation of testing on a single task. Over the 12 days of Experiment 4e as a 
whole, Sham Group 1 did not demonstrate episodic-like memory. Moreover, 
performance fell with continued testing, perhaps again suggesting an over-
habituation to the task. However, at the same time it also lends credence to the open 
field method. Observing such variability over relatively short periods of testing allows 
for any subsequent manipulations to be made more efficiently. 
Although a marginal improvement in performance was found for Sham Group 1 
when the task was changed from What-Where (Experiment 4d) to What-Where-
Which (Experiment 4e first four days), this was not the case for the subsequent task 
changes. Again, the marginal results of Sham Group 1, although possibly alluding to 
a pattern in behaviour, is not strong enough evidence to conclude that a change in 
task positively affects performance. It may be the case that perhaps both tasks are 
too familiar to the animals for any change in task to be effective.  
Whilst Sham Group 1 were continuing with Experiment 4e and then proceeding to 
Experiment 4g, Sham Group 2 and the HPC group changed task from Experiment 4e 
(eight days of What-Where-Which) to Experiment 4f (eight days of What-Where). It 
appears from the results that a change in task does not significantly improve 
performance for the Sham groups and interestingly the HPC group appeared equally 
unaffected. Despite a marginal result from the Sham Group this pattern was not 
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repeated and so it can only be concluded that as the animals have undergone 
periods of habituation to both tasks, neither appear novel. 
4.7 Discussion 
The current chapter saw a change in methodology from the E-maze to the open field 
for several reasons. It was possible that exploration measures might be less 
vulnerable to extraneous factors such as noise than a critical measure such as first 
turn. If noise were impacting upon performance then this would be observable in the 
exploratory behaviour of the animals and it would be possible to rectify such issues 
more efficiently due to the fact that testing in the open field can be carried out in 
blocks of four days (Norman & Eacott, 2005).  
Experiment 4a sought to demonstrate episodic-like memory using the What-Where-
Which task in order to subsequently investigate the individual components of 
episodic-like memory, akin to the comparison between Eacott and Norman (2004), 
and Eacott and Gaffan (2005). The results of this experiment were not successful in 
demonstrating such episodic-like memory in either the Sham group nor the HPC 
group. Although the Sham group‟s performance did approach significance in the first 
block, there were still no significant differences between the performance of the two 
groups. It may be however, that with larger group sizes and therefore greater 
statistical power, that the Sham group‟s performance would reach significance levels 
and differences between the levels of performance of the two groups may be more 
notable.  
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It appeared clear, despite the lack of significant results, that there were still 
unidentified extraneous factors effecting performance of both groups. During the last 
block both groups‟ performance dropped, albeit not significantly so. It was concluded 
that stress was not the causal factor as such indicators of stress were not present in 
the animals. Considering the factors that had changed since Chapter 3 when 
episodic-like memory was demonstrated, it was hypothesised that the change in 
testing room may in fact be having an effect on performance. It was reasoned in 
particular that the size and geometry of the testing room may be affecting exploration 
if the animals are lacking in landmarks that would aid their positioning and navigation 
in the open field.  
Therefore, Experiment 4b saw the addition of landmarks to the walls surrounding the 
open field. The result was that although there was no significant improvement in 
performance from Experiment 4a to 4b, the Sham group were now demonstrating 
episodic-like memory, and the HPC group remained at chance. Due to the fact that 
no significant differences between the two groups were found, it was not possible to 
conclude that the lack of demonstration in the HPC group was as a consequence of 
the lesions to the hippocampus. In order for such a question to be answered it 
seems clear that larger group sizes are needed to increase the power of analyses. 
The same argument stands regarding landmarks. It cannot be concluded that the 
addition of landmarks to the testing room was the cause of the Sham group now 
demonstrating episodic-like memory as there was no significant improvement in 
performance from Experiment 4a to 4b, yet future studies using larger group sizes 
could yield clearer results. 
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Despite these results, interesting data could still be gleaned from carrying out a 
control task of What-Where. As recognition based on familiarity is claimed not be 
hippocampally dependent (Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Fortin, Wright, & Eichenbaum, 
2004; Yonelinas, et al., 2002), then the more simple dual association of What-Where 
should not be impaired. However, previous research has questioned such a 
suggestion (Manns, et al., 2003; Wais, et al., 2006; Wixted & Squire, 2004). If 
familiarity is not hippocampally dependent, a control What-Where task should show 
both the Sham and HPC group performing above chance. However, if one were to 
support the view that the hippocampus plays a role in recall and familiarity then the 
results should show the Sham group performing above chance but not the HPC 
group. Again, significant differences would need to be found between the two groups 
in order to conclude that this is in fact the case. 
Experiment 4c attempted to show evidence for one of the above theories. As the 
What-Where task necessitated the use of one context alone, an investigation was 
also carried out in tandem to observe if there were any context preferences. 
Although the results suggested there was no effect of context on performance, the 
results unexpectedly showed that neither group were demonstrating memory for 
What-Where. As the Sham group had shown the more complex What-Where-Which 
memory in Experiment 4b, it was concluded that a problem lay in the methodology. 
The performance of the HPC group also supported this suggestion as they were 
significantly preferring to exploring the object in the familiar what-where 
configuration.  
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Research (unpublished) from other members of the lab group have shown the What-
Where task to be successful in animals of the same strain, using the same objects 
and in an identical environment. The relevance of this lies in the different cleaning 
methods adopted by the different members of the group. Although this issue was 
thought to have been addressed in Chapter 2, it was now thought that it was not only 
the odour from the animals themselves that were having an effect on the results, but 
also that the alcohol cleaning wipes used to clean the objects and open field were 
potentially leaving behind a residue that the animals were averse to. Experiment 4d 
investigated this by carrying out further days of the What-Where task using two 
different cleaning methods (Intermediate and Minimal). Neither method resulted in 
the Sham or the HPC group demonstrating memory for What-Where and nor were 
there seen to be significant differences in the results due to the different methods. 
However, the „Minimal‟ cleaning method was determined to be the most successful 
due to the fact that the Sham group were seen to improve. Although this was not of 
significance, it was the performance of the Sham group that needed to be focused 
on as it is would be this group that would be seen to improve.  
Experiment 4d and the previous Experiment 4a also highlighted was the variability in 
performance over time which has also been noted previously in Chapter 3. Tasks in 
the open field can be conducted successfully over a period of four testing days as 
shown in Experiment 4b and does allow for more efficient manipulations to the 
methodology. However, the issue of stability in performance is an important one, 
especially when considering the advantages and disadvantages of each type of 
methodology employed. Previous research has shown that performance can be 
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sustained in the E-maze (Eacott et al., 2005), although the level of performance 
might plausibly be improved upon. The studies of Chapters 2 and 3 were unable to 
do that. However, the transfer of this problem over to the open field, which is known 
to be a reliable task, suggests that there are still unidentified extraneous variables 
affecting the results. Has the change in methodology to the open field again 
highlighted the issue of task novelty? The introduction of novel landmarks certainly 
was successful in boosting performance, but again this was not sustainable. 
Although this would not explain the results of the What-Where tasks of Experiments 
4c and 4d, it is certainly an important methodological aspect that needs investigating 
further.  
Experiments 4e, 4f and 4g (also including the results of Experiment 4d) sought to 
investigate performance over time, and also to investigate the effect of task change 
on performance. Results from Chapter 3 and the current chapter brought to light the 
variability in performance over time. As explained previously, it is important to have a 
task that is stable over time considering the limitations that lesion groups can place 
on such experiments. It is also an interesting issue if there were to exist any 
differences between lesion groups and sham groups and would certainly provide 
valuable information to future studies of similar vein. Although the low numbers of 
the groups means that any analyses will have the power compromised, any 
differences observed may be treated as trends until more powerful analyses can be 
carried out on larger group sizes. With regard to task change, it was postulated that 
the novelty or interest of changing task may serve to improve performance due to 
rats possessing an innate preference for novelty (Ennaceur & Delacour, 1988). 
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Although this issue was touched upon in Chapter 3, it was thought that the two tasks 
involved (i.e. Objects Visible and Objects Hidden) were not distinct enough from 
each other for the change in task to be considered a novelty by the animals. 
Using Experiment 4d as a starting point it was found the change in task from What-
Where to What-Where-Which did not result in either group demonstrating episodic-
like memory. Block analyses also revealed no improvements in performance 
following the task change.  
In order to investigate the stability of performance over time half of the Sham group 
(Sham Group 1) remained on the What-Where-Which task. Although reducing the 
numbers of the groups and the power of subsequent analyses, this method does 
allow for tentative within-group comparisons. Although no demonstration of episodic-
like memory was observed, again there was found to be variability in the data with 
performance dropping as the task continued. Although performance was marginally 
improved when the task changed from What-Where (Experiment 4d) to What-Where-
Which (Experiment 4e first block), this was not the case for subsequent task 
changes. Sham Group 2 and the HPC group also showed no improvement in their 
performance when changing task from What-Where-Which to What-Where. In 
addition there was no demonstration of episodic-like memory from either group in 
Experiments 4e and 4f as a whole or when blocking the data.  
Therefore, despite a marginal result from the Sham group initially, further task 
changes did not lead to actual significant improvements in any of the groups. In fact 
the HPC group appeared equally as unaffected by the change in tasks as the Sham 
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group. It cannot be concluded or alluded to (considering the group sizes) that a 
change in task has a positive impact on performance. 
This then begs the question whether or not the habituation period to the tasks is 
excessive or if in fact the results show the habituation period to be sufficient. An 
investigation that manipulated habituation periods (although not to the extent that 
resulted in any stress to the animals) would allow one to observe if this had an effect 
on future task changes.  
The above point also relates to the variability of performance over time which has 
been noted at several points during the current chapter. Is performance over time 
variable due to over-habituation, or is it the sensitive nature of the task to extraneous 
variables (the likes of which have been discussed in the current and previous 
chapters) that is having the observed effects on performance.  
Although tasks in the open field can be more efficiently manipulated when compared 
to tasks in the E-maze, it too has also proven to be a sensitive task. Such a task 
needs further attention and manipulation in order to be considered reliable over time. 
Subsequent investigations of this vein however were not possible due to the author 
developing an allergy to the rats. The direction of the next chapter therefore takes a 
drastic turn in its methodology. Is it possible to create similar tasks as those seen in 
the previous chapters that could be used to investigate episodic-memory in humans? 
If this were to be possible, comparisons could be drawn between the two and 
perhaps answer some questions regarding whether or not episodic-like memory in 
animals is actually a mirror of episodic memory in humans. 
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5 INVESTIGATING HUMAN EPISODIC MEMORY 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the methodology of episodic (or episodic-
like) memory tasks in animals. Previous chapters studied episodic-like memory in 
non-human animals. The advantage of animal studies is that they allow for a much 
broader range of investigative techniques (such as the lesion study of Chapters 3 to 
4) compared to studies involving normal human participants or neuropsychological 
patients.  However, despite these advantages there still remains the contentious 
issue of the relationship between episodic-like memory tasks in animals and the 
experience of episodic memory in humans. 
Although Tulving (1972) originally defined episodic memory as the memory for the 
what, where and when of an episode, he later admitted that this definition was over-
simplified and re-defined episodic memory to incorporate three essential 
components: self, autonoetic awareness and subjectively sensed time (Tulving, 
2002). This new definition made demonstrating episodic memory in animals an 
impossible task due to the fact that there exists no agreed behavioural markers of 
conscious recollection in animals. The previous chapters however, discussed how 
Clayton & Dickinson (1998) used Tulving‟s original (1972) definition to demonstrate 
what is now referred to as episodic-like memory in animals. This led to further 
modifications of this definition such as the what-where-which concept (Eacott et al., 
2005; Eacott & Gaffan, 2005; Eacott & Norman, 2004) which sees „which‟ (as 
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opposed to „when‟) is the occasion setter that defines an experience as being 
unique.  
So, the question of whether or not episodic memory can be demonstrated in animals 
has been answered to the extent that episodic-like memory can be demonstrated in 
animals. The extent to which this bears relevance to what is episodic memory in 
humans however, is still debated. For example, simply knowing what happened, 
where and when does not necessarily mean that the memory is episodic. Zentall 
(2005)  highlights this point by explaining that just because one knows that the 
Declaration of Independence was signed in Philadelphia on July 4 th 1776 does not 
mean that this is an episodic memory. This issue has not at the time of writing been 
directly addressed in that there have been no studies that attempt to take a task that 
demonstrates episodic-like memory in animals in order to determine if this is 
experienced as episodic memory in humans. Research has tended to focus on 
human studies which are then adapted to animal studies using the modified 
definitions of episodic-like memory. Despite the observed variability in the data of 
previous chapters, Chapter 2 was successful in demonstrating episodic-like memory 
in animals. The current chapter aims to create a task, comparable to those used in 
the previous chapters, to investigate if this memory can in fact mirror itself as 
episodic memory in humans. This would refute claims that episodic memory can only 
be supported by the human memory system, as no other memory system known 
possess the necessary features that serve to define episodic memory (Tulving & 
Markowitsch, 1998).  
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Creating a task that is comparable to those used in the previous chapters is not 
simple. The what-where-which and what-where-when tasks are used to show 
episodic-like memory in animals, but how is episodic memory exhibited in humans? 
It is important to understand this before attempting to create such a task.  
As explained in the General Introduction (section 1.4) dual-process models of 
recognition memory impart that recognition occurs through two separate memory 
processes which are clearly distinct: familiarity and recall. Familiarity is considered 
relatively automatic and more quantitative, reflecting a „strength-like‟ signal. 
Recollection however, is regarded as a somewhat slower process as it requires the 
recovery of memories that relate to the spatial, temporal and interitem context of a 
particular episode and so is more qualitative in nature (Mandler, 1980). Alternative 
models, i.e. „single-process‟ models, view recollection as reflecting the retrieval of 
strong and detailed memories, whereas familiarity reflects weaker and less detailed 
memories (e.g. Donaldson, 1996).  
Autonoetic awareness is considered a defining property of episodic memory that is 
expressed through the reliving of a personal episode (Tulving, 1983). Noetic 
awareness does not require any such self-recollection, only an awareness of 
familiarity or knowing. For expressions of autonoetic awareness Tulving applied the 
term „remembering‟, and for expressions of noetic awareness he applied the term 
„knowing‟. Tulving (1985) demonstrated that participants were able to understand the 
two types of awareness and the differences between them and report them using 
remember and know responses. Tulving‟s Remember/Know procedure has attracted 
the attention of researchers over the years attempting to develop it further.  
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Remembering and knowing define general states of awareness, both of which may 
be broken down into varieties of experiences (Gardiner & Conway, 1999). 
Remembering can be broken down into more specific source monitoring judgements, 
know responses however, can be broken down into additional response categories. 
This allows for guess responses to be reported as such, and just know responses to 
be reported separately from familiarity. Familiarity was now defined as the feeling of 
some recent but unremembered encounter and knowing was just simple knowing, 
However, both still reflect noetic awareness (Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, 
& Cohen, 1997).  
The above issue reflects an ongoing debate as to how know responses are 
interpreted. When knowing is considered the default response, this allows for 
participants to take advantage and respond know when they do not in fact possess 
the necessary awareness to justify the response (Strack & Forster, 1995). Early 
studies using the remember/know procedure discouraged guessing, yet the addition 
of a guess response as an option is the more sensible route to take (Gardiner & 
Conway, 1999; Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; Gardiner, Kaminska, 
Dixon, & Java, 1996; Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998, 2002; 
Gardiner, Richardson-Klavehn, & Ramponi, 1997) as allowing for a guess response 
does not exclude the option of discouraging it. Evidence from these studies suggests 
that it is the guess responses that reflect various other judgemental strategies and 
not in fact know responses.  
Other developments of the remember/know procedure involve confidence 
judgements. Several researchers have proposed that remember and know 
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responses reflect varying degrees of confidence with regard to the products of 
memory retrieval (Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman, 1998; Inoue & Bellezza, 1998). 
However, this proposition has been shown to be untenable as research that has 
directly compared both forms of judgement report difference patterns of results 
(Gardiner, 2001; Gardiner & Conway, 1999; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Holmes, Waters, 
& Rajaram, 1998; Mäntylä, 1997; Parkin & Walter, 1992; Perfect, Williams, & 
Anderton-Brown, 1995; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram, Hamilton, & Bolton, 2002). 
What the above literature has served to show is how the remember/know procedure 
can differentiate between recollection and familiarity. This would therefore be the 
comparable task to Eacott, et al.‟s (2005) study which showed dissociations between 
recollection and familiarity in the E-maze. The methodology of the procedure has 
already developed quite dramatically since Tulving (1985) first introduced it. 
Although there is still debate about how to interpret the data that it provides, the 
relevance of it here is that it provides a comparable task that can be modified further. 
This would allow for the proposed investigation into how the what-where-which and 
what-where-when memory, for example, as shown in chapters 2 to 4 in animals, 
would present itself in humans, and whether or not the episodic-like memory 
previously demonstrated would equate to what is episodic memory in humans. In 
addition, are the individual components of episodic-like memory such as the 
temporal and contextual components as essential in humans and are they all 
episodic in nature? 
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5.2 Experiments 5a 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Tulving‟s (1985) remember/know paradigm provides a suitable method (with 
modifications) for a task to be built around that is comparable to those used in 
Chapters 2 to 5. This allows for investigations into how such memories as what-
where-which and what-where-when would present themselves in humans. Therefore 
the current chapter developed a questionnaire with an accompanying slide show that 
probed such memories using the remember/know paradigm.  
It was hypothesised that questions probing „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-
When‟ memory should result in similar patterns of data as both types of question are 
episodic but simply using difference occasion setters to help define the experience 
as unique (i.e. time or context). The rationale behind this prediction was that episodic 
memories are reliant on recollection, and if episodic-like memories are truly episodic 
in nature then they too should rely on recollection processes. Therefore, if 
participants‟ memory for „What-Where-Which‟ or „What-Where-When‟ is questioned 
they should only report a remember response as these reflect the recollection 
processes. Consequently these remember responses would be extremely accurate 
and accompanied by high confidence ratings. The high confidence ratings reflect that 
a remember response is signifying absolute recollection. If there was no absolute 
recollection then this would be reported via Guess responses. The proportion of 
Know responses should be approaching zero as these questions cannot be solved 
using familiarity alone. If per chance Know responses were to be reported then the 
accuracy of these responses would be at chance as use of the familiarity circuit here 
 190 
 
cannot result in the recall of accurate episodic information. It would also be expected 
that confidence ratings would not be as high as for Remember responses. Non-
episodic questions of a „What‟ nature acted as a baseline reference for the episodic 
questions. It was predicted that these questions would be qualitatively different from 
„What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ questions as they can be solved using 
familiarity alone. 
5.2.2 Methods and Materials 
5.2.2.1 Participants 
Twenty nine third year undergraduate students studying neuropsychology took part 
in the current experiment. There was a mix of males and females with an age range 
of between 21 and 23 years of age.  
5.2.2.2 Apparatus 
5.2.2.2.1 Stimuli 
Stimuli were taken from a pilot study carried out by undergraduates (see 
http://images.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://www.graphicxtras.com/f7/illustrator_
symbols_26_gall.png&imgrefurl=http://www.graphicxtras.com/Products/aisymbols_m
ore26.htm&h=2033&w=800&sz=179&hl=en&start=7&um=1&tbnid=Y_iSLyxMUl-
OxM:&tbnh=150&tbnw=59&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dunusual%2Bsymbols%26um%3
D1%26hl%3Den%26rlz%3D1W1SNYW%26sa%3DN). The stimuli consisted of 
symbols that were made up of circles of differing sizes and put together to form 
shapes which were red in colour.  See Figure 5.1 for two examples. 
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Figure 5.1: Examples of the Stimuli used 
5.2.2.2.2 Slide Show 
A slide show was created using Microsoft Office Powerpoint 2007. The slide show 
consisted of two instructional slides pertaining to the experiment, and two 
experimental slides. The experimental slides were made up of a black and white 
background context (either a chequered background or a zebra print background) 
that was to mirror the use of contexts in the E-maze and the Open Field. On these 
backgrounds were nine different symbols/stimuli akin to those shown in Figure 5.1. 
The stimuli were the same on each experimental slide as were the possible locations 
of the stimuli, however object-location pairings changed between contexts (see 
Figure 5.2). Between the instructional slides and the first experimental slide and also 
between each experimental slide a blank slide was inserted.  
 
Figure 5.2: The two experimental slides showing the differing background contexts and differing 
locations of the stimuli 
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5.2.2.2.3 Questionnaires 
The questionnaires consisted of nine questions. Three of these were questions of a 
„What‟ nature (see Figure 5.3), three were of a „What-Where-When‟ nature (see 
Figure 5.4) and three of a „What-Where-Which‟ nature (see Figure 5.5). After each 
question was presented there were two possible answers, one of which had to be 
selected. Participants were then asked to select either „remember‟, „know‟ or „guess‟. 
If the participant selected either „remember‟ or „know‟ they were additionally required 
to give a confidence rating from 1 to 5 (1 indicating low confidence and 5 indicating 
high confidence). If the participant selected guess they were instructed not to give a 
confidence rating. There were three versions of the questionnaire, all with the same 
questions but counterbalanced for order. Questionnaires were printed out in black 
and white (see appendix). 
Q. WHICH OF THESE SYMBOLS HAVE YOU SEEN BEFORE? 
A:      B: 
          
Answer (circle your choice):  
A  B 
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
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How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
Figure 5.3: Example of a 'What' question 
 
Q. ON WHICH SLIDE DID YOU SEE THIS SYMBOL IS THIS PARTICULAR LOCATION? 
 
Answer (circle your choice):  
A: 1
ST
 SLIDE  B: 2
ND
 SLIDE 
 
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
Figure 5.4: Example of a 'What-Where-When' question 
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Q: ON WHAT BACKGROUND DID YOU SEE THIS OBJECT IN THIS LOCATION? 
 
Answer (circle your choice):  
A: ZEBRA  B: CHEQURED 
    
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
Figure 5.5: Example of a 'What-Where-Which' question 
5.2.2.2.4 Instructions 
A sheet of instructions was presented on the top of each questionnaire. This detailed 
what was required from the participant for the experiment. It also explained in 
sufficient detail the difference between remember and know (adapted from Geraci & 
McCabe, 2006; Rajaram, 1993; Wais, Mickes, & Wixted, 2008) and gave examples 
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of each. Participants were informed that they were able to refer back to these 
instructions at any point during the task. The instructions on the slide show reiterated 
those on the questionnaire sheet and allowed for any questions to be asked (see 
appendix). 
5.2.2.2.5 Test Room and Experimenter 
The current experiment took place in a lecture theatre in the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Durham. All instructions were given by the 
experimenter. Silence was observed throughout the duration of the experiment.  
5.2.2.3 Design 
The task employed a within-participants design. Participants were given one of the 
three counterbalanced questionnaires, therefore each participant who was sat side 
by side had a different order of questions.  
5.2.2.4 Procedure 
After obtaining consent to participate, participants were given one of the three 
possible questionnaires (as detailed above). They were instructed not to turn over 
the first page until told to do so. The slide show was then presented. The first two 
instructional slides were read to the participants which explained the requirements of 
the task and importantly, what constituted a „remember‟, „know‟ or „guess‟ response. 
It was also emphasised that participants had to answer every question and also that 
if they responded „guess‟ to a question then they were not required to report a 
confidence rating. Participants were then told they had one minute to read the 
instruction sheet. After answering any possible questions the first experimental slide 
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was shown (zebra context) for thirty seconds. A blank slide was then presented for 
one minute followed by the second experimental slide (checked context) for thirty 
seconds. After the second experimental slide participants were told they could turn 
over their questionnaires and begin (see Figure 5.6 for a timeline of the slide show). 
There was no time limit imposed on completing the questionnaire. All timings were 
strictly adhered to by using a stop watch. 
  
  
    1 Minute                       1 Minute                    Immediate 
Figure 5.6: Timeline of the Slide Show 
5.2.2.5 Data collection 
Following the completion of the experiment, the questionnaires were collected, 
coded and analysed appropriately. Any questionnaires that were not fully completed 
were excluded. Anonymous codes were kept of all the participants to ensure that no 
participant was tested again in any future experiments. 
5.2.3 Results 
The analyses used for the current experiment were of a binomial nature. This was 
due to the fact that participants could answer either all or none of the questions as 
either „remember‟, „know‟ or „guess‟ and they are either selected or not selected, 
therefore only two values can occur, 0 or 1. 
Instructions 1
st
 Experimental 
Slide 
Test 2
nd
 Experimental 
Slide 
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Determining if the difference between the proportion of accurate responses was 
expected by chance alone was determined via these binomial calculations. Average 
confidence measures were taken from each correct response. Results were 
analysed using the binomial probabilities outlined above and taken by answer type. 
Binomials were presented as p values and results were always 1-tailed unless 
specifically stated otherwise. 
5.2.3.1  ‘What-Where-Which’ questions 
It was hypothesised that correct responses should be made using Remember (R) 
judgments if the task is episodic in nature due to the fact that such episodic 
questions can only be accurately answered using recall mechanisms. However, the 
results show that in fact out of a possible 87 responses only 32 of these (37%) were 
reported as R responses. In contrast, these questions resulted in 36 Know (K) 
responses (41%) and 19 Guess (G) responses (22%). Thus, contrary to 
expectations, „What-Where-Which‟ questions actually resulted in marginally more K 
responses than R responses. 
An alternative hypothesis was put forward regarding the possibility that K responses 
would be reported. If this were to be the case it was predicted that only R responses 
stemming from the recall circuit would result in above chance accuracy. The 
accuracy of any K responses reported would be at chance considering that accurate 
episodic memory cannot be extracted from the familiarity circuit. Therefore, the 
accuracy of R, K and G in response to „What-Where-Which‟ questions was also 
examined.  
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For those questions that the participant reported an experience of remembering, the 
accuracy rate was 91% (29/32) (p ≤ 0.001). When a „What-Where-Which‟ question 
evoked a feeling of Knowing or resulted in a Guess response the accuracy rate was 
not significantly different from chance level at 58 % (21/36) (p = 0.203) and 53% 
(10/19) (p = 0.499) respectively. Thus, as proposed previously, only those responses 
that were experienced as Remember resulted in above chance accuracy levels.  
Confidence ratings were also reported for R and K responses. It was hypothesised 
that if K responses were reported for these episodic questions then the confidence 
ratings would be lower when compared to those associated with R responses.  
 
 
Figure 5.7: What-Where-Which: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.7 shows the total number of R and K responses and the number of 
respective accurate responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions. What is apparent 
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from this figure is that „total R responses‟ and „accurate R responses‟ are located in 
the higher confidence ratings (4-5). However, „total K responses‟ and „accurate K 
responses‟ are more widely distributed with the majority constituting the lower 
confidence ratings (2-3). The distribution of responses and accurate responses for 
both R and K leads to the question of whether accurate responses are simply a 
result of confidence. Would R responses be accurate for all reported responses 
irrespective of the confidence level? Would K responses always be accurate 
considering they are a reflection of noetic awareness cannot be used to solve an 
episodic task that requires autonoetic awareness? By examining confidence levels 5 
and 4 for example, the proportion of accurate R responses are 100% and 86% 
respectively. K responses result in accurate responses of 100% and 88% 
respectively, however, the low number of responses should also be noted (i.e. for 
confidence level 5 there is only one K response and this response was accurate). It 
is also apparent that the proportion of accurate K responses seems to decrease 
alongside confidence levels. Although this can be said for accurate R responses, the 
proportion of R responses for confidence level 2 was 100% whereas as accurate K 
responses continued to decrease (36% for confidence level 2). This suggests then 
that accuracy of R responses is not a matter of confidence but a reflection of the 
retrieval of an episodic memory as accuracy is high even when a low confidence 
level is reported alongside it. The proportion of accurate K responses which are seen 
to decrease with respect to confidence does not necessarily suggest that accuracy is 
a matter of confidence considering the relatively low number of accurate K 
responses that are associated with higher confidence levels.  
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5.2.3.2  ‘What-Where-When’ questions 
It was hypothesised that the responses for „What-Where-When‟ would follow exactly 
the same pattern as those for „What-Where-Which‟ questions. However, out of a 
possible 87 responses, only 48 (55%) of these did participants report a R 
experience. In contrast, there were 22 K responses (25%) and 17 G responses 
(20%). However, even though there were more K responses than originally 
predicted, there were more R responses than K responses for this episodic question. 
As for the „What-Where-Which‟ questions, the alternative hypothesis put forward was 
that if both R and K responses are produced, it would only be R responses that 
would result in above chance accuracy. The accuracy of these responses were 
examined for „What-Where-When‟ questions and it was found that of those R 
responses, 96% (46/48) were answered accurately which was significantly above 
chance (p ≤ 0.001). Those questions which evoked a feeling of Knowing were 
answered with an accuracy of 91% (20/22) which was again significantly above 
chance (p ≤ 0.001). The accuracy of G responses were at chance (47%, 8/17 p = 
0.5). Therefore, in contrast to predictions, and also in contrast to the findings from 
„What-Where-Which‟ questions, both R and K responses resulted in above chance 
accuracy.  
It was also predicted that the confidence levels reported would be high for R 
responses and relatively lower for K responses, similar to the results found for „What-
Where-Which‟ questions.  
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Figure 5.8: What-Where-When: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.8 shows that the majority of R responses are accompanied by high 
confidence levels and high accuracy levels. The wide distribution of K responses 
follows much the same pattern as observed for „What-Where-Which‟ questions, with 
the majority of responses occurring in the average range (2-3). However, what is 
clearly in contrast to the observations from „What-Where-Which‟ questions is that 
despite the lack of confidence in these responses, the proportion of these K 
responses that are accurate is surprisingly high. Accuracy of K responses for these 
questions is high for all confidence levels with the lowest accuracy rate occurring for 
confidence level 2 (75%), although only one response which was correct was 
reported for confidence level 1. The distribution of these accurate K responses does 
not seem to follow the same pattern as that observed for What-Where-Which 
questions. In fact the pattern is more similar to the distribution of accurate R 
responses, with high accuracy still observed in the lower confidence levels (1 and 2).  
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5.2.3.3 ‘What’ questions 
The non-episodic „What‟ questions resulted in 72 out of a possible 87 responses 
being reported at R (83%). Responses associated with a feeling of Knowing were 
lower, with only 13 out of a possible 87 responses (15%), and only 2 G responses 
were reported (2%). With regard to accuracy, both R (99%, 71/72) and K (100%, 
13/13) responses resulted in high accuracy levels (p ≤ 0.001, p ≤ 0.001 respectively). 
Only two G responses (2%) were reported, both of which were accurate (100%, p = 
0.025).  
 
Figure 5.9: What: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate responses for each 
confidence level 
Figure 5.9 highlights the simple nature of the non-episodic „What‟ questions which is 
reflected in the high confidence and accuracy levels. This is in contrast to the 
episodic questions of „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟, despite it being 
predicted that both episodic questions would be answered using the recall circuits 
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and therefore also resulting in high accuracy and confidence levels. As figures 5.7 
and 5.8 demonstrate, this was clearly not the case.  
5.2.3.4 Comparisons of question types 
It was originally predicted that „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ 
questions would result in similar patterns of data as both questions probe episodic 
memory but are simply defining it with a different occasion setter. It was also 
predicted that responses to these questions would be overwhelmingly of a R nature. 
As reported previously, what was found was that there were more R responses for 
„What-Where-When‟ (55%) questions compared to „What-Where-Which‟ questions 
(37%), although as table 5.1 shows, both question types resulted in above chance 
accuracy rates for these R responses.  
Contrary to predictions, participants reported K in response to these episodic 
questions with more K responses for „What-Where-Which‟ (41%) than „What-Where-
When‟ questions (25%). An alternative hypothesis that was proposed if K responses 
were to occur was that the accuracy of these K responses for both episodic 
questions would be at chance as such episodic questions cannot be solved using the 
familiarity circuit. As table 5.2 shows, this was the case for „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions, however, „What-Where-When‟ questions resulted in K responses proving 
to be accurate above the chance level. In fact there was a higher proportion of 
accurate K responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions compared to „What-Where-
Which‟ questions. 
Questions probing memory for „What‟ were predicted to be qualitatively different to 
the episodic questions of „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ as they can 
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be solved using only the familiarity circuit. As reported previously, there was found to 
be a drop in R responses from „What‟ questions (83%) to „What-Where-Which‟ (37%) 
and „What-Where-When‟ questions (55%). There was found to be a lower proportion 
of Know responses regarding „What‟ questions (15%) reflecting the less complicated, 
non-episodic nature of the question. With regard to accuracy of responses (see 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2), „What‟ questions resulted in a higher proportion of accurate R 
responses compared to both „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ 
questions. This was also true of accurate Know responses.  
Table 5.5.1: Summarising the results for accurate Remember responses for each question type 
Remember Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 29/32 91% p ≤ 0.001 
What-Where-When 46/48 96% p ≤ 0.001 
What 71/72 99% p ≤ 0.001 
 
Table 5.5.2: Summarising the results for accurate Know responses for each question type 
Know Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 21/36 58% p = 0.203 
What-Where-When 20/22 91% p ≤ 0.001 
What 13/13 100% p ≤ 0.001 
 
5.2.4 Discussion 
The original hypothesis stated that the episodic questions of „What-Where-Which‟ 
and „What-Where-When‟ would not only result in an overwhelming proportion of R 
responses and accurate R responses, but that the patterns of data for the two 
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questions types would be comparable due to the fact that both questions probe a 
triad of episodic memory components with only the occasion setter differing. 
Confidence levels associated with these responses were also predicted to be high 
due to the all or nothing nature of the remember experience. If it were to be the case 
that participants responded K to these episodic questions, then the alternative 
hypothesis stated that the accuracy of these responses should be at chance level for 
both question types as episodic questions cannot be solved using the familiarity 
circuit. Confidence levels associated with these responses should be relatively lower 
as unlike an experience of remembering, a feeling of familiarity is not absolute. 
Questions probing memory for „What‟ would be qualitatively different to the episodic 
questions as it is possible to solve these questions using familiarity alone. 
The results supported the original hypothesis with respect to the fact that the 
proportion of R responses that were accurate were significantly above chance for 
both episodic questions, which was also reflected in high confidence ratings. 
However, the patterns of data differed in that there was found to be a higher 
percentage of accurate R responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions compared to 
„What-Where-Which‟ questions.  
The original hypothesis was not supported however, as for both „What-Where-Which‟ 
and „What-Where-When‟ K responses were also reported, and in the case of „What-
Where-Which‟ questions there were marginally more K responses than R responses. 
However, small numbers of K responses were also reported for the non-episodic 
„What‟ questions. Supporting the alternative hypothesis with regard to these K 
responses, the accuracy of these in response to „What-Where-Which‟ questions 
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were at chance. The unexpected result was that when participants responded K to 
the episodic „What-Where-When‟ questions, unlike for the „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions, the accuracy rate was above chance despite confidence levels not 
reflecting this.  
Interestingly, as the proportion of accurate K responses for „What-Where-When‟ 
questions was above chance, in that respect they were more comparable to the 
results for the „What‟ questions. As it is not possible to solve an episodic question 
using familiarity, and if one assumes that „What-Where-When‟ is indeed an episodic 
question, then one possible reason for this unusual and unexpected pattern of data 
may be that participants are also using strength of memory trace to solve the „What-
Where-When‟ questions. This could be possible as in the current experiment there 
was no delay between the end of the second experimental slide and the start of the 
test phase. Therefore, it is entirely plausible that in response to „What-Where-When‟ 
questions, participants are assigning strong memories to the more recently seen 
experimental slide and weak memories to the experimental slide that was presented 
first. This could explain how participants are using a K response to successfully 
solve an episodic question. The difference in the proportion of R responses could 
also be explained if participants are using this alternative method to solve the task. 
Strength of memory trace may lead to a Remember response if the participant is 
sure the correct answer was located in the first or second experimental slide, even 
though this would not constitute a Remember response by the definition given to 
them in the instructions. If a participant is unconsciously using this method, then they 
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would experience a feeling of familiarity but the strength of memory trace would lead 
to a correct answer.  
Whilst examining the results it was also appropriate to determine if the observed 
results were simply a matter of confidence. Are Remember responses accurate for 
all confidence intervals, or does confidence determine accuracy? By looking at 
accurate responses over the confidence intervals patterns emerged for both 
Remember and Know responses. The proportion of accurate Remember responses 
for both episodic questions, although seen to decrease over confidence levels 4 and 
3, were still highly accurate at the low confidence level of 2. In response to „What-
Where-Which‟ questions, the proportion of accurate K responses decreased 
alongside confidence levels. This serves to show that R responses are indicating the 
recall of episodic memory which is absolute in nature as confidence does not appear 
to wholly affect accuracy of recall. Dual process models (Mandler, 1980) however, 
and to an extent single process models (Donaldson, 1996), would not expect 
Remember responses to be accompanied by a low confidence rating as recollection 
(i.e. Remember) reflects strong and detailed memories. Although it would be 
expected that K responses should have accuracy at the chance level for all 
confidence levels in response to episodic questions, the decrease in accuracy of K 
responses with respect to confidence levels supports the notion that K responses are 
a reflection of non absolute, non-episodic memory. It is possible to have a slight 
feeling or a strong feeling of familiarity, however, it is not possible to have slight, yet 
absolute recall of a memory. The pattern of accurate Know responses for „What-
Where-When‟ questions differed. In fact the pattern was more comparable to that of 
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accurate Remember responses, which showed high accuracy at the lowest reported 
confidence levels. This also supports the possibility that participants are using 
another method to solve this episodic „What-Where-When‟ task and these Know 
responses may not be reflecting familiarity alone. 
In order to investigate whether strength of memory trace is a contributing factor to 
the observed results, further experiments need to be carried out with the issue of 
delay being addressed.   
5.3 Experiment 5b 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The previous experiment observed several interesting and unexpected patterns of 
data. Firstly, it was found that participants were not only responding Remember to 
the episodic questions of „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ but they 
were also responding Know. In fact, „What-Where-Which‟ questions resulted in 
marginally more K responses than R responses. This was unexpected as in order to 
solve an episodic task one can only use the recall circuits which are defined by a 
Remember response. Any alternative responses were expected to be reported as 
guesses. There were also unexpected differences in the proportion of Remember 
and Know responses between the two episodic questions. It was originally 
hypothesised that the patterns of data for both questions would be similar due to the 
fact that they are both episodic questions with only the occasion setter differing. 
However, „What-Where-When‟ questions resulted in more Remember responses in 
comparison to „What-Where-Which‟ questions. In addition, those Know responses 
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that were reported for „What-Where-When‟ questions had an accuracy rate that was 
found to be significantly above chance which was in contrast to the results for „What-
Where-Which‟ questions but not the non-episodic „What‟ questions. The alternative 
hypothesis in Experiment 5a for any Know responses that may occur predicted that 
accuracy would be at chance for both types of episodic question. As it is not possible 
to solve such an episodic question using familiarity, it was suggested that 
participants are also using strength of memory trace to solve these questions. The 
reasoning behind this suggestion was the fact that there was no delay between the 
second experimental slide and the test phase of the task, which could make it 
possible for participants to assign strong memories to the most recently seen 
experimental slide and weak memories to the first experimental slide and answer the 
questions accordingly. Therefore, the current experiment addressed this issue by 
increasing the delay between the second experimental slide and the test phase of 
the task. This was achieved by having the instructional phase of the task after the 
second experimental slide, thereby increasing the delay without altering the total 
length of the experiment. Although it may still be possible to use this strategy to 
solve the task, the delay should reduce the effectiveness of it. It was predicted that 
the patterns of data for „What-Where-Which questions‟ would be similar to those 
seen in Experiment 5a. Data resulting from „What-Where-When‟ questions however 
should result in a drop in accuracy of Know responses from above chance to chance 
levels reflecting the elimination of strength of memory trace. There may also be a 
drop in the proportion of both Remember and Know responses which would then be 
comparable to data from „What-Where-Which‟ questions.   
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5.3.2 Methods and Materials 
5.3.2.1 Subjects 
Thirty eight first year undergraduates studying statistics for psychology took part in 
the current experiment. There was a mix of males and females with an age range of 
between 18 and 20 years of age. 
5.3.2.2 Apparatus  
5.3.2.2.1 Stimuli 
Stimuli were the same used as in Experiment 5a. 
5.3.2.2.2 Slide Show 
The slide show in the current experiment only differed with regard to the location of 
the instructional slide. For Experiment 5a it was located at the start of the slide show, 
however, in order to increase the delay between the second experimental slide and 
the test phase, the instructional slide was now presented after the second 
experimental slide. This also allowed for the total length of the experiment to be the 
same as in Experiment 5a. 
5.3.2.2.3 Instructions 
Due to the different location of the instructional slide (see slide show), the 
introductory instructions now simply informed participants that they would be 
presented with two different slides, each of which they needed to concentrate and 
afterwards they would be given further instructions on how to proceed. 
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5.3.2.2.4 Questionnaires 
Experiment 5a saw three versions of the questionnaire counterbalanced for order. 
The current experiment introduced three more questionnaires so that not only were 
questions counterbalanced for order, but also for answer. Consequently the three 
new questionnaires were identical to the original three but with the answers in the 
opposite order. There now existed six questionnaires counterbalanced with and 
between blocks of question types.  
5.3.2.2.5 Test Room and Experimenter 
As in Experiment 5a, the experimenter was the author, however the testing room 
changed to a laboratory in the psychology department at the University of Durham. 
5.3.2.3 Design 
The design was the same as outlined in Experiment 5a but for the addition of three 
questionnaires that allowed for the counterbalancing of answers.  
5.3.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure only differed from that described in Experiment 5a with respect to 
when the participants were presented with the instructional slide. The current task 
saw participants being presented with an introductory instruction slide (see slide 
show) followed by the first experimental slide for 30 seconds. After this first 
experimental slide a blank slide was presented for 1 minute, as in Experiment 6a. 
The second experimental slide was then presented for 30 seconds, following this 1 
minute was taken to present and verbalise the full instructional slide and to inform 
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participants that they could now read the instructions located on top of the 
questionnaire sheets (see Figure 5.10 for a timeline of the slide show). 
 
                                 
   1 Minute                           1 Minute 30 
Figure 5.10: Timeline of the Slide Show 
5.3.3 Results 
Results were analysed the same manner as described for Experiment 5a. 
5.3.3.1 ‘What-Where-Which’ questions 
Although the focus of the current experiment mainly lies with the data associated 
with „What-Where-When‟ questions, it was hypothesised that „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions would result in data that was comparable to that observed in Experiment 
5a. Yet one unusual aspect of the data from Experiment 5a was the fact that there 
were marginally more Know (K) responses than Remember (R) responses for „What-
Where-Which‟ questions. However, data from the current experiment shows that out 
of a possible 114 responses (38 participants x 3 questions) 43 of these were 
reported as a R experience (38%), whereas only 32 were reported as a K response 
(28%). This is in contrast to the results of Experiment 5a but at the same time more 
consistent with the original hypothesis of Experiment 5a. Although K responses were 
still reported, the proportion of R responses were as expected, higher than the 
proportion of K responses. In fact the difference in the proportion of R responses 
1
st
 Experimental 
Slide 
2
nd
 Experimental 
Slide 
Instructions Test 
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from Experiment 5a to the current experiment was marginal, however there was a 
more noticeable drop in the proportion of K responses. Guess (G) responses were 
also higher in the current experiment with 37 out of a possible 114 (33%). This again 
was expected in Experiment 5a as if a participant is not able to recall the episodic 
information required to answer the question then it follows that they should report a 
G response.  
For those questions that participants reported a feeling of remembering, the 
accuracy rate was highly significant (79%, 34/43, p ≤ 0.001). When a feeling of 
familiarity was experienced, indicated by a K response, the proportion of responses 
that were accurate was 69%, (22/32) which was significantly above chance (p = 
0.026). Although this was unexpected as K responses reflecting familiarity should not 
facilitate the solving of an episodic question, this was seen previously in Experiment 
6a in response to What-Where-When questions. The proportion of accurate G 
responses was at chance (57%, 21/37, p = 0.254).  
Again, confidence ratings were also reported for R and K responses. It would be 
expected that a similar pattern of results to Experiment 5a would be observed with 
the majority of R and accurate R responses constituting the higher confidence levels, 
although accuracy for lower confidence levels if reported would also be high. It was 
also expected that K responses would again be widely distributed, as in Experiment 
5a, with the majority constituting the lower confidence levels. Accuracy, although 
found to be significantly above chance in the current experiment, should follow the 
same pattern as for Experiment 5a, with accuracy decreasing alongside confidence 
levels.   
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Figure 5.11: What-Where-Which: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.11 shows the total number of R and K responses and the number of 
respective accurate responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions. Indeed, the 
majority of R responses do constitute the higher confidence levels, whereas K 
responses are more widely distributed. Although accuracy levels for R responses are 
somewhat lower for each confidence level compared to Experiment 5a, as said 
before, overall there is no difference in the accuracy rates of the two experiments, 
and also R responses are still highly accurate at the lowest reported confidence level 
(e.g. 100% and 80% for levels 2 and 3 respectively). The distribution of accurate K 
responses does not appear to follow the same pattern as that observed in 
Experiment 5a. Although accuracy was found to be above chance in the current 
experiment, accuracy did not increase with confidence (e.g. 67%, 86% and 44% for 
levels 2, 3 and 4 respectively) in turn suggesting that in fact accuracy is not 
dependent upon confidence.  
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5.3.3.2 ‘What-Where-When’ questions 
It was hypothesised that the results from the current experiment would see a drop in 
the proportion of R and K responses from Experiment 5a, that would be comparable 
to the results from „What-Where-Which‟ questions. Out of a possible 114 responses, 
67 of these were experienced as R (59%) which was only marginally different to the 
proportion of R responses in Experiment 5a. The proportion of K responses for the 
current experiment was (27/114, 24%) which again is lower than the proportion of R 
responses and only marginally different to the proportion reported in Experiment 5a. 
This was also true of G responses (20/67, 18%).  
Despite this, the crucial aspect of the current experiment involved accuracy of 
responses. The proportion of accurate R responses was still significantly above 
chance (84%, 56/67 p ≤ 0.001) although notably lower than observed in Experiment 
5a. The proportion of accurate K responses was now bordering on chance (67%, 
18/27, p = 0.062) which appeared to be a dramatic drop from Experiment 5a as 
predicted. The current experiment also resulted in a substantially higher proportion of 
accurate R responses compared to K responses, which fits with the original 
hypothesis that proposed episodic questions would result in more R than K 
responses as familiarity cannot be used to solve an episodic task. The proportion of 
accurate G responses was at chance (65%, 13/20, p = 0.131) as predicted originally, 
and as seen in Experiment 5a.  
Confidence ratings were again analysed with respect to the total proportion of R and 
K responses and the proportion of accurate R and K responses. 
 216 
 
 
Figure 5.12: What-Where-When: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.12 shows that R responses follow the predicted pattern in that the majority 
of responses constitute the higher confidence levels, yet responses occurring for low 
confidence levels are also found to be highly accurate. However, accuracy for R 
responses is lower for individual confidence levels (e.g. 82% and 83% for levels 4 
and 5) compared to Experiment 5a, however, overall there was a significant drop in 
accuracy. The proportion of K responses in the current experiment was not as widely 
distributed as in Experiment 5a. In addition, although accuracy was highest for the 
highest confidence level reported (i.e. 83% for level 4), this did not then decrease 
alongside confidence (i.e. 58% and 67% for levels 3 and 2 respectively). The pattern 
seen here is more comparable to the pattern observed for What-Where-Which 
questions in the current experiment, again suggesting that accuracy is not a result of 
confidence.  
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5.3.3.3 ‘What’ questions 
The non-episodic „What‟ questions resulted in 84 responses being reported as R 
(74%) which was noticeably lower than Experiment 5a. Responses associated with a 
feeling of Knowing were substantially lower than the proportion of R responses, with 
only 24 out of a possible 114 responses (21%), however only marginally different to 
the results of Experiment 5a. With regard to G responses only 6 out of a possible 
114 were reported (5%) which was also similar to the results found in Experiment 5a.  
Accuracy was high for both R (96%, 81/84, p ≤ 0.001) and K responses (92%, 22/24, 
p ≤ 0.001), but at chance for G responses (67%, 4/6, p = 0.344). 
 
Figure 5.13: What: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate responses for each 
confidence level 
The high confidence and accuracy levels of Figure 5.13 again highlights the simple 
nature of the non-episodic „What‟ questions and is comparable to the results 
observed in Experiment 5a and shown in Figure 5.9. 
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5.3.3.4 Comparisons of question types 
It was predicted that with the modifications to the methodology that „What-Where-
Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ questions would result in more comparable patterns 
of data that were not so apparent in Experiment 5a. It was predicted that the 
proportion of R and K responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions would be similar 
to that of „What-Where-Which‟ questions, and crucially, the proportion of accurate K 
responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions would drop to chance levels, matching 
that of „What-Where-Which‟ questions.  
As seen in Experiment 5a, there were substantially more R responses for „What-
Where-When‟ (59%) questions compared to „What-Where-Which‟ questions (38%), 
however as before, both question types resulted in above chance accuracy rates for 
these R responses (see Table 5.3). As expected, as both questions probe episodic 
memory, there was only a marginal difference between the proportion of these 
accurate R responses. Unlike the results from Experiment 5a, there was very little 
difference in the proportion of K responses for „What-Where-Which‟ (28%) and 
„What-Where-When‟ questions (27%). Although the accuracy of K responses 
dropped to chance levels for „What-Where-When‟ questions as predicted, accurate K 
responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions were now unexpectedly just above 
chance (see Table 5.4). However, the actual difference between the proportion of 
accurate K responses for „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ was very 
small.  
As with Experiment 5a, it was expected that questions probing memory for „What‟ 
would be qualitatively different to the episodic questions of „What-Where-Which‟ and 
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„What-Where-When‟ as they can be solved using familiarity alone. There was found 
to be a notable drop in R responses from „What‟ questions to „What-Where-When‟ 
questions and a further drop compared to „What-Where-Which‟ questions. Compared 
to Experiment 5a, the proportion of K responses was comparable for all three 
questions types. With regard to accuracy of these responses, „What‟ questions 
resulted in a higher proportion of accurate R and K responses compared to both 
episodic questions (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). 
Table 5.3: Summarising the results for accurate Remember responses for each question type 
Remember Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 34/43 79% p ≤ 0.001 
What-Where-When 56/67 84% p ≤ 0.001 
What 81/84 96% p ≤ 0.001 
 
Table 5.4: Summarising the results for accurate Know responses for each question type 
Know Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 22/32 69% p = 0.026 
What-Where-When 18/27 67% p = 0.062 
What 22/24 92% p ≤ 0.001 
5.3.4 Discussion 
Considering the results of Experiment 5a, the current experiment modified the 
methodology with regard to the delay between the second experimental slide and the 
test phase of the task. It was predicted that this modification would reduce the 
effectiveness of the strength of memory trace strategy being used to solve the „What-
Where-When‟ questions. It was predicted if only episodic memory was being utilised 
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to solve the „What-Where-When‟ questions then the results should be more 
comparable to the results form „What-Where-Which‟ questions. Therefore, there 
would be a decrease in the proportion of Remember and Know responses for „What-
Where-When‟ questions and also a decrease in the proportion of accurate Know 
responses for these questions to chance level. Again, results probing the non-
episodic „What‟ memory would be expected to be qualitatively different to the 
episodic questions. 
The results of the current experiment show that the proportion of Remember and 
Know responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions were comparable to those seen 
in Experiment 5a, and as expected for an episodic question, there was a higher 
proportion of R responses. Accuracy of these R responses, although lower than 
seen in Experiment 5a, was still above chance levels. In addition, the accuracy of 
Know responses was seen to drop from Experiment 5a, resulting in accuracy at 
chance level. It would therefore appear that increasing the delay between the second 
experimental slide and the test phase of the task eliminated the use of strength of 
memory trace to solve these episodic „What-Where-When‟ questions. This is also 
reflected in the confidence ratings. Know responses are not as widely distributed as 
seen in Experiment 5a, nor does the accuracy decrease alongside confidence levels. 
Remember responses do follow the same pattern as observed in Experiment 5a 
showing high accuracy as the lowest reported confidence levels. Thus, accuracy is 
not simply a matter of confidence.  
What is interesting is data from „What-Where-Which‟ questions. There was found to 
be a notable drop in the proportion of K responses from Experiment 5a resulting in a 
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bigger difference between the proportion of R and K responses within the current 
experiment, although this difference was not considered substantial. The proportion 
of Guess responses was also somewhat higher for the current experiment, however 
there was little difference in the proportion of Know and Guess responses, as 
originally predicted. If a participant is answering an episodic question they must 
utilise the recall circuits signified by a Remember response, the proportion of Know 
and Guess responses would be at chance as familiarity cannot facilitate the recall of 
an episodic memory. The proportion of accurate Remember responses was 
significantly above chance, again as expected, but now it was „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions that resulted in Know responses being accurate above chance levels. 
These accuracy levels, although above the chance level, when considered in regard 
to the actual proportion of responses was not  overtly different to the accuracy levels 
for „What-Where-When‟ questions whose accuracy was at chance. Confidence levels 
for these responses however, were comparable to the „What-Where-When‟ 
questions of the current experiment and also of the same „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions of Experiment 5a.  
When comparing the non-episodic „What‟ questions, Experiment 5a saw a higher 
proportion of Know responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions, but not „What-
Where-When‟ questions. In the current experiment however, there exists very little 
difference in the proportion of Know responses from „What‟ questions to both the 
episodic questions. Although importantly, accuracy is significantly higher for „What‟ 
questions as they can be solved through the familiarity circuits. Therefore, although 
the proportion of responses to do not differ dramatically, accuracy as expected does.  
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The results of the current experiment were successful in the original aim of reducing 
the proportion of accurate Know responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions. 
Although the current experiment has resulted in the proportion of accurate Know 
responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions now being above chance, as said 
before, this is not substantially different when considering the proportion of 
responses to data from „What-Where-When‟ questions. The importance of the 
proportions must not be overlooked when applying such binomial statistics. Due to 
this, the following experiment would aim to collect more data in order to increase the 
power of the results before any firm conclusions are made. Several minor 
modifications regarding counterbalancing and colour of stimuli will also be made to 
the methodology. Analyses of this experiment will be compared to the current 
experiment and then the two experiments as a whole will be analysed to determine if 
this has a noticeable effect on the results. Participants in the following experiment 
will also be of a different year group as it is possible that the first year group used in 
the current experiment had no experience of the Remember/Know procedure. Those 
participants who have studied the area may have an unfair advantage over first year 
participants as their understanding of the differences between Remember and Know 
would be greater.  
5.4 Experiment 5c 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Experiment 5b appeared to successfully reduce the effectiveness of the strength of 
memory trace strategy to solve the episodic „What-Where-When‟ questions. Yet, 
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although there was only a marginal difference in the proportion of accurate Know 
responses between the two episodic questions, „What-Where-Which questions 
resulted in above chance accuracy for Know responses. Before drawing any firm 
conclusions, it is necessary to keep in mind the actual proportions of accurate 
responses for both question types. Although the binomial statistics used to analyse 
the data in this chapter do inform the reader as to whether a proportion is above 
chance, overall proportions of responses must also be considered as this may affect 
the overall power of the result. Therefore, the current experiment aimed to gather 
more data with the intention increasing the power of analysis. As the current 
experiment also manipulated the methodology with regard to counterbalancing and 
colour of stimuli, analysis was initially conducted separately to Experiment 5b and 
then with Experiment 5b. 
5.4.2 Methods and Materials 
All aspects of the methodology and materials were as described in Experiment 5b 
with the exception of the manipulations outlined below. 
5.4.2.1 Subjects 
45 second year undergraduates studying psychology took part in the current 
experiment. There was a mix of males and females with an age range of between 19 
and 21 years of age. 
5.4.2.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli in the slide show were altered to a grey scale colour that would then be 
comparable to the questionnaires on which the stimuli were also grey scale. 
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5.4.2.3 Slide Show 
The only aspect of the slide show that was altered was the colour of the stimuli to a 
grey scale (see Stimuli). 
5.4.2.4 Questionnaires 
Questionnaires were as described in Experiment 5b. The only alteration was with 
regard to the counterbalancing of the final block of three questions. This was rectified 
by altering the answers from either A to B, 1st to 2nd, or Zebra to Chequered.  This 
meant that all questions were balanced for order of question and answer so if 
participants with the same order of questions were seated next to each other the 
answers would not necessarily be the same. 
5.4.2.5 Test Room and Experimenter 
The test room for the current experiment was a lecture theatre in the department of 
computer science at the University of Durham. 
5.4.3 Results 
5.4.3.1  ‘What-Where-Which’ questions 
Data from the current experiment shows that out of a possible 135 responses (45 
participants x 3 questions) 50 of these were reported as a R experience (37%) 
compared to 47 K responses (35%) and 38 (28%) G responses. Only marginal 
differences were observed between the proportion of R responses from Experiment 
5b to the current experiment. The difference between both K and G responses from 
Experiment 5b to the current experiment were slightly higher than that of R 
responses but still relatively inconsequential. 
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For those responses where participants indicated a feeling of remembering, 
accuracy was again high (82%, 41/50, p ≤ 0.001) and of a similar level to the 
accuracy rate reported in Experiment 6b. Those responses that indicated a feeling of 
Knowing saw accuracy at chance levels (53%, 25/47, p = 0.386) as originally 
hypothesised and which was also a substantial drop from the levels reported in 
Experiment 5b which were above chance. This is in agreement with the original 
hypothesis which states that in response to an episodic question the proportion of 
accurate R responses would be higher than for any reported K responses, as only 
recall processes reflected by a Remember response can facilitate the solving of an 
episodic question. Accurate G responses were also at chance levels (albeit 
marginal) (55%, 21/38, p = 0.062) as seen in both the previous experiments.  
Again, confidence levels were reported, however, as the question of whether 
accuracy was a matter of confidence was answered in Experiment 5b, only the 
patterns of accuracy and confidence levels were analysed with respect to question 
type in order to observe any anomalies.  
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Figure 5.14: What-Where-Which: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.14 shows a similar distribution of R responses and accurate R responses 
with respect to confidence levels. The majority of R responses constitute the higher 
confidence levels and accuracy is high despite a low confidence rating (e.g. 100% 
level 2). Know responses are again widely distributed, and although accuracy is high 
for low confidence levels such as level 1 (100%), accuracy for other levels is low in 
comparison.  
5.4.3.2 ‘What-Where-When’ questions 
Out of a possible 135 responses, 58 of these (43%) were reported as Remember, 43 
as Know (32%) and 34 (25%) as Guess. Although the proportion of R responses was 
higher than that of K responses in the current experiment, the difference in the 
proportion of R responses was notably reduced compared to Experiment 5b which 
inevitably led to an increase in K and G responses.  
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Of those R responses reported, the accuracy rate was high as originally 
hypothesised (90%, 52/58, p ≤ 0.001) and only slightly higher compared to those 
reported for Experiment 5b. The previous experiment reported the accuracy of K 
responses at chance level, which would be expected for an episodic question. It was 
therefore concluded that if strength of memory trace was being used as a strategy to 
solve these questions in Experiment 5a, that the modifications to the methodology of 
Experiment 5b rectified this. However, the current experiment shows accuracy of K 
responses again significantly above chance levels (67%, 29/43, p = 0.017), although 
the proportion of accurate responses did not differ from the previous experiment to 
the current experiment. As discussed in Experiment 5a and 5b, accuracy of K 
responses should be at chance reflecting the fact that only the recall circuits 
(signified by a R response) can solve episodic questions. Guess responses as 
expected were at chance levels (56%, 19/34, p = 0.305) as seen in Experiment 5b. 
In the current experiment accuracy was also found to be substantially higher when a 
participant reported a feeling of Remember compared to when a feeling of Know was 
reported which would be expected for an episodic question that should only be 
solved using recall.  
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Figure 5.15: What-Where-When: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.15 shows again the distribution of responses and accurate responses over 
the differing confidence levels. Remember responses continue to dominate the 
higher confidence levels and accuracy is high even in the lower levels of confidence. 
Know responses are widely distributed and accuracy is notably lower.  
5.4.3.3 ‘What’ questions 
In response to the non-episodic „What‟ questions, 87 out of a possible 135 (64%) 
were reported as a Remember experience, which was again notably higher than the 
proportion of Know responses (27%, 37/135) and Guess responses (8%, 11/135). 
The proportion of Remember responses were seen to decrease from Experiment 5b 
to the current experiment, similar to the results found for „What-Where-When‟ 
questions.  
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Accuracy for R (98%, p ≤ 0.001) and K responses (95%, p ≤ 0.01) was high as 
expected due to the fact that this non-episodic question can be solved using recall or 
familiarity. Accuracy of G responses was found to be above chance in the current 
experiment (82%, 9/11, p = 0.035).  
 
Figure 5.16: What: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate responses for each 
confidence level 
Figure 5.16 shows the majority of R responses constituting the higher confidence 
levels with accompanying high accuracy levels. The non-episodic mature of this 
question is also reflected in the high accuracy levels of K responses.  
5.4.3.4 Comparisons of question types 
When considering binomial data, as said previously, proportions as well as 
significance must be taken into account. This was highlighted in Experiment 5b when 
although the proportion of accurate K responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions 
was only marginally different to those for „What-Where-When‟ questions (69% and 
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67% respectively), the proportion of accurate K responses for „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions was seen to be above chance. For this reason, comparisons between 
questions types was also carried out by totalling Experiment 5b and 5c to determine 
if an increase in power resulting from this culmination would yield more concrete 
results (see Tables 5.7 and 5.8). If this culmination resulted in any differences to the 
data of Experiment 5c alone it was clearly noted. 
As the current experiment aimed to gather more data for analyses purposes, the 
aims of the current experiment were the same as stated in Experiment 5b. It was 
predicted that with the modifications to the methodology carried out in Experiment 5b 
that „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ questions would result in more 
comparable patterns of data that were not so apparent in Experiment 5a. It was also 
predicted that the proportion of R and K responses for „What-Where-When‟ 
questions would be similar to that of „What-Where-Which‟ questions, and crucially, 
the proportion of accurate K responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions would 
drop to chance levels, matching that of „What-Where-Which‟ questions.  
The results of the current experiment show that there were again more R responses 
for „What-Where-When‟ (43%) questions compared to „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions (37%) although the difference in the proportion of these responses were 
now less pronounced. As in Experiment 5b, both question types resulted in above 
chance accuracy rates for these R responses (see Table 5.5) with „What-Where-
When‟ questions again resulting in the higher proportion of accurate R responses.  
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Similar to Experiment 5b, the proportion of K responses for „What-Where-Which‟ 
(35%) questions was slightly higher than for „What-Where-When‟ questions (32%), 
however the difference was again marginal. Although the accuracy of K responses 
dropped to chance levels for „What-Where-When‟ questions in Experiment 5b, 
accurate K responses in the current experiment were now above chance (see Table 
5.6). Pooling the data from both experiments confirmed the accuracy as above 
chance levels (see Table 5.8). 
 Accuracy of K responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions in Experiment 5b were 
reported to be above chance, however in the current experiment the accuracy 
dropped to chance levels (see Table 5.6). Pooling the data again did not see the 
accuracy above the chance levels, however by looking at Table 5.8 it is clear the 
added data affected the results. This not only shows the importance of collecting 
large data sets when applying such binomial statistics, but it also highlights the fact 
that „What-Where-Which‟ questions are perhaps being affected by the same strength 
of memory trace as „What-Where-When‟ questions but perhaps to a lesser degree.   
As stated in the previous experiments, it was expected that „What‟ questions would 
be qualitatively different to the episodic questions of „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-
Where-When‟. The results of the current experiment showed that again „What‟ 
questions (64%) resulted in more R responses than „What-Where-Which‟ questions 
(37%) and „What-Where-When‟ questions (43%). There were however less K 
responses for the non-episodic „What‟ questions (27%) compared to „What-Where-
Which‟ questions (35%) and „What-Where-When‟ questions (32%). 
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With regard to accuracy, „What‟ questions resulted in more accurate R responses 
than both „What-Where-Which‟ questions and „What-Where-When‟ questions. There 
was also a higher proportion of accurate K responses for „What‟ questions compared 
to „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ questions despite the lower 
proportion of overall K responses. Therefore, as predicted, non-episodic „What‟ 
questions appear to differ qualitatively from the episodic questions of „What-Where-
Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ in all aspects analysed.  
Table 5.5: Current Experiment: Summarising the results for accurate Remember responses for each 
question type 
Remember Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 41/50 82% p ≤ 0.001 
What-Where-When 52/58 90% p ≤ 0.001 
What 85/87 98% p ≤ 0.001 
 
Table 5.6: Current Experiment: Summarising the results for accurate Know responses for each question 
type 
Know Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 25/47 53% p = 0.386 
What-Where-When 29/43 67% p = 0.017 
What 35/37 95% p ≤ 0.001 
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Table 5.7: Experiments 5b and 5c totalled: Summarising the results for accurate Remember responses 
for each question type 
Remember Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 75/93 81% p ≤ 0.001 
What-Where-When 108/125 86% p ≤ 0.001 
What 166/171 97% p ≤ 0.001 
 
Table 5.8: Experiments 5b and 5c totalled: Summarising the results for accurate Know responses for 
each question type 
Know Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 47/79 60% p = 0.057 
What-Where-When 47/70 67% p = 0.003 
What 57/61 93% p ≤ 0.001 
 
5.4.4 Discussion 
The results of the current experiment were surprising in that previously it was 
thought that the manipulations to the methodology of Experiment 5b had decreased 
the effectiveness of the strength of memory trace strategy in solving the episodic 
„What-Where-When‟ questions. Although the current experiment saw the proportion 
of accurate K responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions above the chance level, 
the proportion of accurate K responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions were now 
at chance level even when data from both Experiment 5b and the current experiment 
were pooled. However, the culmination of the two experiments appeared to have an 
observable effect on this data. It was previously suggested that this could be due to 
other strategies such as strength of memory trace being used to solve these tasks, 
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suggesting that strength of memory trace is still affecting both episodic questions but 
perhaps affecting „What-Where-Which‟ questions to a lesser degree. 
Due to the fact that this current experiment has not entirely resolved this issue, it 
seems appropriate and logical to conduct a further experiment to determine if it is 
indeed this strategy that participants are using in conjunction with actual episodic 
memory to solve the „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ questions.   
The following experiment will consist of two studies. The first of which will attempt to 
emphasise any strength of memory trace strategy being used by increasing the 
delay between the two experimental slides. It would be expected that participants will 
be able to remember the last experimental slide more so than the first and therefore 
if strength of memory trace is used it should result in accurate Know responses for 
both questions being above chance levels. The second of the two studies shall 
reduce the delay between the two experimental slides but increase the delay 
between these and the test phase. Strength of memory trace should therefore decay 
due to the delay and both slides should be remembered relatively equally.  
5.5 Experiment 5d 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The results of Experiments 5a suggest that participants were using alternative 
strategies to solve the episodic „What-Where-When‟ questions as the proportion of 
accurate Know responses were highly significant. As such questions cannot be 
solved using the familiarity circuit, it was hypothesised that strength of memory trace 
was being utilised to retrieve the necessary information to answer the questions 
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correctly. Experiments 5b and 5c attempted to decrease the effectiveness of such a 
strategy by increasing the delay between the last experimental slide and the test 
phase of the task. Both experiments still resulted in accurate Know responses above 
the chance level for either the episodic „What-Where-When‟ or „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions. If the unexpected results of the previous experiments are caused by 
participants using this strength of memory trace and no alternative strategy, 
increasing the delay between the two slides should then encourage the use of this 
strategy and result in significantly high proportions of Know responses and accurate 
K responses for both episodic questions (the results of experiment 5b and 5c to an 
extent suggest that „What-Where-Which‟ questions are also affected).  
In contrast, by decreasing the delay between the two experimental slides and 
instead placing the extended delay after the second experimental slide, strength of 
memory trace theoretically should have decayed relatively equally for both 
experimental slides. What the results should show is episodic memory with no 
interference from strength of memory trace. This would be reflected in, as predicted 
originally in Experiment 5a, that for both episodic questions R responses should be 
highly accurate and K and G responses should be at chance level. Results from the 
non-episodic „What‟ questions should again be qualitatively different to the results 
from the episodic questions.  
Considering the above the current experiment involved two conditions which 
manipulated the length of the delay between the two experimental slides. 
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5.5.2 Methods and Materials 
All aspects of the methodology and materials were as described in Experiment 5c 
with the exception of the manipulations outlined below. 
5.5.2.1 Participants 
5.5.2.1.1 Condition 1: Long Delay 
Thirty five third year undergraduates studying psychology took part in the current 
experiment. There was a mix of males and females with an age range of between 20 
and 22 years of age 
5.5.2.1.2 Condition 2: No delay 
Twenty six third year undergraduates studying child health psychology took part in 
the current experiment. There was a mix of males and females with an age range of 
between 20 and 22 years of age. 
5.5.2.2 Slide Show 
The only aspect of the slide show that was altered was the delay between the two 
experimental slides.  
5.5.2.2.1 Condition 1: Long Delay 
The „long delay‟ condition required a 2 minute 30 second delay in which the 
instructions were presented. The test phase was presented immediately after the 
second experimental slide. The total length of the experiment was not altered (see 
Figure 5.17). 
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2 Minutes 30                                       Immediate 
Figure 5.17: Timeline of the slideshow 
5.5.2.2.2 Condition 2: No delay 
The „no delay‟ employed a one second delay between the two experimental sides 
and a 2 minute 30 second delay plus the time allocated for instructions after the 
second experimental slide and before the test phase of the task. The total length of 
the experiment was not altered (see Figure 5.18). 
 
 
       Immediate                               2 minutes 30 
Figure 5.18: Timeline of the Slideshow 
5.5.2.3 Test Room and Experimenter 
5.5.2.3.1 Condition 1: Long Delay 
The test room for this condition was a lecture theatre in the department of 
psychology at the Stockton campus of the University of Durham. 
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2
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5.5.2.3.2 Condition 2: No delay 
The test room for this condition was a lecture theatre in the department of physics at 
the University of Durham. 
5.5.2.4 Design 
The task employed a between-participants design with different participants in each 
condition, as outlined above.  
5.5.3 Results 
5.5.3.1 ‘What-Where-Which’ questions 
5.5.3.1.1 Condition 1: Long Delay 
Out of a possible 105 responses (35 participants x 3 questions) 38 of these were 
reported as a Remember experience (36%), compared to 41 Know responses (39%) 
and 26 Guess responses (25%). If in fact strength of memory trace is being 
employed as a strategy in the current experiment then it would not necessarily be 
surprising that there would be a higher proportion of K responses than R responses 
as it may be considered an easier strategy to use.  
Accuracy of R responses was found to be significantly above chance (76%, 29/38, p 
= 0.001), and as expected accurate K responses were also significantly above 
chance (71%, 29/41, p = 0.006). The proportion of accurate G responses was 
logically at chance (62%, 16/26 p = 0.163) as even if strength of memory trace was 
used as well as actual episodic memory to solve the task, G responses would be 
unaffected.  
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Confidence levels were again examined to determine if altering the methodology to 
specifically allow for strength of memory trace to be employed would have an effect 
on these confidence ratings and also on the confidence of accurate responses.  
 
Figure 5.19: What-Where-Which: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.19 shows that R responses follow the familiar pattern of constituting the 
higher confidence levels, however accuracy is now seen to increase alongside 
confidence (e.g. 50% accuracy for level 2 compared to 84% accuracy for level 5). 
Know responses are more widely distributed with respect to confidence levels, 
however accuracy does not follow confidence levels (e.g.  71% level 3, 70% level 5).  
5.5.3.1.2 Condition 2: No Delay 
Out of a possible 78 responses (26 subjects x 3 questions) 20 of these were 
reported as R (26%), 31 as K (40%) and 27 (35%) as G responses. As well as R 
responses constituting the least proportion, accuracy of R responses were found to 
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be at chance levels (60%, 12/20, p = 0.251), which was also the case for K 
responses although marginal (65%, 20/31, p = 0.075), and G responses (52%, 
14/27, p = 0.5). Confidence levels were again reported with respect to the total 
number of responses made and the proportion of accurate responses. 
 
Figure 5.20: What-Where-Which: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.20 shows confidence for R responses and accuracy of these responses not 
as high as previously observed (e.g. 83% level 4). Confidence for Know responses is 
still varied yet appears to increase alongside confidence.  
5.5.3.1.3 Condition 1 (Long Delay) v Condition 2 (No Delay) 
The elimination of the delay between the two experimental slides appeared to reduce 
the proportion of R responses (36% to 26%), however these responses were not 
reflected in K responses (39% to 40%) but in fact reflected in a increase in G 
responses (25% to 35%). This could be explained if the lack of a delay between the 
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two experimental slides is causing a mergence of the two slides into one episode. 
This confusion would then be reflected in G responses. Accurate R responses found 
to be above chance in Condition 1 (Long Delay) also dropped to chance levels in 
Condition 2 (No Delay) (76% to 60%). This was also the case for K responses (71% 
to 65%).  The proportion of accurate G responses remained at chance levels (62% to 
52%). Although it may be expected that accuracy would decrease in Condition 2 (No 
Delay) as strength of memory trace should be more difficult to employ as an 
additional strategy, it should still be expected that in response to these episodic 
questions accuracy of R responses would be above chance reflecting episodic 
memory. As suggested before, it is possible that the lack of delay between the two 
experimental slides is not allowing for the two experimental slides to be separated 
into two episodes and consequently the two are merging into one confusable 
memory. 
5.5.3.2  ‘What-Where-When’ questions 
5.5.3.2.1 Condition 1: Long Delay 
Out of a possible 105 responses, „What-Where-When‟ questions resulted in 43 
Remember responses (41%) compared to 40 (38%) Know responses. Guess 
responses constituted 22 out of the 105 responses (21%). It was previously 
hypothesised that if only episodic memory was being used to solve these episodic 
tasks that there should exist no difference between the proportion of R and K 
responses as neither can facilitate the solving of an episodic task. As the data 
shows, this difference was minimal. 
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 With regard to accuracy, R responses were found to be above chance levels (88%, 
38/43 p ≤ 0.001), as were accurate K responses (70%, 28/40 p = 0.008). Similar to 
the results reported for „What-Where-Which‟ questions, there was a higher 
proportion of accurate R responses compared with K responses. Accurate G 
responses were at the chance level as expected (59%, 13/22, p = 0.261).  
 
 
Figure 5.21: What-Where-When: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.21 shows that the majority of R responses are accompanied by a high 
confidence rating, with accuracy being high even when confidence is low (e.g. 100% 
level 2). Those responses indicated a feeling of Knowing are not as widely 
distributed as seen previously, yet accuracy is still varied whether confidence is 
considered high or low (e.g. 86%, level 2; 67%, level 5).  
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5.5.3.2.2 Condition 2: No Delay 
Out of a possible 78 responses to „What-Where-When‟ questions 30 of these were 
reported as a Remember experience (39%), 27 reported as a feeling of Knowing 
(35%), and 21 were reported as Guesses (27%). Again, the difference between the 
proportion of R and K responses was minimal. 
Unlike the results reported for „What-Where-Which‟ questions, this condition resulted 
in accuracy for R responses above the chance levels (87%, 26/30, p ≤ 0.001), as 
was the accuracy for K responses (78%, 21/27, p = 0.004). The proportion of 
accurate G responses remained at chance (62%, 13/21, p = 0.192).   
 
Figure 5.22: What-Where-When: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate 
responses for each confidence level 
Figure 5.22 above shows R responses again slightly less confident than seen in 
previous experiments, although accuracy is still high. There is a more familiar pattern 
of K responses with regard to confidence levels, which sees K responses slightly 
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more distributed than for „What-Where-Which‟ questions in the current experiment, 
however accuracy was lower.  
5.5.3.2.3 Condition 1 (Long Delay) v Condition 2 (No Delay) 
The elimination of the delay between the two slides did not result in a drop in R 
responses (41% to 39%) as was seen for „What-Where-Which‟ questions. However, 
K responses (38% to 35%) and G responses (21% to 27%) were comparable from 
one condition to the other, which as detailed previously, was the case for „What-
Where-Which‟ questions. In addition, G responses were seen to again increase in 
Condition 2 (No Delay) suggesting that the two experimental slides are becoming 
confusable. Accuracy of R responses was found to be similar from one condition to 
the other (88% to 87%). It would be expected that the elimination of the delay 
between the two experimental slides would reduce the effectiveness of other 
strategies being employed to solve these episodic questions and so accuracy, 
although predicted to remain above chance, should notably drop. Not only was this 
not the case but the proportion of accurate K responses (70% to 78%) was seen to 
increase from Condition 1 (Long Delay) to Condition 2 (No Delay) suggesting that 
there are still other strategies being used to solve these episodic tasks. Accurate G 
responses (59% to 62%) remained at chance.  
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5.5.3.3 ‘What’ questions 
5.5.3.3.1 Condition 1: Long Delay 
These non-episodic questions resulted in 65 out of 105 responses being 
experienced as Remember (62%), compared with 33 K responses (31%) and 7 G 
responses (7%).  
Accuracy for R responses was highly significant (95%, 62/65, p ≤ 0.001), as were 
accurate K responses (88%, 29/33, p ≤ 0.001) and G responses (100%, 7/7, p = 
0.008). As in previous experiments accuracy of these responses is always seen to 
be high, therefore any alternative strategies being used to solve the episodic 
questions may not be observable or potentially necessary in these non-episodic 
questions.  
 
Figure 5.23: What: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate responses for each 
confidence level 
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Figure 5.23 shows that the majority of both R and K responses are highly confident 
and also highly accurate, however the figure also highlights the notable difference in 
the proportion of R and K responses.  
5.5.3.3.2 Condition 2: No Delay 
Out of a possible 78 responses for the non-episodic „What‟ questions, 51 were 
reported as a Remember experience (65%), 22 were reported as a feeling of 
Knowing (28%) and 5 were reported as Guess responses (6%).  
Accuracy for these non-episodic questions were highly significant when reported as 
a R experience (98%, 50/51, p ≤ 0.001). Accuracy was also above chance when a 
feeling of Knowing was reported in response to a „What‟ question (91%, 20/22, p ≤ 
0.001). Accurate G responses were found to be at chance levels (40%, 2/5, p = 0.5).  
 
Figure 5.24: What: Total number of responses alongside total number of accurate responses for each 
confidence level 
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Figure 5.24 above shows the majority of responses being reported as R and also 
constituting the higher confidence levels. Accuracy of these responses is also visibly 
high. Responses indicated as a feeling of Knowing are slightly more distributed, 
however the high levels of accuracy are notable. 
5.5.3.3.3 Condition 1 (Long Delay) v Condition 2 (No Delay) 
The elimination of the delay between the two slides did not notably affect the 
proportion of R responses (62% to 65%), K responses (31% to 28%) or G responses 
(7% to 6%). 
Accuracy of R responses was not seen to differ dramatically from Condition 1 (Long 
Delay) to Condition 2 (No delay) (95% to 98%). Although there is a slight increase in 
the proportion of accurate R responses, it may be that the more simple, non-episodic 
nature of the task is unaffected by the lack of a delay between the two experimental 
slides. Alternatively, it may also be that strength of memory trace is not the only 
alternative strategy being employed to solve the tasks. Accuracy of K responses 
were also not dramatically difference from one condition to another, but again, were 
seen to increase slightly despite the lack of a delay in Condition 2 (88% to 91%). 
Guess responses however, were seen to drop to chance levels from Condition 1 
(Long Delay) to Condition 2 (No Delay) (100% to 40%).  
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5.5.3.4 Comparison of Question Types 
5.5.3.4.1 Condition 1: Long Delay  
There was found to be no substantial differences in the proportion of R responses for 
„What-Where-Which‟ questions (36%) and „What-Where-When‟ questions (41%) 
which would be expected for the two similar episodic questions despite the fact that 
in this condition other strategies are being encouraged to solve the tasks. This is 
also true when comparing the proportion of K and G responses for „What-Where-
Which‟ questions (39% and 25 % respectively) and „What-Where-When‟ questions 
(38% and 21% respectively). Accuracy of R responses were found to be notably 
higher for „What-Where-When‟ questions compared to „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions, although accuracy for both were above chance levels (see Table 5.9). 
However, with regard to accurate K responses the differences were minimal (see 
Table 5.10).  
Although Condition 1 allows for strength of memory trace to be used to solve the 
episodic questions, data from the non-episodic „What‟ questions should still differ 
due to their more simplistic nature. It was found that „What‟ questions (62%) resulted 
in more R responses than „What-Where-Which‟ (36%) and „What-Where-When‟ 
questions (41%). However, the differences between the proportions of K responses 
for „What‟ questions (31%) compared to „What-Where-Which‟ (39%) and „What-
Where-When‟ questions (38%) were minimal. Guess responses were substantially 
lower for „What‟ questions (7%) compared with „What-Where-Which‟ (25%) and 
„What-Where-When‟ questions (21%). Accuracy of R and K responses were higher 
for „What‟ questions compared with „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ 
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questions (see Tables 5.9 and 5.10) as seen in pervious experiments confirming the 
prediction that there are differences between the non-episodic and episodic 
questions. 
Table 5.9: Condition 1 (Long Delay): Summarising the results for accurate Remember responses for each 
question type 
Remember Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 29/38 76% p = 0.001 
What-Where-When 38/43 88% p ≤ 0.001 
What 62/65 95% p ≤ 0.001 
 
Table 5.10: Condition 1 (Long Delay): Summarising the results for accurate Know responses for each 
question type 
Know Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 29/41 71% p = 0.006 
What-Where-When 28/40 70% p = 0.008 
What 29/33 88% p ≤ 0.001 
 
5.5.3.4.2 Condition 2: No Delay 
There was found to be more R responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions (39%) 
compared to „What-Where-Which‟ questions (26%) and accuracy was also higher. In 
fact accuracy of R responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions was at chance (see 
Table 5.11). It would be expected that even though strength of memory trace may 
not be as useful in this condition, that accuracy would still be above chance levels 
reflecting recall of episodic information in response to the episodic question. 
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Although the proportion of accurate R responses for „What-Where-When‟ questions 
were above chance (see Table 5.11), the fact that accurate K responses were also 
above chance (see Table 5.12) suggests that it is not only episodic information that 
is being used to solve the tasks. As this is not the case for „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions it suggests that alternative strategies for these questions are less effective. 
However, results from previous experiments do suggest an effect still exists (e.g. see 
Experiment 5b).  
The proportion of R responses for the non-episodic „What‟ questions (65%) was 
found to be substantially higher compared to „What-Where-Which‟ (26%) and „What-
Where-When‟ questions (39%). Those responses reported as an experience of 
Knowing were lower for the non-episodic „What‟ questions (28%) compare to for 
„What-Where-Which‟ (40%) „What-Where-When‟ questions (35%). There were 
dramatically less G responses for „What‟ questions (6%) when compared with „What-
Where-Which‟ (35%) and „What-Where-When‟ (27%) questions. Accuracy of R 
responses was found to be higher for the non-episodic „What‟ questions when 
compared to „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-Where-When‟ questions, despite 
accuracy for „What-Where-When‟ questions also being above chance levels (see 
Table 5.11). There were also more accurate K responses for „What‟ questions 
compared to both episodic questions (see Table 5.12). Although this would be 
expected as  the non-episodic „What‟ questions can be solved using familiarity alone, 
the fact that accurate K responses for the episodic „What-Where-When‟ questions 
are also above chance suggests that other strategies are still being employed to 
solve the tasks.  
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Table 5.11: Condition 2 (No Delay): Summarising the results for accurate Remember responses for each 
question type 
Remember Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 12 out of 20 60% p = 0.251 
What-Where-When 26/30 87% p ≤ 0.001 
What 50/51 98% p ≤ 0.001 
 
Table 5.12: Condition 2 (No Delay): Summarising the results for accurate Know responses for each 
question type 
Know Responses 
Question Type Proportion of Accurate Responses 
Percentage 
Accuracy 
Significance 
Value 
What-Where-Which 20/31 65% p = 0.075 
What-Where-When 21/27 78% p = 0.004 
What 20/22 91% p ≤ 0.001 
 
5.5.4 Discussion 
The aim of the current experiment was to investigate further the use of strength of 
memory trace as a strategy in solving episodic questions. This was achieved by 
manipulating the delay between the two experimental slides. Condition 1 (Long 
Delay) emphasised the delay between the two experimental slides. Therefore, if 
strength of memory trace is being employed, then strong memories would 
automatically be assigned to the last and most recently seen experimental slide and 
weak memories to the first experimental slide. It was expected that the additional 
strategy used to solve the episodic questions would result in accuracy of Know 
responses for both types of episodic questions being above chance levels. This 
would confirm the use of an additional strategy being employed to solve such an 
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episodic task as according to definition, using Know to solve episodic tasks does not 
reflect recall of episodic memory. Considering the manipulation of the delay it would 
be plausible for this strategy to in fact be strength of memory trace. If this is indeed 
the case, then results from Condition 2 (No Delay) should show results more in 
keeping with the original hypothesis which states that episodic questions can only be 
solved using Remember responses as this is a reflection of the recall of episodic 
information. Having no delay between the experimental slides but instead having an 
extended delay after the second experimental slide and before the test phase, 
should result in a decay of memory trace with both slides having equal memory 
strengths and so showing similar patterns of data.  
Results from the first condition (Long Delay) were as predicted for both types of 
episodic question with the proportion of accurate Know responses being significantly 
above the chance level. However, as seen in the previous experiments, there are still 
differences between the two episodic questions. For example, the difference 
between the proportion of accurate R and K responses for „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions was not that great, yet for „What-Where-When‟ questions the difference 
was more substantial. In fact the proportion of accurate R responses was notably 
higher for „What-Where-When‟ questions compared to „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions yet the difference found between the proportions of accurate K responses 
between the two question types was minimal. In certain instances data from „What-
Where-When‟ questions are more comparable to the data from the non-episodic 
„What‟ questions.  
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Although the results were as predicted for Condition 1 (Long Delay), what is 
becoming clear is that the episodic questions of „What-Where-Which‟ and „What-
Where-When‟ are being affected in different ways. The results from Condition 2 (No 
Delay) emphasise this fact. The elimination of the delay resulted in not only a higher 
proportion of Know responses compared to Remember responses for „What-Where-
Which‟ questions but also accuracy of those Remember and Know responses were 
at chance. Although this may be expected for Know responses, it was thought that 
participants should certainly still be able to use episodic memory to solve these tasks 
which would be reflected in above chance accurate Remember responses, yet these 
were found to have dropped from Condition 1 which used a long delay. Data from 
„What-Where-When‟ questions showed the familiar higher proportion of Remember 
responses compared to K responses that had not been affected by the change in 
methodology. Accurate Remember and Know responses remained above chance 
levels. It is apparent that manipulation of the delays between the experimental slides 
has had differing effects on what should be similar episodic questions, to the extent 
that some data from „What-Where-When‟ questions, such as the proportion of Know 
responses, is more akin to the data from the non-episodic „What‟ questions. If only 
episodic information were being used to solve „What-Where-When‟ questions then 
the proportion of accurate K responses should be at chance level as originally 
predicted.  
One possible explanation for the fact that „What-Where-When‟ questions seem to be 
less affected by the lack of a delay in Condition 2 compared to „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions is that perhaps the two experimental slides were too confusable when 
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presented one immediately after another. This may not affect „What-Where-When‟ 
questions due to the fact that the temporal aspect of them is more relatable to 
humans than the contextual aspect would be. Humans arrange their daily lives 
according to a temporal framework. Context in this experiment may not be as 
relatable as perhaps the context was not virtual enough in nature. Participants were 
not placed in an environment in which they could „experience‟ the two differing 
contexts, instead they had to essentially remember a pattern upon which stimuli 
were presented. This relates to the issue of space, the different ways in which it is 
processed and represented and its subsequent impact upon neuropsychological 
testing in humans. The processing of egocentric spatial relations (static object-to-
self) are thought to be mediated by the medial superior-posterior areas, whilst 
allocentric spatial coding (object-to-object) necessitates the additional involvement of 
the right parietal cortex, the ventral visual stream and the hippocampal formation 
(Zaehle, Jordan, Wüstenberg, Baudewig, Dechent, & Mast, 2007). The relevance of 
this difference becomes apparent when one considers that the process of extracting 
spatial information from navigating through an environment will differ from the 
process of extracting that information from a two-dimensional map. Equally, scene 
and landmark information stored as retinotopic snapshots (e.g. presented using 
pictures) will differ from that stored as a consequence of navigating through the 
environment.  
It therefore seems that although strength of memory trace may be contributing the 
observed results, there are clearly other factors playing a role. The unexpected 
differences between the two episodic questions inform us that the nature of the 
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episodic memory in humans is not a simple one. Although only one component of 
episodic memory was manipulated, namely the occasion setter, it was assumed that 
what was being measured was still true episodic memory according to previous 
definitions. However, it now appears that perhaps the definitions concerning 
episodic-like memory in animals cannot be directly translated back to humans.  
When contemplating the possible problems with the methodology, as mentioned 
previously concerning context, several questions are raised. With respect to human 
methodology, what actually is „Which‟? Does „Which‟ equate to „Where‟ or is „Which‟ 
a component or even specifier of „Where‟. When humans consider a context it 
usually encompasses a place or a location, therefore are „Which‟ and „Where‟ bound 
together and so measuring the same component of episodic memory? For example, 
a place of work could be considered as contextual cue but also as a cue for location. 
In addition, an office in a work place could be considered as a contextual cue for the 
general location i.e. where. This issue concerning appropriately defining the 
individual components of episodic memory was also discussed by Eacott and Easton 
(2009) when they sought to determine the absolute nature of „when‟. Perhaps before 
attempting to understand the strategies that humans use to solve episodic tasks 
such as the ones reported in the current chapter, the individual components of 
episodic memory need to be understood more fully, with respect to their role in 
everyday life. 
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5.6  Discussion 
The current chapter aimed to investigate whether what is considered by definition as 
episodic-like memory in animals, can be translated back full circle to episodic 
memory in humans. The previous experimental chapters have detailed the use of 
tasks such as „What-Where-When‟ and through manipulation of the occasion setter 
shown episodic-like memory in animals using the „What-Where-Which‟ task. It was 
asked therefore, if applying a comparable task in humans would result in similar 
patterns of data with regard to recollection and familiarity. In addition, would the 
manipulation of the occasion setter in humans prove as inconsequential as it 
appears to be in animal studies (considering episodic-like memory has been 
successfully demonstrated using both occasion setters) or are these individual 
components of episodic memory in humans too critical to manipulate? 
The Remember/Know paradigm (Tulving, 1985) was employed as this allowed for 
recollection and familiarity to be dissociated, just as Eacott et al.‟s (2005) study 
demonstrated possible in the E-maze. It was expected that results from Experiment 
5a would show that the two episodic questions would be answered using Remember 
responses as these reflect recollection of episodic memory. Accuracy of these 
responses would therefore also be high. Accompanying confidence ratings were 
predicted to be high for those Remember responses for the same reason. As Know 
responses reflect familiarity, and episodic questions cannot be answered using the 
familiarity circuit, the proportion of these responses were predicted to be low, to the 
point of approaching zero. However, it was also offered that if Know responses were 
to occur, that the accuracy of such responses would be at chance. The non-episodic 
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„What‟ questions were predicted to be qualitatively different to the two episodic 
questions due to their simple nature and the fact that they can be solved through 
familiarity as well as recall.  
What became apparent from Experiment 5a, was that not only were participants 
responding Know to the episodic questions but in response to the „What-Where-
When‟ questions, the accuracy of these responses were significantly above chance 
and no different to the accuracy of responses from „What‟ questions. In addition, 
there appeared to be clear differences in the results for „What-Where-When‟ and 
„What-Where-Which‟ questions, despite both hypothetically probing episodic 
memory. Analyses determined that accuracy of responses was not a matter of 
confidence (i.e. high confidence does not equate to high accuracy) as Remember 
responses were accurate even when a low confidence rating was reported reflecting 
the all or nothing nature of the Remember response. As familiarity is not so absolute, 
accuracy would be expected to decrease alongside confidence. This was the case 
for accuracy of Know responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions, however „What-
Where-When‟ questions demonstrated high accuracy of Know responses despite low 
confidence ratings, a pattern comparable to Remember responses. This suggested 
that perhaps participants were using another strategy to solve the episodic „What-
Where-When‟ questions. It was hypothesised that this strategy was strength of 
memory trace. As there was no delay between the presentation of the last 
experimental slide and the test phase of the task, participants could be assigning 
strong memories to the more recently seen experimental slide and weak memories 
to the experimental slide seen first.  
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Experiment 5b investigated this hypothesis further by increasing the delay between 
the last experimental slide and the test phase of the task. Although not totally 
eliminating the possible use of such a strategy, increasing this delay decreases its 
effectiveness. It was predicted that „What-Where-Which‟ questions would produce 
similar patterns of data as seen in Experiment 5a. „What-Where-When‟ questions 
however, should according to the hypothesis, see a reduction in accurate Know 
responses from above chance to chance levels reflecting the diminished memory 
trace. In addition, it was thought that the proportion of Remember and Know 
responses would also drop to be comparable to data from „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions. Interestingly, although this hypothesis held true for „What-Where-When‟ 
questions, the manipulation to the methodology resulted in the proportion of accurate 
Know responses for „What-Where-Which‟ questions being above chance levels. 
Although this was unexpected, the proportion of accurate Know responses for both 
episodic questions were only marginally different from one another, highlighting how 
the proportion of results must be taken into account, especially when applying such 
binomial statistics.  
This consideration led to Experiment 5c which aimed to increase the power of 
analyses. Analysing the results separately and then together with Experiment 5b did 
not provide any clear explanations for the patterns in data observed, however the 
data still suggested that other strategies were being used to solve the episodic tasks.  
It was therefore deemed necessary to conduct another experiment that would 
specifically try to show if indeed strength of memory trace was being employed as a 
strategy to solve the episodic questions.  
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The aim of Experiment 5d was to confirm the use of strength of memory trace by 
manipulating the delay between the two experimental slides. Condition 1 encouraged 
the use of this strategy to solve the episodic tasks by emphasising the delay 
between the two experimental slides. If strength of memory trace was being 
employed then this would be reflected in significantly high proportions of Know 
responses and accurate Know responses for both episodic questions. Condition 2 
aimed to confirm the first condition by doing the opposite, i.e. discouraging the use of 
strength of memory trace by reducing its effectiveness. This was achieved by 
virtually eliminating the delay between the two experimental slides resulting in a 
relatively equal decay of memory for both slides. With regard to this condition, the 
original hypothesis of Experiment 5a was put forward. Remember responses for both 
episodic questions would be highly accurate, and K and G responses would be at 
chance level. Results from the non-episodic „What‟ questions would again be 
qualitatively different to the results from the episodic questions.  
Although Condition 1 resulted in the expected high proportion of accurate Know 
responses for both episodic questions, there still existed fundamental differences 
between them. Condition 2 highlighted this point. Results from „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions appeared to be affected by the elimination of the delay with the proportion 
of accurate Remember and Know responses being at chance level. Whereas the 
proportion of accurate Remember and Know responses from „What-Where-When‟ 
remained significantly above chance. In addition there was a higher proportion of 
accurate K responses compared to R responses for these „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions, yet for „What-Where-When‟ questions there was a higher proportion of R 
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responses. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that it is purely strength of memory 
trace that is having the observed effect on the results. One crucial question that 
stems from the data of the current chapter is why are two seemingly comparable 
episodic questions producing such differing results?  
As said previously, it would be more sensible to attempt to answer this question 
before carrying out any further manipulations to the methodology. The original aim of 
the current chapter was to determine if the tasks that have demonstrated episodic-
like memory in animals as described in the previous chapters, can be translated to 
tasks in humans and result in similar patterns of data that could be considered as 
episodic memory in humans. In addition, it was questioned whether manipulating 
individual components of episodic memory would prove of consequence or not in 
human tasks as such manipulations have proven inconsequential in animals (Eacott 
et al., 2005; Eacott & Gaffan, 2005; Eacott & Norman, 2004). The results from the 
current chapter certainly seem to suggest that the translation of tasks from animal 
methodology to human methodology is not straight forward and it in fact could be 
because the individual components of episodic memory in humans are critical and 
perhaps not as interchangeable and flexible as seen in animal tasks. The results of 
the final experiment in this chapter led the author to question the individual 
components of episodic memory in humans. It was suggested that when humans 
consider a context it usually encompasses a place or a location, therefore are the 
components of „Which‟ and „Where‟ different labels for the same component or is 
„Which‟ a more specific form of „Where‟? The example given previously considered a 
place of work. This place of work could either be considered a cue for location or as 
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a contextual cue. Furthermore, an office in a work place could be considered a 
specific contextual cue for a more general location i.e. „where‟.  
This issue of appropriately defining the individual components of episodic memory 
has also been discussed within the realms of episodic-like memory in animals 
(Eacott & Easton, 2009; Eacott & Norman, 2004). The nature of „When‟ is purported 
to have several difference applications. It can refer to a regular time slot (e.g. 
morning or afternoon), a point in time that has reference to another point in time (e.g. 
yesterday or the first/second time) or it can refer to an absolute point in time (i.e. a 
time that has no associations with another point in time e.g. when I went to hospital) 
It has been suggested that if an animal can only demonstrate memory of whether an 
episode was more or less recent (or first or second) but not demonstrate memory for 
the more absolute episode, then it may be that what is presumed to be a 
demonstration of an integrated memory for „what‟, „where‟ and „when‟, is actually 
more an evaluation of the strength of memory for „what-where‟ (Eacott & Easton, 
2009). Data in the current chapter has certainly suggested that this is in fact what is 
happening. Yet, why would this additional strategy of strength of memory trace 
appear to affect „What-Where-When‟ questions more so than „What-Where-Which‟ 
questions? One potential answer to this is that because humans readily organise 
their lives according to a temporal framework (Roberts, 2008) and consequently are 
extremely accurate at judging time instances, the „When‟ component may be more 
susceptible to the interference of other strategies such as strength of memory trace 
(Friedman, 1993). The observed differences between the two episodic questions 
may also be further exacerbated by the fact that context in the current chapter was 
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not virtual enough to be differentiated. Context was simply two differing patterns of 
background which in reality is not applicable. As discussed previously, the process of 
extracting spatial information from navigating through an environment will differ from 
the process of extracting that information from a two-dimensional map. Equally, 
scene and landmark information stored as retinotopic snapshots (e.g. presented 
using pictures) will differ from that stored as a consequence of navigating through 
the environment. In that sense, „What-Where-Which‟ memory as demonstrated 
animals is perhaps the more true to the definition. With recent technological 
advances the experimental use of virtual reality (VR) paves the way for dealing with 
such issues (for a review see Burgess, 2002; Burgess, Maguire, & O‟Keefe, 2002) 
and would be an appropriate method for further investigating the current study. In 
addition, future investigations could also avoid failures of independence between 
observations if for example, each participant were given one question each, however 
this would therefore require substantially more participants. Another possibility would 
be to ask the participants more questions, however the design of this method would 
have to take into account limitations in memory. In addition, as more questions would 
require different stimuli the issue of then encoding these stimuli differently would 
have to be addressed.  
The results of the current chapter cannot rationally lend support to either dual-
process (e.g. Atkinson & Juola, 1974) or single-process models of recognition 
memory (e.g. Donaldson, 1996) when considering the aforementioned issues. 
However, the results can possibly be considered with respect to the ongoing debate 
as to whether episodic-like memory in animals is a reflection of episodic memory in 
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humans. In fact, the current chapter could even question the purity of episodic 
memory in humans considering how adept we are at using other strategies to solve 
such tasks. The current chapter appears to have successfully translated a task that 
investigates episodic-like memory in animals to a task that investigates episodic 
memory in humans. Predictions were relatively accurate concerning „What-Where-
Which‟ questions, however the series of experiments showed how other strategies 
can be used to solve the episodic tasks. Therefore, despite successful predictions, it 
cannot be entirely certain that data from the „What-Where-When‟ questions in 
particular were purely episodic. It now seems that there is a role reversal, with the 
definition of human episodic memory being questioned. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the definition of episodic-like memory in animals has been given much 
attention (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Eacott & Easton, 2009; Eacott & Norman, 
2004) and stringent criteria have been applied with regard to what constitutes an 
occasion setter as being unique. With respect to the above discussion regarding 
what is „which‟ and what is „when‟, perhaps more stringent criteria need to be applied 
before investigating human episodic memory in a similar manner. 
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6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this discussion is to summarise the findings and conclusions presented in 
this thesis. The findings will be summarised and discussed with respect to the 
surrounding literature. Furthermore, the implications of such findings and their 
potential impact on future research will be addressed. 
This thesis sought to explore two different methodological approaches to episodic 
memory. The first approach aimed to demonstrate episodic-like memory in animals 
by replicating the task of Eacott, Easton, & Zinkivskay (2005) with the further aim of 
investigating the effect of bilateral lesions to the hippocampus on episodic-like 
memory. The second approach aimed to create a comparable task for investigating 
human episodic memory on the basis that if episodic-like memory as demonstrated 
in the animal tasks is indeed a true reflection of human episodic memory then the 
results from these studies should reflect one another. 
6.2 Summary of Findings 
The results of Chapter 2 were successful with regard to replicating Eacott et al.‟s 
(2005) study demonstrating episodic-like memory in the rat using recollection alone, 
despite the fact that performance in this study was significantly poorer compared to 
the original. Subsequent experiments within this chapter however, highlighted 
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potential methodological issues (e.g. interference of odour cues, stability of 
performance over lengthy testing periods) that impact on such spontaneous tasks.  
Chapter 3 investigated the effect of bilateral lesions to the hippocampus on episodic-
like memory using Eacott‟ et al.‟s task which was successfully replicated in Chapter 
2. Although the analyses within this chapter lacked power due to histological 
groupings, there were nevertheless some interesting points for discussion. The 
results of this chapter were not in agreement with previous findings as none of the 
three groups showed evidence of episodic-like memory. In depth analyses of the 
three groups led to the conclusion that this was not due to an ineffective task but due 
to extraneous factors (e.g. noise, context differences) impacting upon the 
performance of the animals. Observable differences (although not significant) were 
noted in the exploratory behaviour of the Hippocampal lesion group compared to the 
Sham group, whilst similarities were noted between the Sham and the Partial 
Hippocampal group. This not only lends credence to the histological groupings but 
supports the claim that the damage to the associated parietal cortex observed in one 
of the animals was not representative of them all. Analyses of D2 scores and raw 
exploration times in both phases of the experiment also highlighted the importance of 
D2 scores in determining object familiarity.  
Due to the methodological issues highlighted in the previous chapters and the fact 
that D2 scores were deemed to be the most appropriate measure of object 
familiarity, Chapter 4 employed the use of an Open Field arena to further investigate 
the effect of bilateral lesions to the hippocampus on episodic-like memory in animals. 
Previous research has provided evidence that such a task can to an extent 
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differentiate between recall and familiarity using lesion data (Eacott & Gaffan, 2005). 
Although in the initial experiment of this chapter performance of the Sham group 
approached significance levels, there remained no significant differences between 
this group and the Hippocampal lesion group. The addition of landmarks to the 
testing room resulted in the Sham group successfully demonstrating episodic-like 
memory whilst the Hippocampal lesion group remained at chance levels. However, 
as there was no significant difference between the two groups it was not possible to 
conclude that this was as a result of the lesions to the hippocampus, although again 
this lends credence to the histological groupings and potential issues surrounding 
damage to the parietal cortex. As the following control task showed neither group 
demonstrating memory for the more simple „what-where‟ task, it was concluded that 
a problem with the methodology still remained. Subsequent experiments within this 
chapter investigated cleaning methodology (i.e. with regard to objects and the 
arena), the stability of performance over time, and the effect of task change on 
performance. Although the Sham group appeared to be more affected by a change 
in task, there was still clear variability in the data over lengthy testing periods, 
emphasising the sensitivity of these tasks. 
Chapter 5 aimed to investigate whether applying comparable „What-Where-When‟ 
and „What-Where-Which‟ tasks to human investigations of episodic memory would 
result in similar patterns of data with regard to recollection and familiarity. By 
analysing the results of Experiment 5a it became apparent that participants were 
using another strategy to solve the episodic „What-Where-When‟ questions. The 
remainder of the experiments in this chapter aimed to confirm the use of strength of 
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memory trace as a strategy for solving these episodic questions. Results from the 
final experiment in this chapter suggested that other strategies were also being 
employed. In attempting to answer the question as to why two such seemingly 
comparable episodic questions were producing such differing it was suggested that 
memory for „What-Where-When‟ was more susceptible to interference from other 
strategies such as strength of memory trace. Issues surrounding the appropriateness 
of context were also discussed with respect to the results from the „What-Where-
Which‟ questions. It was concluded that further investigations were needed to apply 
more stringent criteria with regard to what is „which‟ and what is „when‟, akin to the 
stringent criteria observed in comparable animal studies of episodic memory.  
6.3 Episodic-like Memory in Animals 
Although the findings of Chapters 2 to 4 were only partially successful with respect to 
their original aims the results that stem from these studies provide several points 
worthy of further discussion, in particular when considered alongside the results of 
Chapter 5. 
As summarised above, Chapter 2 was successful in its replication of Eacott, Easton 
and Zinkivskay‟s (2005) task demonstrating episodic-like memory using recollection 
alone whilst also refuting  claims by Hampton and colleagues (2005) that the 
episodic-like memory demonstrated in scrub jays (e.g. Clayton & Dickinson, 1998) is 
a result of specific selection pressures faced by food-storing birds.  Yet if one is to 
claim that such demonstrations of what-where-which memory are comparable to 
human episodic memory then it is important to address how the task in question 
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incorporates the three criteria of episodic-like memory deemed essential by Clayton, 
Bussey, and Dickinson (2003) (see section 1.8 of General Introduction) i.e. content, 
structure, and flexibility.  
The criterion of content is fulfilled if one considers „which‟ to simply be a broader 
occasion setter than „when‟ (Easton & Eacott, 2008). It includes memory for what 
happened, where it happened, and in this case, on which occasion, with respect to 
the recollection of a past episode.  
In addition to the content criterion, Clayton and colleagues maintain that the 
components of what, where, and which must form an integrated structure. Attempts 
to retrieve any one component of an episode will result in automatic retrieval of the 
remaining components. The lack of an integrated structure would result in an animal 
being unable to discriminate between different episodes that share common 
features. Clayton, Yu, & Dickinson (2001) provide evidence that the what, where, 
and when components in their study are integrated, with one component (either what 
or where) binding the other two together in memory. In the task of Eacott et al. 
(2005) replicated in Chapter 2, knowing only what the object is that needs to be 
searched for will not aid in its recovery, nor will knowing what the object is in addition 
to knowing which context is present. The what-where-which task in the E-maze can 
only be solved through the integration of memories regarding what was located 
where and in what context. 
Finally, the criterion of flexibility must also be addressed. Clayton, Bussey, and 
Dickinson (2003) argue that declarative memories are reliant on the flexible 
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utilisation of memorised information, and can be updated when new information is 
acquired. Tasks attempting to demonstrate episodic-like memory must preclude the 
possibility that a semantic strategy is being used to solve the task i.e. rule-based 
learning. As detailed in the General Introduction (see section 1.8.4) a series of 
studies by Babb and Crystal (2005, 2006a, 2006b) were criticised for their 
experimental paradigms which involved an extensive number training trials that could 
result in such rule based learning (Cheke & Clayton 2010; Clayton and Russell, 
2008). Although the same could be said for Clayton and Dickinson‟s (1998) study 
with scrub jays (Easton & Eacott, 2008), as explained previously, the number of 
training trials differed considerably. This issue is reminiscent of Zentall et al.‟s (2001) 
notion of the unexpected question whereby he proposes that documenting episodic-
like memory requires a demonstration that the animal is able to report on a recent 
event when no expectation for a report was required (i.e. to answer an unexpected 
question). The what-where-which task in the E-maze has no specific learnt element. 
Furthermore, the behaviour is not reinforced by food nor is there training beyond 
habituation to the experimental procedure.  Sixteen trials of Objects Hidden were 
carried out in Experiment 2a as opposed to the 80 training trials that Babb and 
Crystal use for their long/short delay procedure (2006b). Therefore, the likelihood of 
the animals learning about an unexpected question are considerably reduced. 
Easton and Eacott (2008) argue that the experience in the sample phases of the task 
is merely a reflection of their natural exploratory behaviour. In addition, as during the 
sample phases the animals are unaware of which object they will be habituated to, 
and in which context they will be tested in at the point of exploration, good 
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performance at test relies on flexible use of the memory for the initial acquisition 
phase. 
It has been reasoned therefore that the task of Eacott et al. (2005) that was 
replicated in Chapter 2 successfully demonstrates and fulfils the criteria of episodic-
like memory as proposed by Clayton and colleagues (2003). Moreover, as this task 
is able to dissociate recollection and familiarity in the same animals in the same 
trials, it lends support to dual-component theories of recognition memory which state 
that recollection and familiarity are separate and independent mental processes (e.g. 
Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Jacoby, 1983a, 1983b; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 
1980; O‟Reilly & Norman, 2002; Tulving, 1985). Despite providing further evidence 
for the presence of episodic-like memory (as defined by what-where-which) in non-
human animals, there has been some criticism surrounding the appropriate 
definition. Cheke and Clayton (2010) suggest that although the „which‟ component is 
phenomenologically more akin to human episodic memory, it cannot be extricated 
from the elements of „what‟ and „where‟ and so „which‟ could be acting as a specifier 
for „where‟ i.e. a place of work could be considered a contextual cue (which) or a cue 
for location (where). They suggest therefore that the component of „when‟ is 
essential in validating the memory is for a specific episode as opposed to timeless 
factual information regarding spatial distinctions. Yet Eacott and Easton (2009) point 
out that although episodic memory is in this respect the memory for the spatial 
arrangement of objects (what-where), what is crucial is linking this memory content 
to a particular past episode (which). This broader definition of episodic memory 
therefore views „which‟ not as a context or background but as a means of identifying 
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a particular episode not excluding any temporal identifiers. Eacott and Easton 
suggest that “the cue words what, where and which should not themselves be over 
analysed, merely acting as a short-hand description of the content of the memory” 
(p. 2277). 
Yet whether episodic-like memory is evidenced by demonstrations of what-where-
when or what-where-which, there still exists the fundamental question of whether or 
not this is relatable to human episodic memory. Certainly there are those who 
suggest that such memories bear no relevance to human episodic memory 
(Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008). In attempting to answer 
this question it becomes pertinent to address the issue of why such an ability in non-
human animals would have evolved. It has been argued that the evolutionary 
advantage of episodic memory may lie in the planning for future events as opposed 
to the recalling of past ones (Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007). Certainly in the case of scrub-jays caching has been shown to be 
affected by food perishability and competition (Clayton, Dally, Gilbert, & Dickinson, 
2005; de Kort et al., 2007). More recently, it has been reported that scrub-jays can 
differentiate from its current and future motivational state, and can cache different 
food types accordingly (Correia, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007; Raby, Alexis, 
Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007), challenging the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis which claims 
that it is only humans who can anticipate future needs (see Suddendorf & Corballis, 
1997). However, whether this ability has evolved specifically for those species that 
cache or whether it has evolved for different reasons is still being questioned (see 
Grodzinski & Clayton, 2010). Cheke and Clayton (2010) warn however, that the 
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falsification of the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis may detract research from focusing on 
the true nature of animal prospection. Acting for a motivational state in the future 
over one in the present does not necessarily prove the existence of episodic future 
thinking particularly considering that studies with human participants fail to provide 
such evidence (Bone, Hey, & Suckling, 2009).  
Another way of discerning whether or not such episodic-like memories are a true 
reflection of episodic memory in humans is to study the underlying neural substrates 
of the associated memory systems. Chapter 3 addressed this issue by investigating 
the effect of bilateral lesions to the hippocampus on episodic-like memory. If 
recollection is hippocampally dependent and familiarity is independent of this, relying 
not on the hippocampus but on a distinct system involving the perirhinal cortex of the 
temporal lobe and the medial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus (Aggleton & Brown, 
1999; Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Fortin, Wright, & Eichenbaum, 2004; Mayes, 
Holdstock, Isaac, Hunkin, & Roberts, 2002; Yonelinas, et al., 2002), then 
performance in the E-maze task which can dissociate the two,  should reflect this. 
The results from Chapter 3 (see section 6.2) were unexpected. Despite the results of 
Chapter 2, no demonstrations of episodic-like memory were observed in any of the 
three groups, including the Sham group, although it was expected that the HPC 
group would perform at chance levels as previous studies have implicated the 
hippocampus in recollection and/or familiarity (Fortin, et al., 2004; Langston & Wood, 
2006; Manns, et al., 2003; Sauvage, Fortin, Owens, Yonelinas, & Eichenbaum, 
2008; Wais, et al., 2006; Wixted & Squire, 2004). In addition, the behaviour of the 
Partial HPC group was more comparable to the Sham group, therefore although no 
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conclusions regarding the effect of bilateral lesions to the hippocampus on episodic-
like memory could be confidently drawn, the effect of such partial lesions can be 
questioned.  
Histological analyses showed that the nature of the partial lesions were more dorsal 
than ventral despite not being targeted as such. Yet it is the dorsal, not ventral 
hippocampus that has been implicated in spatial memory tasks (Bannerman et al., 
1999; Bannerman et al., 2002a; Bannerman et al., 2002b; Bannerman et al., 2004; 
Hock & Busney, 1998; Kjelstrup et al., 2002; McHugh, Deacon, Rawlins & 
Bannerman, 2004; Pothuizen, Zhang, Jongen-Relo, Feldon & Yee., 2004), although 
this is not a ubiquitous view (De Hoz, Knox & Morris, 2003; Ferbinteanu & 
McDonald, 2000; Ferbinteanu, Ray & McDonald, 2003). Therefore, as the Partial 
HPC group appeared more comparable to the Sham group, is it then that the dorsal 
lesions were not sufficient enough to produce a significant memory deficit? 
Disagreement within this area stems partly from the fact there is no independent and 
objective criteria defining what exactly constitutes the dorsal and ventral 
hippocampus. Bannerman and colleagues (1999) suggested that the dorsal 
hippocampus be considered as 50% of total hippocampal volume starting at the 
septal pole, with the ventral hippocampus constituting the remaining half. However, 
this was not based on any independent or objective criteria.  The current study 
adopted a more stringent criteria based on previous studies (Broadbent, Squire & 
Clark, 2004; Jones et al., 2007). The similarity of the Partial HPC group to the Sham 
group as opposed to the HPC lesion group appear to lend support to Broadbent and 
colleagues (2004) who reported that only near complete lesions (75-100%) were 
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sufficient to produce a deficit in object recognition memory and that larger 
hippocampal lesions are needed to impair recognition memory than are needed to 
impair spatial memory. Future studies may wish to also consider genomic-anatomic 
evidence which suggests that there are in fact three (certainly molecular) domains, 
namely dorsal, intermediate, and ventral which possess clear neuronal connectivity 
patterns (Dong, Swanson, Che, Fanselow, & Toga, 2009). Only by clarifying the 
boundaries of these domains will arbitrary definitions stop being imposed and 
hopefully inconsistencies in behavioural evidence will subsequently be reduced.  
Irrespective of the debate as to whether episodic memory and other forms of 
declarative memory have shared neural substrates (Squire et al., 2004) or whether 
episodic memory alone is reliant on a dissociable neural network (Aggleton & Brown, 
1999), the role of the hippocampus is considered vital. Episodic tasks have been 
shown to be significantly impaired in patients with damage to the hippocampus and 
fornix (Aggleton et al., 2000; Scoville & Milner, 1957; Squire & Zola, 1996) 
suggesting reliance on the hippocampal system. This has also been shown to be the 
case in non-human animals (Easton et al., 2009; Langston & Wood, 2006). This 
would therefore suggest the what-where-which memory probed in the episodic-like 
tasks is at least in some way, analogous to human episodic memory. 
6.4 Episodic Memory in Humans: 
As this thesis is one that places attention on methodology, the final chapter aimed to 
address the issue as to whether episodic-like memory in animals, as demonstrated 
in previous chapters (see Chapters 2 and 4), is analogous to the experience of 
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episodic memory in humans. At the point of testing, no such study had considered 
the application tasks of tasks specifically created to investigate episodic-like memory 
in animals to human participants in order to determine if similar patterns of data 
would emerge. The remember/know procedure (Tulving, 1985) was the chosen 
methodology for the final chapter as it was deemed comparable to the task of Eacott 
et al. (2005) in which recollection and familiarity were dissociable. Experiments 
within this chapter manipulated the remember/know procedure in order to investigate 
how what-where-which memory as shown in previous chapters, and what-where-
when memory would present themselves in humans. In addition, this would allow for 
observations to be made regarding the level of importance that occasion setters, 
such as temporal and contextual ones, hold in human episodic memory. 
Several interesting issues emerged out of the series of experiments in Chapter 5, 
most notably was the issue that other strategies such as strength of memory trace 
were being used to solve the episodic questions, in particular the what-where-when 
questions. This has clear implications for the continuing debate surrounding whether 
remember and know judgements are a reflection of recollection and familiarity 
respectively (e.g. Kelley & Jacoby, 1998; Yonelinas, 2001b) lending support to dual-
process models of recognition memory, or if in fact they are a reflection of different 
degrees of memory strength (e.g. Donaldson, 1996; Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Dunn, 
2004, 2008; Hirshman & Henzler, 1998; Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Shimamura & 
Wickens, 2009) as suggested by the signal-detection account.  Although the idea 
that remember/know judgements may reflect different degrees of memory strength 
as opposed to different memory processes was originally recognised by dual-
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process theorists (e.g. Gardiner, 1988), a variety of empirical dissociations were 
used to refute the strength-based interpretation (e.g. Gardiner & Java, 1990; Geraci, 
McCabe, & Guillory, 2009). However, in a comprehensive review of the literature, 
Dunn (2004) showed that the majority of findings that were once considered 
problematic for the signal-detection point of view are in fact fully compatible with it. 
Furthermore, Dunn (2008) suggested that it is not the case that the signal-detection 
model can explain any outcome, rather many experiments have produced results 
that would be impossible to reconcile with a signal-detection model but can be 
explained by a dual-process account.  
The question remains therefore, as to whether the results from the novel 
remember/know task adapted in Chapter 5 can lend support to either of these 
theories. In the standard dual-process interpretation of remember/know judgements, 
a remember judgement is made when recollection occurs (i.e. recollection is an 
either/or categorical process) and is characterised by high confidence and high 
accuracy. A know judgement is made when familiarity occurs and is accompanied by 
lower confidence levels and chance levels of accuracy. The signal-detection 
interpretation states that a remember judgement is made when memory strength 
exceeds a high criterion and know judgements when the strength of the memory 
signal only exceeds the next lower criterion (Donaldson, 1996). Remember 
judgements are almost invariably made with higher confidence and higher accuracy 
than are know judgements (Wixted & Stretch, 2004). The results from the series of 
experiments Chapter 5 cannot claim to lend support to either interpretation for 
several reasons. Firstly, a dual-process interpretation of the results fails to explain 
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the high proportion and high accuracy levels of know responses for the episodic 
questions and the differences that were apparent between them. Although it was 
reasoned that strength of memory trace could be contributory factor, the results from 
Experiment 5d (Condition 2) in which the use of this strategy was discouraged, 
produced similar results, particularly for what-where-when questions. Considering 
this, it was concluded that other unidentified strategies, in addition to strength of 
memory trace, may be having an effect on the results. Secondly, a signal-detection 
interpretation of the results also does not explain the observed differences between 
the two episodic questions. Although Wixted (2009) suggests that adopting a signal-
detection view of remember/know judgments does not have to result in the dismissal 
of the dual-process view of recognition memory (see also Wixted & Mickes, 2010), 
he does admit that the lack of neuropsychological evidence is a hindrance in the 
acceptance of signal-detection models.  
What is clear from the results of Chapter 5 is that strategy as well as task needs to 
be taken into consideration (Squire, 2004). As discussed in the General Introduction 
(see section 1.9) the issue of strength of memory trace is not restricted to human 
data (e.g. Kart-Teke et al., 2006). It may be that because the temporal aspect of an 
episode is reported to be the most difficult to recall (Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 
2003; Clayton & Russell, 2009; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2005), that 
such strategies are more available. Although at the time of testing the idea of 
applying episodic-like tasks to gather human data was novel, a recent study by 
Holland and Smulders (2010) (see also Hayne & Imuta, 2011) employed the use of a 
what-where-when task to investigate human episodic memory. Unlike the task in 
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Chapter 5 which was based on the Remember/Know procedure, their task was 
based on Clayton & Dickinson‟s scrub-jay task in which participants had to hide 
different coin types (what) in different locations (where) on two different occasions 
(when). The participants in the study were either instructed to memorise the what-
where-when information or they were unaware of the fact that their memory would be 
tested. From the results the authors suggest that although episodic memory was 
being used to solve the task, they admitted that some aspects of the task could be 
solved by using different or additional memory systems. Furthermore the authors 
conclude that the most episodic aspect of the task is linking objects to location, 
rather than any temporal aspect.  
A crucial difference between the task of Holland and Smulders (2010) and the task 
used in Chapter 5, is that their task does not allow for the dissociation between 
recollection and familiarity and so cannot easily dissociate between any episodic and 
semantic memory systems being utilised. Although they refute the possibility that 
strength of memory trace is being used as a strategy, the issue of strategy is again 
apparent here. In addition, such a hide-and-seek task allows reliance to be placed on 
the capacity to store memories for what was hidden, where and when it was hidden, 
rather than episodically recalling the information.  
Such studies as those detailed in Chapter 5 and above have important implications 
in the study of other non-verbal populations such as infants. Although it has been 
claimed that semantic memory precedes episodic memory in evolutionary and 
developmental terms (Tulving, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007b), this becomes 
difficult to assess considering that human episodic memory is said to involve mental 
time travel and communicating such a process in the absence of a verbal report 
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proves difficult. Hayne and Imuta (2011) also use a hide-and-seek task to examine 
episodic memory in three and four year old children, both verbally and behaviourally. 
Interestingly, when using both techniques, the component of „when‟ proved the most 
challenging. Although this may be reflecting that the ability to recall things in order 
requires processes that do not develop until later on (Friedman, 2005), it may also 
reflect that the ability to use alternative strategies such as those discussed do not 
precede this development. Concentrating on developing non-verbal tasks for 
example by modifying the task in Chapter 5, would allow for further investigation into 
the appropriate definition of episodic memory and the strategies that can be used to 
solve such tasks. Furthermore, it would allow for the development of a universal test 
of episodic memory that is not restricted by language or culture.  
6.5 Conclusions 
Within this thesis episodic-like memory defined as what-where which has been 
successfully demonstrated and has been shown to fulfil the three criteria of episodic-
like memory deemed essential by Clayton, Bussey, and Dickinson (2003) i.e. 
content, structure, and flexibility. However, issues surrounding methodology 
prevented conclusions being drawn as to the effect of bilateral lesions to the 
hippocampus on episodic-like memory as is defined here. What is apparent from 
Chapters 2 through 4, is that the methodology of such animals studies is extremely 
sensitive in nature, an issue that is finally being addressed in the literature (Albasser 
et al., 2010). This is an important point to consider as without careful observation 
and in depth analyses of the results, a true interpretation of the behaviour cannot be 
made, nor can theoretical perspectives be attached.  
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The final chapter of this thesis also highlighted certain methodological sensitivities 
that are common to animal tasks (e.g. Kart-Teke et al., 2006). Despite manipulations 
to the methodology of the final chapter, it was clear that alternative strategies were 
being employed to solve the task and importantly such strategies were having 
differing effects on relatively similar episodic questions. One of the original questions 
put forward in the General Introduction was whether or not manipulating individual 
components of episodic memory would prove of consequence in human studies 
considering this has been shown not to be the case in animal studies (Eacott et al., 
2005; Eacott & Gaffan, 2005; Eacott & Norman, 2004). Initially it seems that the 
translation of episodic-like tasks in animals to episodic tasks in humans is not 
straight forward and perhaps not relatable. However, the author suggests that there 
are explanations for this. 
The issue of „what is when‟ (see General Introduction, Section 1.9) has received 
considerable attention in the animal literature yet is only beginning to be questioned 
in comparable human literature (Holland & Smulders, 2010). If there exists the 
possibility that an inappropriate definition of „when‟ can inadvertently facilitate the 
use of alternative strategies then such what-where-when memory is not truly 
episodic (Eacott & Easton, 2009). The benefit of using the what-where-which task 
(Eacott et al., 2005; Eacott & Norman, 2004) in Chapters 2 through 4 was that it did 
not allow for such criticisms (although see Cheke and Clayton, 2010). Yet the results 
from Chapter 5 tentatively suggest in humans at least, that such alternative 
strategies can affect memory for what-where-which also. If the difference between 
„when‟ and „which‟ is that they are merely two forms of an occasion setter then it 
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would be expected that alternative strategies would affect both components equally. 
However, as humans readily organise their lives according to a temporal framework 
(Roberts, 2008) the „when‟ component may be more susceptible to the interference 
of other strategies such as strength of memory trace (Friedman, 1993). This is 
particularly pertinent considering that the temporal aspect of an episode is the most 
difficult to recall (Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003; Clayton & Russell, 2009; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2005) and may therefore necessitate the use 
of alternative strategies. Perhaps future studies may wish to address the question of 
not only „what is when‟, but also „what strategy‟.  
 It may be that such differences in the defining the occasion setter may have differing 
evolutionary advantages for humans compared to animals. If this is the case, then 
the question as to whether episodic-like memory in animals is in fact relatable to 
episodic memory in humans is somewhat of a moot point. The underlying principles 
of episodic memory may be similar and in addition underlying neural substrates may 
concur, but the overall applications will always differ.  
Although it is clear that both animal and human studies have served to further our 
knowledge of episodic memory and the underlying neural substrates, this thesis has 
highlighted how future investigations must consider the exact definition of not only 
episodic memory as a whole, but also the definition of the individual components of 
episodic memory. If such consideration is not taken, and if Squire‟s (2004) warning 
about the importance of strategy is not heeded then as seen in previous tasks (e.g. 
Kart-Teke et al., 2006), conclusions will always be limited.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Recognition memory is associated with two different kinds of awareness: 
REMEMBERING and KNOWING. 
REMEMBERING: When you recollect something you have consciously experienced 
at that time. You are also able to consciously recall all aspects of the event e.g. 
location, time of day.  
KNOWING: When recognising something brings about a feeling of familiarity. You 
feel confident that this experience is familiar but you are unable to consciously recall 
any aspects of the said event e.g. you will not know where this feeling of familiarity 
comes from.  
REMEMBERING = RECOLLECTION OF A MEMORY INCLUDING RELATED 
INFORMATION 
Example: You bump into someone in town and you specifically remember them from 
a party you went to the other night.  
KNOWING = FAMILIARITY OF A MEMORY WITH NO EXTRA RELATED 
INFORMATION 
Example: You bump into someone and feel as though you know their face from 
somewhere but can‟t quite place where you have seen them before. 
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BEFORE YOU COMPLETE THE QUESTIONS PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU 
UNDERSTAND THE DEFINITIONS ABOVE. FEEL FREE TO REFER BACK TO 
THESE AT ANY POINT. 
YOU WILL HAVE 9 QUESTIONS TO ANSWER THAT WILL INVOLVE: 
1: Answering the question. 
2: Stating whether you remember or know.  
* There will be times when you feel that you do not know what the answer is – in 
this case circle GUESS. 
3: State how confident you are of your answer (1=Not Confident – 5=Confident). 
If you choose the guess option you do not need to rate your confidence level. 
Please think carefully when you are answering all aspects of these questions. 
Please create the following code that will be specific to you (The first 2 letters of 
your surname, the month of your birth, and the first 2 letters of your place of birth – 
e.g. Smith, August, Plymouth = SM08PL). 
Your code:…………………………………………. 
Signature: ………………………………………….     
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Q1. WHICH OF THESE SYMBOLS HAVE YOU SEEN BEFORE? 
A:      B: 
           
Answer (circle your choice):  
A  B 
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
Q2: ON WHAT BACKGROUND DID YOU SEE THIS OBJECT IN THIS LOCATION? 
 
Answer (circle your choice):  
A: ZEBRA  B: CHEQURED 
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How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
 
Q3. ON WHICH SLIDE DID YOU SEE THIS SYMBOL IS THIS PARTICULAR LOCATION? 
 
Answer (circle your choice):  
A: 1ST SLIDE  B: 2ND SLIDE 
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
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Q4. ON WHAT BACKGROUND DID YOU SEE THIS SYMBOL IN THIS PARTICULAR 
LOCATION? 
 
Answer (circle your choice):  
A: ZEBRA  B: CHEQURED 
   
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident)  
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Q5. ON WHICH SLIDE DID YOU SEE THIS SYMBOL IN THIS PARTICULAR LOCATION? 
 
Answer (circle your choice):  
A: 1ST SLIDE  B: 2ND SLIDE 
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
Q6. WHICH OF THESE SYMBOLS HAVE YOU SEEN BEFORE? 
A:      B: 
          
Answer (circle your choice):  
A  B 
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
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How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
Q7. ON WHICH SLIDE DID YOU SEE THIS SYMBOL IN THIS PARTICULAR LOCATION? 
 
Answer (circle your choice):  
A: 1ST SLIDE B: 2ND SLIDE 
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
Q8. WHICH OF THESE SYMBOLS HAVE YOU SEEN BEFORE? 
A:      B: 
       
Answer (circle your choice):  
A  B 
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
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Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
Q9. ON WHAT BACKGROUND DID YOU SEE THIS SYMBOL IN THIS PARTICULAR 
LOCATION? 
 
Answer (circle your choice):  
A: ZEBRA  B: CHEQURED 
    
 
How did you come to this decision (circle your choice)? 
Remember  Know  Guess 
How confident are you of this decision (circle your choice)? 
(not confident) 1 2 3 4 5 (confident) 
 
